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ABSTRACT 
 In 1974, the Conference on College Composition and Communication passed “Students’ 
Right to Their Own Language” (SRTOL), a statement which encouraged teachers of English to 
“have the experiences and training that will enable them” to value the dialects and cultures that 
their students bring into the classroom. Since the passage of this document, critics have debated 
if, how and why SRTOL can be implemented in the classroom. This dissertation seeks to expand 
the understanding of “Students Right to Their Own Language” by examining how the document 
speaks on behalf of teachers and students and the implications of doing so. I argue that by 
understanding how the CCCC speaks on behalf of others, we can better understand the 
sociopolitical implications of speaking on behalf of others.  
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Introduction: 
Understanding the Necessity of “Students’ Right to Their Own Language” 
 
 This dissertation is about speaking on behalf of others and how it is done in “Students’ 
Right to Their Own Language,” a resolution/position statement produced by the Conference on 
College Composition and Communication (CCCC). Approved by the CCCC in 1974, SRTOL 
advocated that teachers respect the dialects students bring to the classroom. This controversial 
document, contrary to popular belief, did not insist that teachers engage in the explicit teaching 
of dialect nor did it call for teachers to dismiss outright the teaching of “standard” English
1
; 
rather, SRTOL encouraged teachers to become more informed about linguistics and to find ways 
to work with dialect speakers in a thoughtful and respectful manner (McPherson, “Language” 
75-76). Here is the resolution: 
We affirm the students' right to their own patterns and varieties of language--the 
dialects of their nurture or whatever dialects in which they find their own identity 
and style. Language scholars long ago denied that the myth of a standard 
American dialect has any validity. The claim that any one dialect is unacceptable 
amounts to an attempt of one social group to exert its dominance over another. 
Such a claim leads to false advice for speakers and writers and immoral advice for 
humans. A nation proud of its diverse heritage and its cultural and racial variety 
will preserve its heritage of dialects. We affirm strongly that teachers must have 
the experiences and training that will enable them to respect diversity and uphold 
the right of students to their own language. (710-11)
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SRTOL thus serves as a tool for advocacy. SRTOL advocates for students by insisting 
that teachers and school systems respect students’ language practices; additionally, SRTOL 
advocates for teachers by insisting that teachers have the training to help them work with 
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linguistically diverse populations. To do this, the writers of the document spoke on behalf of 
these groups, articulating their thoughts, opinions, and experiences. This dissertation will go into 
detail about how SRTOL does this, while also, and more generally, exploring the implications of 
speaking on behalf of others. 
 To understand why the CCCC felt the need to advocate for others, it is important to 
understand how SRTOL relates to educational policies and practices in the United States. First 
and foremost, SRTOL is an American document. Not only is it produced by an American 
organization, but it deals with quintessential American issues experienced during the 1960s and 
1970s: issues related to diversity, racism, standardized testing, integration, and assimilation of 
students into the classroom. In fact, in important ways SRTOL is a reflection of and a response 
to the Civil Rights and Black Power movements of the 1970s. And it is an implicit repudiation of 
the lesser known Hawaiian Standard English School Program, while also serving as a precursor 
to the 1979 “Ann Arbor” case. 
 In 1979, Judge Charles Joiner ruled in favor of eleven African American families who 
accused administrators and teachers at Martin Luther King, Jr., Elementary School in Ann Arbor, 
Michigan of routinely placing those who spoke African American English Vernacular (AAEV) 
in special education classes and wrongly labeling some of the children learning disabled. (Labov 
167-68; 193). Most importantly, the attorneys representing the families successfully proved that 
the negative attitudes teachers and administrators had towards AAEV impeded the students’ 
academic success. As stated by Judge Joiner: “Research indicates that the black dialect or 
vernacular used at home by black students in general makes it more difficult for such children to 
read because of teachers’ unconscious but evident attitudes toward the home language causes a 
psychological barrier to learning by the student” (qtd. in Ball and Lardner 473).  The teachers’ 
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attitudes, both evident and unconscious, centered upon the belief that AAEV was nothing more 
than faulty English and was a reflection of intellectual inferiority. This seemingly was verified 
through the Wepman test, which today describes itself as a test that can assess “the child’s ability 
to recognize the fine differences between phonemes used in English speech. The examiner reads 
aloud forty pairs of words, and the child indicates, verbally or gesturally, whether the words in 
each pair are the same or different” (Western Psychological Services). According to William 
Labov, the problem with the test given to the Ann Arbor children was that it “included a number 
of oppositions that are mergers in Black English Vernacular: pin vs. pen, sheaf vs. sheath, clothe 
vs. clove and so forth” (169). In other words, the children were unable to make distinctions 
between each pair of words because these words are (practically) homonyms in AAEV. Thus, it 
was not surprising that the school had initially labeled the children “retarded” and had 
misdiagnosed them as having hearing difficulties (Kaiser C4).  
 Of course, the problems associated with the testing of dialect speakers are addressed in 
SRTOL. For example, readers of SRTOL will notice that in a section on standardized testing, 
SRTOL criticizes standardized test designers for assuming that everyone uses the same dialect, 
comes from the same socioeconomic background, and has the same life experiences. The CCCC 
points out that people interpreting test results “must recognize the biases built into the tests and 
be aware of the purpose behind the tests. Used carelessly, standardized tests lead to erroneous 
inferences as to students’ linguistic abilities and create prejudgments in the minds of teachers, 
counselors, future employers, and the students themselves” (720). Thus, a student who comes 
from a home in which the family uses the words “cabinet” and “pop” should not be penalized for 
not knowing what cupboards and soda are. Likewise, a student who says, “I am making 
groceries” should not be considered intellectually inferior because the student does not say, “I 
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am going to the grocery store.” Yet, standardized tests penalize students because they do not 
conform to the “knowledge” the standardized tests say students should have.  
While the “Students’ Right” document preceded the Ann Arbor case, it nonetheless 
anticipated what happened at Martin Luther King, Jr., Elementary School. Administrators and 
teachers interpreting the Wepman and other tests enrolled, or tried to enroll, “five students in 
classes and programs for the mentally handicapped” and enrolled, or attempted to enroll, “two 
[students] in classes for learning disabled children.” Moreover, court documents show that three 
students “were tracked . . .  at lower levels of group instruction” and several were unable to 
progress to higher grades (Labov 168). According to William Labov, Geneva Smitherman, who 
served as an expert witness for the plaintiffs, was well aware of the “linguistic problems in the 
tests”; she was also aware, according to Labov, that school reports showed that teachers and 
administrators unknowingly used characteristics of AAEV in justifying the placement of the 
students (Labov 170).  
Of course, this wasn’t the first time that standardized tests had been used against students 
who were linguistically different from the norm. In 1920, white middle-class parents in 
Honolulu, Hawaii insisted territorial officials create an educational system that separated 
English-speaking students from those not considered proficient in standard English. Known as 
English Standard schools, these schools were established all over Hawaii, starting in 1924. 
Legally, English Standard schools could not discriminate against the majority non-white 
population, though in reality, they did (Young 120-22). The goals of the schools were to 
facilitate the learning of standard English speakers without having them exposed to Hawaiian 
Creole (also referred to as Pidgin) and other languages and to promote the supremacy of 
American values while downplaying Asian cultural beliefs and practices. To enter an English 
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Standard school, perspective applicants had to perform well on verbal, and, if applicable, written 
tests (Hughes 70-76). 
The main issue with English Standard schools revolves around the definition of standard 
English. What is standard English and who has the right to determine who is fluent in standard 
English? From a theoretical perspective, it is difficult to define standard English. After all, 
people within one community may pronounce words, construct sentences, use punctuation and 
employ phrases that deviate from others within the same community. This is why SRTOL 
discusses the idea of “standard” English being a “myth.” After all, there are New Yorkers who 
pronounce the “r” at the end of the word “car” and others who do not (Milroy and Milroy 17); 
there are some Virginians who say, “Whatcha know good?” and others who say, “How are you?” 
Commonly, many people look at standard English as “written language of established writers 
[that] is typically codified in English grammar texts. It is perpetuated to a large extent in formal 
institutions, such as schools, by those responsible for English language education” (Wolfram and 
Schilling-Estes 10). The concept of standard English reflects what James Milroy and Lesley 
Milroy call the “ideology of standardization.” The ideology of standardization provides 
justification for teachers, editors, and the like to promote a type of uniformity within language 
(19). 
We can see the ideology of standardization play out in the creation of the English 
Standard school system. In 1920, the president of the Territorial Normal and Training School in 
Hawaii described what he termed “Hawaii’s English problem,” which was a listing of what he 
deemed to be nonstandard English features. According to him, “Inability to hear English sounds 
correctly, faulty enunciation, a peculiar inflection and the use of certain local idioms are [the] 
chief characteristics [of the problem]” (qtd. in Tamura, “English Only” 49). He, like the middle-
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class parents who complained, never considered the idea that the varying enunciations, 
inflections, and local idioms might reflect a new form of English—Hawaiian English—a 
particular standard within a particular community in Hawaii. Instead, parents and some school 
officials argued that the people of Hawaii needed to sound like the people from the mainland of 
the United States.  
Therefore, students who could not show their fluency in the standard English that 
territorial officials deemed to be acceptable were forced to attend district schools. Judith Hughes 
recounts the story of Maemae Elementary School, a district school in Honolulu that was 
converted into an English Standard school in 1940. The students attending Maemae who wished 
to stay in the school had to take an entrance exam in which the students had to enunciate words 
and numbers; modify verb tenses; and read stories. Because three-fourths of the students did not 
pass the exam, they were expected to transfer from Maemae and continue their education at other 
district schools (77). When parents petitioned the school officials, parents noted that the  
selective grouping of students according to their ability to speak and write the 
English language is unfair and entirely too prejudicial because it is the duty of 
your servants in these schools to train the young children in the manner of 
speaking and writing the English language correctly. This practice should be 
entirely removed or greatly modified. (qtd. in Hughes 77-78) 
Notice that the parents find the testing to be “unfair” and “prejudicial” against their children. It 
was not that their children did not know English. More than likely, the children probably did. 
(After all, the district schools emphasized English within their curriculum.) The students 
probably spoke with an accent and perhaps used grammatical structures that did not conform to 
what the examiners wanted.  In his research on English Standard schools, Morris Young notes 
7 
 
that “examiners were prompted to note errors in the TH sound, lip movement and word endings, 
expression and phrasing” (123-24). Not surprisingly, a 1947 study concluded that “Japanese, 
Hawaiians, Part-Hawaiians and Filipinos were underrepresented” in the English Standard 
schools (Hughes 80).  
 Those attending district schools had teachers who did not understand how to work with 
linguistically diverse speakers. According to Tamura, there were teachers who belittled Creole 
and the way students spoke it; and there were other teachers who asked students to teach them 
Creole so that they as teachers could help students see the differences between Creole and 
standard English (“Power” 437-38). The latter were teachers who embraced the principles of 
SRTOL long before SRTOL even came into being. 
 The Hawaiian school system, however, replicated the sociopolitical structure of Hawaii. 
Whites (especially those of non-Portuguese heritage) who could speak standard English were on 
top. The language that they spoke, standard  English, represented the “European American 
oligarchy” that dominated the islands soon after the U.S. overthrew the monarchy in 1893 
(Tamura, “Power” 439-40). Those who didn’t speak standard English, especially Native 
Hawaiians, may have done so out of loyalty for their ancestors, many of whom worked the 
plantations in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Eileen H. Tamura provides a 
1934 quote from a young girl who explained the pressure she felt to speak Creole: “If we speak 
good English, our friends usually say, ‘Oh you’re trying to be hybolic (i.e., to act high and 
mighty), yeah!” (qtd. in Tamura, “Power” 440). In addition to creating schools in which standard 
English reigned supreme, territorial officials also banned foreign-language newspapers, foreign 
language schools (especially Japanese schools), and the speaking of Hawaiian in schools 
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(Tamura, “Power” 440-41; Young 118). Thus, speaking Hawaiian Creole served as a means of 
maintaining a culture that was attacked by territorial officials (Tamura, “Power” 440). 
 Unfortunately, SRTOL does not specifically reference the educational system in Hawaii. 
If it had, I believe that those who read the document would have been able to understand better 
the history of how educational systems in the United States codified linguistic discrimination. 
The inclusion of Hawaii’s history might not have made opponents accept the document, but it 
would have at least shown them that the U.S. has a history of institutionalizing linguistic 
discrimination in schools. Therefore, readers of SRTOL should note that Hawaii systematized 
across the territory (state) what had been systematized at King Elementary School: the 
penalization of students who do not speak (or write) standard English.  
One of the things I want to highlight about these cases is not just how SRTOL is reflected 
in them, but also how people speak on behalf of others, especially, it seems, when language 
issues are prominent. Notice that the parents of the children affected by the tests advocated for 
them through the judicial system. As explicitly noted in the Hawaii case, those who were not 
allowed into the Hawaii Standard schools were primarily Hawaiian or Asian children. In the Ann 
Arbor case, the students who were marginalized from the mainstream were those who came from 
housing projects. As Geneva Smitherman points out, the Ann Arbor parents “were a small group 
of single female heads of household, who did not enjoy the support of the other (middle and 
upper class) Black parents at King School” (Word 13). However, in order for the families in both 
cases to speak on behalf of their children, they had to find lawyers willing to speak on behalf of 
them. 
Speaking on behalf of others occurs in many forms. In this dissertation I highlight two 
ways in which people speak on behalf of others. The first is through speaking about others.  In 
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particular, I emphasize how speaking about others is a form of speaking on their behalf. After all, 
whenever we discuss who someone is, what someone thinks or values, we speak about that 
person in such a way that we may, whether we know it or not, speak on his or her behalf (Alcoff 
9). Let me offer a more recent example that relates to SRTOL. 
In 1996, the Oakland, California United School District Board approved its “Resolution 
on Ebonics” which called for students to learn standard English even if it meant using Ebonics 
(another term for AAEV) to do so. Though the school board focused on students learning 
standard English, the media commentators primarily focused on the teachers teaching Ebonics. 
In one of several “whereas” clauses that sought to address linguistic differences, the Oakland 
School Board spoke about students this way: 
. . . the standardized tests and grade scores of African American students in 
 reading and language arts skills measuring their application of English skills are  
 substantially below state and national norms and that such deficiencies will be 
 remedied by the application of a program featuring African Language Systems 
 principles in instructing African American children both in their primary language 
 and English. (qtd. in Perry and Delpit 144) 
In this passage African American students are described as bilingual. The school board points 
out that the students speak a “primary language” that is not English. Likewise, the school board 
asserts that African American students do not test well in English. The students are being 
described, spoken about, and portrayed. Since readers are not reading what students have to say 
about themselves, readers must rely on the Oakland School Board to speak about—and thus on 
behalf of—the students it serves.   
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 Likewise, this resolution also encourages others to speak about and on behalf of people 
by speaking about their dialect. As Theresa Perry notes, commentators did not discuss the 
rhetoric of AAEV; rather they focused on grammatical features, which are easier to notice, 
critique, and stigmatize (Perry 12). Columnist Ellen Goodman described the dialect as a “second-
class language for a second-class life” (qtd. in Perry 11); and editorial writer Brent Staples 
referred to the dialect as “broken English” and “degraded English” (qtd. in Lakoff 241).  
Linguists who went to the media to counteract these assertions and provide a more complex 
understanding of dialects, languages, and slang found themselves, in the words of Robin 
Tolmach Lakoff, “cut off after a few seconds or left to die on the cutting-room floor” (243). In 
other words, the Ebonics debate really wasn’t much of a debate at all. It was an opportunity for 
people to voice their opinions on why AAEV was not a legitimate dialect. 
 Clearly those who speak AAEV may not like my assertion that Ellen Goodman and Brent 
Staples spoke on their behalf. After all, there had not been a vote in the AAEV-speaking 
community about who would and could not speak about their community. And to their readers, 
Goodman and Staples were describing the people they believed AAEV speakers actually to be. 
Put differently, they were speaking about and on behalf of others without the others’ permission.  
 Speaking about and on behalf of others happens all the time. Academics speak on behalf 
of others when they conduct research on and about those of various socioeconomic and cultural 
groups. Politicians speak on behalf of others when they convey how their constituents feel about 
a given subject. And religious leaders speak on behalf of others when they convey how God or a 
prophet might feel about a given behavior.  
 The second way in which we speak on behalf of others is to speak for others. Speaking 
for others is a form of advocacy. Someone who advocates for a group seeks to help the group 
11 
 
achieve justice. In this respect, the Oakland School Board resolution and SRTOL serve as a 
means of speaking for others. The Oakland School Board sought to ensure that its students 
received the funding and the support necessary to help improve their test scores in English. The 
CCCC sought to ensure that students not be subjected to linguistic discrimination. In fact, part of 
SRTOL states, “We affirm students’ right to their own patterns and varieties of language—the 
dialects of their nurture or whatever dialects in which they find their own identities and styles” 
(710).  Both organizations sought justice for a specific group of people.  
Thus, I define speaking on behalf of others as this: speaking on behalf of others is a 
speaker’s (or writer’s) attempt to describe, define, represent and/or re-present someone else’s 
values, perspectives, and experiences to an audience that may or may not include the person (or 
persons) represented.
3
 This dissertation will explore, then, how SRTOL not only speaks about 
but also speaks for students, teachers, professional organizations, identity communities, and the 
public at large. Whether spoken about or spoken for, these groups, I argue, find themselves 
nonetheless being spoken on behalf of by other people.   
 Just as SRTOL speaks about and for various groups, the document itself is likewise 
spoken about and spoken for by many others who wish to render it in particular ways. For 
example, the CCCC, because it commissioned the SRTOL statement, necessarily had to speak 
both about and for its importance to writing teachers. But as I will show in subsequent chapters, 
it could not do so without challenge. In fact, many writing teachers disputed how the CCCC 
described the needs and experiences of both teachers and students. If it seems that the layers of 
speaking on behalf of others are complex, this is because the rhetorical situation that produced 
and shaped SRTOL is also complex. To illustrate something of this complexity, I now turn 
attention to the scholar whose theoretical work on the rhetorical situation has been influential. 
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Lloyd F. Bitzer defines a rhetorical situation as “a complex of persons, events, objects, 
and relations presenting an actual or potential exigence which can be completely or partially 
removed if discourse, introduced into the situation, can so constrain human decision or action as 
to bring about the significance modification of the exigence” (“Rhetorical” 6). In paraphrasing 
this definition, three terms often receive distinct emphasis: exigencies, audience, and constraints. 
As I intend to show, all three terms bear greatly upon understanding the rhetorical situation 
within which the SRTOL document emerged. In fact, to understand how Bitzer’s rhetorical 
situation works in this context, I plan to examine briefly the history of the CCCC, since the 
organization is considered the author (or speaker) of the “Students’ Right” statement. I will also 
rely on the accounts of Geneva Smitherman, Stephen Parks, Elisabeth McPherson and others 
who have written about the history of STROL. Additionally, I will also discuss the events 
leading up to the formation of the document and the exigencies the document seeks to address.  
If, as Bitzer tells us, an exigence is “an imperfection marked by urgency; it is a defect, an 
obstacle” (“Rhetorical” 6), then surely one of the exigencies which led to the formation of the 
document was the inability of English teachers to work with students who spoke and wrote in 
dialects other than standard English.   
But, in order for English teachers to address this exigence, they also had to address the 
constraints that existed upon the range and kinds of actions available to them. Once they had 
confronted these constraints, however, they still had to fulfill their “function as mediators of 
change” (Bitzer, “Rhetorical” 7). In other words, the audience of SRTOL was implored not only 
to affirm the students’ right to their own language, but also to help “teachers  . . . have the 
experiences and training [that] will enable them” to support this goal (CCCC 711).  The debate 
regarding the acceptance and ultimate effectiveness of SRTOL centered on the primary audience 
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of college English teachers who were members of the CCCC, but who did not agree with the 
document; additionally, it also centered on the English teachers who agreed with the document, 
but believed they were powerless to remove the constraints which made it difficult to apply the 
document to the classroom. Lastly, the effectiveness of SRTOL centered on how well the CCCC 
could speak on behalf of its membership. In sum, by studying the rhetorical situation involved in 
producing SRTOL, we can see the exigencies, the constraints, and the audience(s) which the 
CCCC encountered. Once we study these features, separately and together, we can better see 
how the CCCC sought to speak on behalf of its membership and the students it sought to protect.  
Not only will I examine the rhetorical situation from Bitzer’s perspective, but I will also 
incorporate the theories of Linda Alcoff and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, two individuals who 
have theorized about the issues involved on speaking on behalf of others. To be precise, Bitzer’s 
rhetorical situation will serve as an analytic framework for my dissertation and Alcoff and 
Spivak will serve as the theoretical articulation of the problem of speaking for others. Alcoff’s 
and Spivak’s  theories help readers understand the social dimensions of speaking on behalf of 
others—that is, who has the power and the right to speak on behalf of others. To offer concrete 
examples of Alcoff’s and Spivak’s ideas, I will discuss Jacqueline Jones Royster’s article, 
“When the First You Hear Is Not Your Own” and Rigoberta Menchú’s testimonio, I, Rigoberta: 
An Indian Woman in Guatemala. Though Royster’s article and Menchú’s work do not explicitly 
theorize the concept of speaking on behalf of others, both works help give readers a sense of how 
those who are spoken on behalf of feel about those who speak on behalf of them. 
Thus, I have four goals for my dissertation: 1) to demonstrate how one important (but 
unaddressed) concern in making the SRTOL document was the problem of speaking on behalf of 
others; 2)  to demonstrate how the problem of speaking on behalf of others may be illuminated 
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when regarded through the conceptual framework of the rhetorical situation; 3) to examine how 
the SRTOL document was shaped by the rhetorical situation within which it emerged; and 4) to 
reveal how this particular rhetorical situation motivated people to speak on behalf of others, and 
in some measure, had a determinative effect on what they said in the document itself.  
Methodology: 
To accomplish my goals, I intend to discuss the concept of speaking for others as it 
pertains to SRTOL. Because the problem of speaking for others has been central to postcolonial 
and feminist studies, but not Rhetoric and Composition, I intend to show why it is necessary for 
the field of Rhetoric and Composition to pay more attention to the repercussions we face when 
we speak on behalf others, especially if those “others” are part of our primary audience. In fact, it 
seems that the field of Rhetoric and Composition has focused more on audience generally and 
not at all on the problem of speaking on behalf of one audience to another audience. For 
example, one of the more famous (and frequently cited) articles dealing with audiences is 
“Audience Addressed/Audience Invoked: The Role of Audience in Composition Theory” by 
Lisa Ede and Andrea Lunsford. They discuss the historical distinctions between “audience 
addressed” and “audience invoked” and the merging of these two audiences. What they don’t do, 
however, is address the problems inherent in the invoking and addressing of audiences when 
speaking on behalf of others. 
  Ede and Lunsford describe “audience addressed” as an audience that the writer knows 
well—if not personally, then demographically. The writer knows the audience’s ideological 
beliefs, age, religion, educational background, et cetera, and can take all of this information into 
consideration when writing a text. They use the term “audience invoked” to describe the 
audience the writer imagines, and that through various rhetorical strategies, might even actualize 
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into existence (78-83). We can see an example of “audience addressed” and “audience invoked” 
in the background statement and bibliography CCCC commissioned to justify the actual 
resolution/position statement to the teachers reading the piece. Here is what the SRTOL 
Committee wrote:  
The members of the Committee realized that the resolution would create 
controversy and that without a clear explanation of the linguistic and social 
knowledge on which it rests, many people would find it [SRTOL] 
incomprehensible. Therefore members of the Executive Committee requested a 
background statement which would examine some common misconceptions about 
language and dialect, define some key terms, and provide some suggestions for 
sounder, alternative approaches. (711)  
Not only does the CCCC recognize that its primary audience may be confused or baffled 
by the actual resolution/position statement, but it also anticipates what it needs to do to 
ameliorate the confusion. The CCCC simultaneously addresses the audience by explaining why 
the resolution is needed and invokes an audience when it not only imagines how the audience 
may react, but also attempts to counteract the audience’s reaction by creating this background 
statement. By simultaneously engaging in the process of invoking an audience and addressing an 
audience, the CCCC essentially sees itself as being able to speak on behalf of an audience. It 
could do this because it knew how to address the audience and it thought it would be able to 
persuade the audience to support the position statement. Perhaps that is why the organization 
wrote in the actual resolution/position statement: “We affirm the students’ right to their own 
language. . . . We affirm strongly that teachers must have the experiences and training that will 
enable them to respect diversity and uphold the right of students to their own language” (710-
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11). Notice that the resolution itself does not contain any hint of conflict among the membership; 
it is the background statement which hints that the members may not understand or may not 
agree with the document. The assumption is that everyone in the membership can see objectively 
the linguistic oppression that exist in society and thus the urgent exigence that compels action.  
In order to fully understand the concept of speaking for others in this context, I intend to 
examine the literature that addresses the formation of SRTOL. To this end, I want to do 
something that others have not done: examine these histories as repositories from which to glean 
the rhetorical situation that shaped the document. My dissertation, however, will highlight how 
the exigencies that existed within the rhetorical situation motivated the CCCC to speak on behalf 
of its membership and of the students. Readers will thus understand how the rhetorical situation 
shaped the formation and reception of SRTOL, the exigencies that motivated the CCCC to want 
to speak on behalf of others and the implications, both disciplinary and pedagogical, of the 
CCCC’s speaking on behalf of two distinct but related groups (of teachers and students). 
Likewise, readers will understand how the rhetorical audiences reacted to the CCCC and the way 
in which they responded by speaking on behalf of themselves and others. 
My first chapter will provide the theoretical background on the concept of speaking for 
others, especially as this concept has been conceived in the specialties of Postcolonial theory and 
Women’s Studies. To do this, I will use the works of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak and Linda 
Alcoff to help readers understand the complexities of speaking on behalf of others, and I will use 
texts by Royster and Menchú as works that exemplify the implications of doing so.  
 While Alcoff’s and Spivak’s theories are the foundation for understanding the 
repercussions for speaking on behalf of others, they do not help readers understand fully why 
people choose to engage in this process. Thus, I will argue that Bitzer’s rhetorical situation can 
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be used as a necessary complement to Alcoff’s and Spivak’s theories. After all, speaking on 
behalf of others is not just a theoretical concept. It is a rhetorical act. Bitzer’s theory can help 
readers understand how this rhetorical act is carried out in situations in which people speak for 
others. We can examine constraints that may help or impede the rhetorical audience from 
accepting the way in which speaker speaks on behalf of others. Likewise, we can examine how 
the rhetorical audience might respond and accept (or not accept) to the way in which speaker 
speaks on behalf of it. 
In order to examine the concept of the CCCC’s speaking for others, I devote chapter two 
towards examining briefly the literature on the history of the CCCC and its construction of 
SRTOL. To achieve this historical perspective, I will rely on Stephen Parks’s Class Politics: The 
Movement for the Students’ Right to Their Own Language; several essays by Geneva 
Smitherman, including “The Historical Struggle for Language Rights in the CCCC” and 
“’Students’ Right to Their Own Language’: A Retrospective”; and other books, articles, and 
scholarship that provides us with an historical overview of the document. Likewise, I will 
examine articles by supporters and opponents of the documents. This will help readers 
understand better the various issues supporters and opponents highlighted within SRTOL. All of 
these works provide us with valuable historical scholarship on the societal issues that led to the 
formation of the document, as well as subsequent attempts to enact SRTOL in our pedagogies. 
By examining the formation and application of SRTOL, I will be able to further discuss the 
exigencies and potential remedies the writers saw SRTOL addressing. 
After establishing the theoretical basis for the problem of speaking for others, and after 
reviewing the extant histories on the SRTOL document, I will then move to an analysis of this 
document using Bitzer’s rhetorical situation as my framework. To be precise, I will devote each 
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subsequent chapter to one of the three characteristics that Bitzer identifies as components of the 
rhetorical situation: exigencies, audiences, and constraints. I will then offer a concluding 
discussion that looks at the implications of my analysis. 
In chapter three, then, I will discuss Bitzer’s rhetorical situation and focus on his 
discussion of exigence. I will point out a major problem with his theory: Bizer does not focus on 
how the rhetor’s identity can either influence or discourage a rhetorical audience from addressing 
the exigence. Though I rely on Alcoff’s, Spivak’s and Royster’s discussions on identity, I will 
discuss the importance of James Paul Gee’s theory of institutional identity and affinity identity 
and how these identities contribute to how the CCCC interprets itself as on organization that can 
speak on behalf of others. Then I will show the relationship between how the CCCC perceives its 
institutional and affinity identity and how it shapes the way in which it frames the exigencies in 
SRTOL. 
Chapter four will examine Bitzer’s concept of the rhetorical audience. To understand how 
the rhetorical audience and other audiences responded to the rhetorical exigencies, I will use 
chapter four to examine articles and letters to editors regarding SRTOL to see how writers felt 
about the CCCC’s position and how they responded to the CCCC speaking on their behalf. I will 
discuss how Alcoff’s and Spivak’s theories can be used to understand how the critics responded 
to the way in which the CCCC spoke on behalf of them and how they, as critics, speak on behalf 
of others. Thus, this chapter will help readers better understand the implications of speaking on 
behalf of others. Likewise, I will use chapter four to discuss affinity identities and how the 
rhetorical audience created their own affinity identities based on their support and opposition to 
SRTOL. Understanding affinity identities can help readers visualize how the rhetorical defined 
19 
 
the role of English teacher. Moreover, this chapter will show how supporters and opponents 
speak about the opposing group and speak on behalf of their own affinity group. 
In the fifth chapter, I will discuss how Bitzer defines constraints and point to various 
constraints that existed which prevented the rhetorical audience from modifying the exigencies. 
These constraints included a politically conservative political climate that clashed with the 
progressive principles within SRTOL and the attempts to rescind SRTOL. Additionally, I will 
discuss the success and failures of SRTOL based on the way in which the CCCC spoke on behalf 
of its members and students. I will point out how SRTOL is important because it publically 
acknowledges the linguistic diversity of the country; the potential for linguistic domination; the 
need for teacher training; and the fact that students come into the classroom speaking “dialects of 
their nurture or whatever dialects in which they find their own identity and style” (710).  In many 
ways, STROL brings up the issues of who has the right to not only to enter the classroom but 
also who has the right to determine how one should speak in the classroom. Most importantly, by 
studying the history and the responses of SRTOL we can better gauge how the CCCC sought to 
speak on behalf of its membership and on behalf of the students who did not speak standard 
English. Using SRTOL, I will examine the positive and negative implications of the CCCC 
speaking on behalf of others and discuss ways in which the CCCC can create documents that will 
allow a space for members to disagree. To create these documents, I will show how the CCCC 
should think about addressing exigencies by examining how it engages in rituals of speaking, 
positionality, and representation.  
In my conclusion, I will apply what we can learn from the theoretical understandings of 
speaking on behalf of others to pedagogy. I will explore how teachers speak on behalf of others 
in the classroom through the use of various pedagogical techniques such as the Socratic method 
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and rivaling. I will argue that teachers need to be cognizant of how they speak on behalf of 
others and encourage students to do the same. 
Hopefully, this dissertation will shed light on how the field of Rhetoric and Composition 
engages in speaking for others. After all, many of us who teach in the field regularly engage in 
speaking for others in academia. Sometimes we play “devil’s advocate” during a classroom 
debate; sometimes we write articles or attend conferences in which we talk about and talk for 
first generational students or working class students, though we ourselves may not necessarily fit 
into these categories. In fact, speaking for others is so commonplace, we may not necessarily 
think about speaking for others as a rhetorical action. My dissertation, however, will examine a 
situation in which the field of Rhetoric and Composition needed to be cognizant of when, how, 
and why it spoke for its members and students. While the “success” of the document is 
debatable, what we do know is this: its acceptance as a document among teachers was dependent 
on how well the committee who created the document could represent (and/or re-present) the 
ideologies regarding language use and teaching among its members; and its legacy as a 
document is based on how it attempted to protect students, and, in some ways, speak on behalf of 
them by advocating that students be allowed to use their own voices—their own dialects—in the 
classroom. 
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Chapter One: 
The Problem of Speaking on Behalf of Others 
 
What Does It Mean to Speak on Behalf of Others? 
I define speaking on behalf of others as a speaker’s (or writer’s) attempt to describe, 
define, represent and/or re-present someone’s (or a group’s) theories and experiences to an 
audience.
4
 The concept of speaking on behalf of others can be represented like this: 
Speaking on Behalf of Others 
 
Speaking about Others  Speaking for Others 
As this visual representation suggests, speaking on behalf of others can encompass 
speaking about someone and/or speaking for someone. In this chapter I will discuss theorists 
Linda Alcoff, Jacqueline Jones Royster, and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. As I develop my 
chapter, I will write about Alcoff, Royster, and Spivak by describing and defining who they are 
and what they represent—in other words, I will speak (or write) about them. In this respect, by 
speaking about them and their works, I implicitly speak on their behalf. Why? Because I 
metaphorically “stand in” for them. While I use direct quotes for the reader to see what Alcoff, 
Royster, and Spivak “literally” say, I mediate their words and interpret their theories so that I, in 
the words of Alcoff, “speak in place of them” (9). I cannot do otherwise. In fact, I argue that all 
writers, including first-year college students, who incorporate reported speech in their writing, 
whether in the form of primary or secondary sources, always, to some extent, speak on behalf of 
the people whose words they incorporate in their writing. This, however, does not mean that 
writers speak for their sources, at least not in the sense of endorsing the positions held by any 
given source. 
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 I hope not to be misunderstood. Speaking for and speaking about, while related, are 
nonetheless distinct. When a speaker or writer wishes to advocate or “speak for” a group or an 
individual—such as when a lawyer advocates for a defendant, or a lobbyist advocates for an 
organization, or a human rights reporter advocates for a cause—that person is actively engaging 
in advocacy for a group or individual, not merely just describing and defining experiences and 
theories. “Speaking for others” always involves advocacy and thus constitutes one form of 
speaking on behalf of others. In fact, speaking for others cannot help but entail speaking about 
others. However, it is possible, after all, to speak about others without advocating for them. For 
example, when I discuss Alcoff, Royster, and Spivak in this chapter, I’m not advocating for a 
particular cause that they might individually or collectively embrace; and yet, by representing 
their perspectives, I am speaking on their behalf. To be clear, speaking about others is not the 
same as speaking for others, but they are interrelated. I speak about Alcoff, Royster and Spivak, 
but I do not speak for (as in advocate) them. 
Like Linda Alcoff, I recognize that the lines between “speaking for others” and “speaking 
about others” are not firmly drawn. (She does not use the term “speaking on behalf of others.”)  
Though I make a distinction between these terms, she contemplates the possibility that “speaking 
for” and “speaking about” others are intertwined: 
The conflation of [speaking for and speaking about others is] intentional on my 
part. There is an ambiguity in the two phrases: when one is speaking for others 
one may be describing their situation and thus also speaking about them. 
Similarly, when one is speaking about others, or simply trying to describe their 
situation or some aspect of it, one may also be speaking in place of them, that is, 
speaking for them. (9) 
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Speaking on behalf of others happens all of the time, especially if we live and work 
within a culture where people routinely speak about and (unintentionally or intentionally) for 
others. This is especially true in academia. In classrooms, students talk about how they and their 
friends feel regarding a particular issue; in faculty meetings, professors discuss how program 
changes affect students positively or adversely; at university board meetings, administrators 
discuss how funding (or lack thereof) affects professors and their productivity.
5
 I use these 
examples not only to show how often speaking about/for others is done, but also to show how 
ordinary, and how readily accepted the concept of speaking on behalf of others is. 
A cursory look at academic publications is instructive because here is where speaking on 
behalf of others is so commonplace that many readers may not even notice it when it occurs. To 
see how speaking on behalf of others is done in Rhetoric and Composition, for example, I 
encourage readers of this study to examine the second edition of Victor Villanueva’s anthology, 
Cross-Talk in Comp Theory: A Reader.  People interested in Rhetoric and Composition can read 
essays where writers speak about and for others. Examples include  Donald Murray’s “Teach 
Writing as a Process Not Product,” in which Murray speaks on behalf of students by describing 
how students feel when they receive papers back: “Year after year the student shudders under a 
barrage of criticism, much of it brilliant, some of it stupid, all of it irrelevant” (3); or Walter 
Ong’s “The Writer’s Audience Is Always a Fiction” in which Ong talks about and speaks on 
behalf of writers: “What do we mean by saying the audience is a fiction? Two things at least. 
First, that the writer must construct in his imagination, clearly or vaguely, an audience cast in 
some sort of role—entertainment seekers, reflective sharers of experience . . . and so on” (60); or 
Richard E. Miller’s “The Arts of Complicity: Pragmatism and the Culture of Schooling”  in 
which Miller discusses Paulo Freire’s influence on teachers in Rhetoric and Composition: “Freire 
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has given teachers a new way to see themselves as something other than mindless functionaries 
of the state apparatus responsible for tidying the prose of the next generation of bureaucrats” 
(656). These examples (and countless others like them) illustrate how speaking on behalf of 
others is unavoidable in academic discourse and most other discourses as well. Why then should 
it even be regarded as a problem? 
Maybe the reason why I initially read these articles and never noticed the fact that the 
authors were speaking on behalf of others is because I didn’t see anything controversial in their 
statements. Like Donald Murray’s student, I too have shuddered when reading criticism given to 
me by some of my professors. As a writer, I too understand how Ong forms his conclusions 
about how writers fictionalize audiences. As a teacher and a scholar in Rhetoric and 
Composition, I too know the influence Freire has had on the field. Perhaps it is safe to say that 
speaking about or for others is not a problem at all when readers agree or identify with what is 
said. 
But what happens when readers do not identify with what is said and thus do not play the 
role we expect the reader to play? What about the reader bold enough to ask Donald Murray: 
“How do you know students ‘shudder under a barrage of criticism’?” Or that student who tells 
Walter Ong, “To be honest, I never think of my audience performing any sort of role at all.” 
Maybe it is even possible to imagine Paulo Freire disputing Richard Miller’s interpretation of his 
ideas. After all, scholars and philosophers often complain that their ideas have been 
misunderstood or misrepresented by others. And while speaking on behalf of others may be an 
inevitability of academic discourse, and while it may be motivated by a desire to help people 
understand a different perspective, it is also vulnerable to rhetorical challenges and possible 
dangers.  
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This is why it is important to be aware of how one speaks on behalf of others. Writers 
should reflect on how they speak about others and consider the effects their works might have on 
the audience, especially if there is a possibility that there might be readers who are part of the 
group spoken about. Writers need to understand their own ideologies and how these ideologies 
inform the way writers approach topic. Most importantly, writers should consider the ethical 
responsibilities of speaking on behalf of others and whether or not they are representing a group 
fairly. 
There are many academics like myself in the field of Rhetoric and Composition who 
think about issues related to speaking on behalf of/speaking for others. For example, in the Gesa 
E. Kirsch and Joy S. Ritchie essay, “Beyond the Personal: Theorizing a Politics of Location in 
Composition Research,” Ritchie writes of how she encouraged two students to coauthor an essay 
with her because she was afraid of speaking about and for them (12).
6
 Kirsch, in a different 
essay, encourages writers who speak for others to not only understand the power implications of 
doing so, but to also explain to readers why they need to speak on behalf of others (“Opinion: 
Multivocal” 198-99). Paul Butler writes of how critics, such as Stanley Fish and Heather Mac 
Donald who are not in the field of Rhetoric and Composition, end up speaking about and 
speaking for the field (55-58).  Kelvin Monroe in “Writin da Funk Dealer: Songs of Reflections 
and Reflex/shuns” discusses how he has heard white students define blackness and who is black 
and who is a “white black person” (107).  
Perhaps the field’s best-known article about speaking on behalf of others is Jacqueline 
Jones Royster’s “When the First Voice You Hear Is Not Your Own.” Royster does an excellent 
job critiquing the way in which white scholars ignore, misinterpret, or talk over the scholarly and 
cultural contributions of African Americans in her article. Like the other articles mentioned 
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before, Royster explores the politics of speaking on behalf of others. I will return to Royster 
later, but for now, what I wish to point out is that what Royster and other theorists do not do, but 
what I seek to do in my study, is provide a comprehensive rhetorical understanding of why 
people engage in speaking on behalf of others.  
Much of the research I have found on speaking on behalf of others comes from the fields 
of women’s studies and postcolonial studies. For this project, I will therefore pay close attention 
to Linda Alcoff and Gayatri Chakravroty Spivak. Their works can help scholars in the field of 
Rhetoric and Composition better understand the power dynamics that occur among the speaker, 
audience, context, and the individual/group spoken for in any given situation. In fact, I will use 
this chapter to help readers understand how Alcoff and Spivak can be used to illuminate 
speaking on behalf of others within Rhetoric and Composition by putting their texts in 
conversation with Royster’s seminal essay and Rigoberta Menchú’s influential testimonio. 
 
Speaking about Others  
 In my definition of speaking on behalf of others, I note that when speakers engage in this 
rhetorical act, speakers often “re-present someone’s (or a group’s) theories and experiences to an 
audience.” Spivak uses the term “re-presention” (or Darstellung) to connote “rhetoric as trope” 
rather than “rhetoric as persuasion” (“Subaltern” 277). Re-presentation, thus, calls for the 
speaker to speak about, rather than speak for, other individuals or groups. As you read the 
upcoming section, you will see how Royster and Menchú depict various situations. In their 
depictions, you will notice how the authors choose to highlight certain issues, communities, and 
individuals over others. These depictions highlight how authors, when speaking about others, 
have to “[speak] in place” for the people and the communities they describe (Alcoff 9).    
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The Speaker and Her Contexts 
Though Alcoff’s postcolonial essay, “The Problem of Speaking for Others,” does not 
provide details about why people are motivated to speak for others, she does examine who gets 
to speak for others and why. Influenced by theories of Foucault and Deleuze, Alcoff encourages 
readers to examine the “rituals of speaking” which involve the speaker’s or writer’s social 
identity (which she calls “positionality” or “location”) and the “discursive context” (12). The 
discursive context involves the relationship “between the utterance/text and other utterances and 
texts as well as the material practices in the relevant environment” (12). In other words, the 
discursive context entails understanding the utterance made by the speaker, how it was made, 
and what influenced the speaker to make the utterance and shape the utterance as he or she did.  
Understanding how the rituals of speaking operate can influence how the listener perceives the 
speaker’s truths (12-13). Additionally, rituals of speaking also involve a hierarchy and a power 
struggle among those who speak, listen, and are spoken of. Alcoff writes, “Who is speaking, who 
is spoken of, and who listens is a result, as well as an act, of political struggle” (15). Alcoff 
further reminds readers that speakers have to seem credible in order for the audience to value the 
speakers’ points; additionally, speakers have to be accountable for what they say about others 
and when they speak on others’ behalf (13-16). 
When someone speaks about others, that speaker is doing so with the assumption that he 
or she is an “expert” on the person or group he or she speaks on behalf of. I put the word 
“expert” in quotation marks because what makes someone an expert about a particular culture, 
group, or individual is debatable. For example, Maxine Hairston, in her infamous 1992 article, 
“Diversity, Ideology, and the Teaching of Writing,” criticized James Berlin, Patricia Bizzell, 
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John Trimbur, and others for teaching college students political and cultural studies rather than 
writing and critical thinking (698-70). Not surprisingly, those who pedagogically side with 
Berlin, Bizzell, and Trimbur wrote to the journal that published her article defending them (and 
others like them) against what they saw as Hairston’s lack of expertise about their pedagogical 
ideologies and thus her mischaracterization of their works and theories. Significantly, Hairston 
responded to the letters, admitting that she had misquoted C.H. Knoblauch, but also 
acknowledging that she would not change the main points of her article (Letter 255). 
This debate highlights how the rituals of speaking work. Hairston explained why she 
wrote an article conveying her opposition to the incorporation of gender, race, and cultural 
studies into the writing classroom. The journal that published her article also published responses 
to the article which allow readers to see how people accept Hairston’s truths. Readers can see 
how scholars demand accountability from writers, especially if scholars feel that others may have 
misinterpreted them. Most importantly, readers can see the issues inherent in speaking about 
people, for Hairston had to issue an apology to Knoblauch for the mischaracterization of him in 
her piece.  
 
The Subject as Other 
When someone is speaking about others, the individual or group being spoken of either 
becomes the subject of the message or an important component of the overall topic. Even 
Aristotle notes the importance of speaking about others within his “three divisions of oratory,” 
which are ceremonial, political, and forensic rhetoric.  In ceremonial speeches, speakers render 
praise or disapproval of the person about whom they speak; in forensic speeches, speakers 
endorse or sanction the individual about whom they speak; and in political speeches, speakers 
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debate how policies and laws affect the individual or group about whom they speak (Book 1, Ch. 
3). When Aristotle discusses these divisions, he highlights what speakers must know and 
emphasize about the subject (the individuals or groups) within the speeches. 
Of course, one thing Aristotle doesn’t discuss, but scholars do today, is how a subject—
that is, a person or group—can be othered by the speaker of a text. When we discuss Othering, 
we discuss something Aristotle does not: ethnicity and class. Within the academic setting, the 
Other, as described by Sundar Sarukkai, is a European concept designed to establish a binary 
between European scholars and the people (of color) they study. In his article, “The ‘Other’ in 
Anthropology and Philosophy,” Sarukkai notes that anthropologists have traditionally 
characterized “the other” as “non-western,” “inferior,” and “different” (1406-07). He points out 
that anthropologists have defined the “Other” based on their own Western understanding of 
culture. Hence, anthropologists speak about people and on behalf of people by describing and 
interpreting the lives of the “native” (1407). Though some anthropologists engage in “participant 
observation,” that is, they live with the people they are studying, while simultaneously adopting 
the rituals and speech of the “natives,” anthropologists still run the risk of “constructing 
[themselves] as ‘not-other,” thereby increasing the risk of objectifying the people they study 
(1407).
7
 
It is this objectivity and the feeling of academic Otherness that Royster critiques in her 
essay. In Scene One, Royster constructs herself as the audience who is referred to as the Other. 
As the Other, she feels “compelled” to understand her African American culture from the 
perspective of European and European American scholars. She repeats the word “compelled” 
three times in the first paragraph of this opening scene to indicate that though no one is coercing 
her to listen to these perspectives, she feels as if these perspectives are being imposed on her. 
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The speakers, she insinuates, do not consider that she as an African American could be a part of 
the listening audience (30-31).
8
 As a representative figure, she must sit silently while authority 
figures talk about her African American culture without truly understanding or being accountable 
to the culture. More importantly, as the Other, she is not considered to be a part of the audience 
that the authority figure imagines. As an example, she points to the Herrnstein and Murray book 
The Bell Curve, which paints African Americans as intellectually inferior; the writers, thus, 
perhaps unaware, simply assume that African Americans are not part of the audience who will 
read the book (Royster 31). 
When someone is othered, that person hears how others interpret his or her culture. 
Because the person othering speaks or writes about a group of people, that person, according to 
Alcoff, speaks on the Others’ behalf. Thus, the person is describing Others in such a way that he 
or she is “speaking in place of them, that is speaking for them” (9). The problem is that some 
scholars do not have what Royster calls “home training,” which she defines as an outside 
visitor’s understanding that he or she has no right to go into someone’s home “tramping around 
like you own the place, no matter how smart you are, or how much imagination you can muster, 
or how much authority and entitlement outside that home you may be privileged to hold” (32). In 
other words, Royster criticizes scholars for believing that they “own” cultures of which they are 
not a part, and for misinterpreting, prejudging, demeaning, and even libeling an entire group of 
people often unaware that they are doing so. In that respect, she is highlighting Sarukkai’s 
criticism of anthropology and the way in which the discipline others people through some of the 
research techniques that anthropologists employ.  Now, Royster is not advocating that people 
have no right to study cultures outside of their own; rather, she encourages scholars to recognize 
that they are strangers within another’s culture; thus, they should be respectful of the culture that 
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they are studying. Most importantly, scholars should engage with the people of the culture: 
scholars should speak with the people and listen to them. To merely speak about/on behalf of 
them basically “others” the culture discussed (Royster 32-34). 
Having home training also means that researchers, in their attempt to speak about others, 
will have what Marilyn Frye calls a “loving perception” or “loving eye.” Mariana Ortega 
describes Frye’s theory as one that encourages researchers to “look and listen” as well as “check 
and question” (60). Researchers who have a loving perception are cognizant of how their own 
“desires and needs” shape the way they interpret and “distort knowledge of this world” (60). 
Sometimes, however, researchers will have both a loving and arrogant eye regarding their 
research. As an example, Ortega points to how a white feminist researcher may believe that by 
incorporating the texts written by women of color, she is allowing these women to have voice. 
However, if she misquotes, misinterprets, or does not analyze the texts, the researcher instead 
“constructs a reality that is in fact closer to what she wants it to be rather than what it is” (Ortega 
62). Her refusal to “check and question” her research can cause her to miss the nuances of her 
research subjects’ cultures, languages, and beliefs. The researcher, thus, modifies, if not 
misconstrues, the voices and experiences of women of color (Ortega 62). By not interrogating 
how she constructs and shapes her research and research subjects, the researcher becomes an 
“arrogant perceiver,” one who has “eyes that skillfully organize the world and everything in it 
with reference to the arrogant perceiver’s desires and interests” (Ortega 59). In other words, the 
researcher does not attempt to see or understand how her research subjects may construct their 
own reality.  
To have “home training” and a “loving eye” means that researchers need to be aware of 
how they construct people and cultures in their writing. Researchers need to pay close attention 
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to the ways in which they use their knowledge to compose text. In some respects they need to 
reflect on their text and how they move from, say, including quotes to interpreting quotes. Most 
importantly, researchers need to understand their own subjectivity and how that reflects the way 
they construct the realities of others.  
 
The Responsive Audience and Its Text 
Like Aristotle who considers the audience important for determining the “speech’s end 
and object” (Book 1, Ch. 3), Alcoff considers the audience important to determining “whether a 
claim is taken as a true, well-reasoned, compelling argument or significant idea” (13). The 
audience, thus, is not a passive entity, but one that actively engages with and judges the 
speaker’s text. Sometimes audiences, such as those who replied to Maxine Hairston, will respond 
to a speaker by producing new text—consequently creating a conversation with the speaker and 
with the speaker’s original audience and sometimes including new audiences in the process.  
Though many scholars refer to Rigoberta Menchú’s work as a testimonio, it also acts 
very much as an autoethnography. Mary Louise Pratt defines autoethnography as “a text in 
which people undertake to describe themselves in ways that engage with representations others 
have made of them” (Pratt 501). In other words, a writer will construct an autoethnography as a 
response to previous researchers’ construction of the writer’s culture. In Menchú’s work, she 
speaks about her family, her Quiché traditions, and the community in which she lives. While 
doing so, she addresses the differences in the ways in which the ladinos (mixed raced 
Guatemalans and full-blooded Indians who refuse to associate themselves with Indians) and 
Indians view various issues. For example, she points out that unlike ladinos, her community does 
not automatically reject homosexuals because “everything is a part of nature” (Menchú 60).  
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Additionally, unlike ladinos, who reject their religious Indian heritage, the Quiché preserve their 
religious heritage, while also using elements of Catholicism (84-86). By explaining the 
differences between her culture and the ladino culture, she explains why the Quiché believe what 
they believe.  
When Menchú describes her culture, she speaks about it and thus speaks on its behalf. 
Readers who do not know Guatemalan history have to take her word that what she speaks is the 
truth. Likewise, they have to also take her word that she is adequately describing ladinos and the 
Guatemalan government. Though she admits several times that she hated ladinos, thus showing 
her bias, she also admits that her attitude about ladinos changed through her relationships with 
activists (some of whom were ladinos) seeking to improve Guatemalan society. Her work serves 
as a means of explaining her culture and justifying the preservation of it. 
Just as Menchú uses her work to speak about and on behalf of Indians, Royster uses her 
essay to speak about and on behalf of black scholars and her research subjects. In Scene Two, 
Royster discusses the reactions scholars have to her research on rhetoric used by nineteenth 
century African American women writers. She says that people tend to elicit skepticism or 
discomfort with her work. Royster implies that many in her audience assumed that nineteenth 
century African American women could not be educated, cultured, or proficient in the arts, 
politics, business, sciences, and the like. What they instead think is that Royster has researched 
the “exception” and not the rule of how African American women lived their lives. Royster, 
therefore, uses her essay, as means of speaking to the critics. Royster responds to her critics by 
making clear that she believes that narratives and testimonies (which serve as part of “African-
based cultures of theorizing”) can function as important paradigms for the “transformative 
process” of establishing credibility for the speaker and the speaker’s location. However, she also 
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recognizes that the audience can ignore or disbelieve the narratives; thus we see how the rituals 
of speaking are carried out in the Royster essay: She, as a speaker, may not have credibility with 
the audience. When she presents her research, some audience members question not only the 
validity of the research but also the validity of the narratives she presents to buttress her 
assertions (34-36). Thus, Royster cannot even present the first person narrative account of 
nineteenth century writers, much less even speak on behalf of them, without it being seen as 
invalid.  
One major component of speaking on behalf of others is voice.
9
 The speaker/writer can 
use his or her own voice to speak on another’s behalf; but the speaker, like Royster, can adopt 
the voice(s) of the people for whom they speak as a means of providing “voice” to the group. 
The definition of voice, especially as articulated by those in Rhetoric and Composition, is 
nebulous. Personally, I believe that “voice,” even when considered as a singular quality, would 
better be understood as a plurality, an amalgamation of various voices used for communication 
with various types of peoples in various types of situations.  Voice, then, is individual in that my 
voice is representative of the influences that have affected me. But voice is also cultural because 
those influences are internalized in the voices that I use. Thus, my voice reflects the field of 
Rhetoric and Composition in that I have adopted the field’s lexicon and incorporated it into my 
vocabulary, but it also reflects the writers I admire and who use stream of consciousness in their 
writings.   
If voice is seen as individual and cultural, then this means that the speakers or writers 
who speak on behalf of others may, at times, find a need to negotiate between the use of their 
voice and the voice(s) of an individual, organization or community.  The writer must, therefore, 
using his or her awareness, question what constitutes the “authentic” or “real” voice(s) of the 
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people about whom the writer speaks. Additionally, the writer must consider how the audience 
will react to voice(s) used in the text. We see this in the final scene of the Royster essay when 
Royster investigates the concept of the “authentic voice,” as she speaks about and speaks on 
behalf of African American writers.  Royster acknowledges that scholars sometimes hear and 
appreciate her, but sometimes they do not truly understand the complexity of her voice(s). As an 
example, she discusses presenting a conference paper in which she recites an excerpt from a 
novel. By Royster reproducing the text in the characters’ voices, she speaks on behalf of the 
author by trying to speak like the author or the character the author created. As she states: 
When the characters spoke in the scene, I rendered their voices, speaking and 
explaining, speaking and explaining, trying to translate the experience, to share 
the sounds of my historical place and to connect those sounds with the systems of 
belief so that deeper understanding of the scene might emerge, and so that those 
outside of the immediacy of my home culture, the one represented in the novel, 
might see and understand more and be able to make more useful connections to 
their own worlds and experiences. (36) 
An audience member then praised Royster for limiting her use of academic jargon, and instead 
commended her for using her “natural” and “authentic” voice (36-37).
10
 The problem is that the 
audience member does not hear the connections between the voice(s) of the characters (as 
represented by the speaking) and the voice(s) of the academic (as represented by the explaining). 
Additionally, the audience member does not care to engage in the cross-boundary discourse 
which requires the connection of his or her own world with that of the fictional world discussed 
by Royster.  For the audience member, authenticity or truth comes only when Royster speaks 
“natural” (37). In this particular case, Royster speaks, but is not really heard.  
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Like Royster who uses multiple voices to discuss her research, Menchú and her translator 
use multiple voices as well. Throughout the text, readers see the following terms repeated: finca 
for plantation, mimbre for willow “used to for making cane baskets, furniture” (250), 
companañero for friend and later as a name use for the guerilla fighters (248), and caxlan which 
is the “Quiché name for ladino” (248).  This allows for Menchú to maintain the Spanish and 
Indian voice(s) of her identity despite losing much of that in translation to English. But this also 
allows for readers to believe that what they are reading is “authentic” and thus increases the 
probability that readers will accept what Menchú says is the truth.  
Though there were some who accepted Menchú’s testimonio as truth, the reality, 
according to Alcoff, is that women and African Americans have difficulty being heard and 
believed due to their lower status in Western society (13). In some respects, Royster’s essay 
shows that. Royster believes it is important for her as a woman and as an African American 
woman to create her own narratives and testimonies that will allow her to “go to a place within 
[herself,]” where she can ultimately hear the sound of her own voice and not necessarily the 
voices of people who try to speak on her behalf (35-36). By hearing her own voice, Royster can 
also speak her own voice and hopefully have someone who is willing to listen to her. 
Or perhaps Royster is not heard because, as Gayatri Chakravroty Spivak asserts, the 
Subject is always Western (“Subaltern” 271); since Royster does not look Western and since her 
rendering of the subject’s voice does not conform to the Western voice, it may have been easier 
for the audience member to see Royster as the Other.  When Spivak begins her essay by writing, 
“Some of the most radical criticism coming out of the West today is the result of an interested 
desire to conserve the subject of the West or the West as Subject” (“Subaltern” 271), she shows 
how Western intellectuals perpetuate a binary between themselves and the (generally) oppressed 
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cultures they study. Because they are typically the ones studying cultures, Western intellectuals 
have the power to represent (as in speak for) and re-present (as in create or portray) Others. 
According to Sabina Sawhney, those in the dominant group often encourage those in the 
subordinate group to perform “otherness.” This performance allows those in the dominant group 
to see identity as fixed, as something that conforms to the dominant society’s assumption of 
ethnic identity (210-16). This sentiment is echoed by Ilan Kapoor who declares that “even if 
subalterns speak, they (like anyone) may perform the roles they think are expected of them” 
(636). Most importantly, this performance of identity alters the way a speaker can speak and the 
way a speaker can speak on behalf of someone.  
The idea of performance plays a major role in Menchú’s work. In her text, Menchú 
indicates that she had little schooling and only a basic understanding of Spanish. Because she is 
presumably not fluent in reading and writing, her editor Elisabeth Burgos-Debray shapes the 
text. Burgos-Debray is the one who records Menchú and writes about Menchú’s culture. She 
“allows” for Menchú to go into great detail describing the Quiché culture—everything from the 
way in which marriage ceremonies are conducted to the way in which children are taught to 
maintain the secrets of their culture. As an editor, she can remove parts of Menchú’s story as 
well as restructure text. She can decide to allow or disallow for dialect features. It is, therefore, 
no surprise that some scholars see ethnographies as a type of “oral performance” that lets 
ethnographers create culture based on the informant’s words.  In fact, Alice A. Brittin quotes 
scholar Stephen Tyler’s assertion that ethnographies (such as Menchú’s) serve as a means of 
engaging in “oral performance” so that the editor can “steal the only thing she [the informant] 
has left—her voice” (qtd. in Brittin 102).  
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Thus, some scholars say that it is Burgos-Debray who gave “voice” to Menchú by 
helping to write Menchú’s testimonio (Brittin 102). But, as Brittin points out, Menchú and her 
compañeros had the ultimate say in how the book came to be. Menchú had her friends read the 
book to her, and she ordered the removal of certain sections of the book. By doing this, Menchú 
took control of the content and the way in which she was re-presented. According to Brittin, 
Menchú did not altogether allow Burgos-Debray to represent or re-present her (102-04). 
Like Menchú, Royster can speak, though Royster does not need someone to mediate for 
her. In fact, Royster re-presents the African American community by highlighting what she calls 
“long-standing practices in African-based cultures of theorizing in narrative form” (35). Most 
importantly, she does what Frank Farmer encourages Composition scholars to do: “insinuate 
ourselves in discourses that were never meant to include us in the first place” (626). In other 
words, Royster decides to literally voice her opinion in debates in which writers or speakers 
never envisioned her as part of the audience. 
Royster’s rationale for speaking on behalf of the African American community is clearly 
political—she wants to defend African Americans against The Bell Curve. But she also wants to 
articulate the experiences that African Americans have had in the academy and in the larger 
American society. She mentions the fact that Anna Julia Cooper, the first African American 
woman to earn a Ph.D., knew her voice was “muted” in nineteenth century America. Likewise, 
Royster points to poet Audre Lorde’s assertion that what she speaks can be “bruised and 
misunderstood” (qtd. in Royster 36). In effect, Royster shows that there is a pattern of African 
American intellectual women whose voices have been stifled in American society.  
Menchú’s decision to speak on behalf of community is also political. She wants to bring 
attention to the repressive regime in Guatemala. Though she speaks about her life, she also notes 
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that her experiences are similar to the experiences of other Guatemalans as well: “The important 
thing is that what has happened to me has happened to many other people too: My story is the 
story of all poor Guatemalans. My personal experience is the reality of a whole people” (1). This 
attempt to use one’s experiences to speak about experiences of a whole group is known as 
essentialism. 
Trina Grillo defines essentialism as  
the notion that there is a single woman’s, or Black person’s, or any other group’s, 
experience that can be described independently from other aspects of the 
person—that is there is an “essence” to the experience. An essentialist outlook 
assumes that the experience of being a member of the group is a stable one, one 
with a clear meaning, a meaning constant through time, space, and different 
historical, social, political and personal contexts. (19) 
Thus, when Royster discusses how African Americans feel in regards to The Bell Curve and 
links her experiences to silencing with Cooper’s and Lorde’s experiences with silencing, she 
engages in a form of essentialism. When Menchú declares that her experience is “the reality” for 
other Guatemalans, she engages in a form of essentialism. Essentialism, Grillo lets readers know, 
happens all the time (29). In fact, Spivak, in a 1994 interview with Elizabeth Gross, admitted to 
sometimes engaging “strategic” essentialism (166). Thomas Crisp notes that strategic 
essentialism “is the temporary deployment of positivist essentialism by a marginalized 
population for political purposes in order to displace a hegemonic majority” (95). Strategic 
essentialism allows for oppressed groups (or individuals representing a group) to describe 
themselves and their experiences while also critiquing the dominant group’s ideologies and 
sociopolitical dominance (Bucholtz 401). In their discussions, Spivak, Crisp, and Buscholz point 
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out that individuals or groups use or should use strategic essentialism with an understanding that 
it is a temporary strategy to address an injustice or a call for political awareness of an issue.
11
  
 The use of strategic essentialism, like the use of the autoethnographies or testimonials, 
allows speakers to respond to how they have been portrayed within cultural texts. The speakers, 
thus, were at one time audience members (perhaps intentional or unintentional audiences), who 
become both a speaker and a responsive audience member to the text. Royster responds 
forcefully to scholars and Menchú responds forcefully to the Guatemalan government.  
 
The Nonresponsive Audience and Its Silences 
Unfortunately, not every situation involving the rituals of speaking allows for others to 
respond. This is true in debates when audience members may not have the opportunity to refute 
comments by debaters or when readers are unable to publish a book-length counterargument to a 
publication they just read. Likewise, there are also instances in which those who are spoken 
about feel too powerless to respond. 
As seen in the Royster article, members of the audience who are spoken of (or spoken on 
behalf of) can feel powerless to counteract claims made about them or made on behalf of them. 
In fact, it may even be possible that the speaker who speaks about or speaks on behalf of a group 
of people does not even imagine that group as part of the audience. This can also be seen in the 
section in which Menchú hears her employer and the employer’s friends discuss the laziness of 
Indians, without caring that Menchú is in the room and knowing that there is a cultural 
prohibition against Menchú responding, thus silencing her (Menchú 99). Lisa Ede and Andrea 
Lunsford emphasize that historically rhetoricians have envisioned audiences as either being 
address or invoked. When an audience is addressed, the rhetors “share the assumption that 
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knowledge of [the] audience’s attitudes, beliefs, and expectations is not only possible (via 
observation and analysis) but essential” (78). In other words, rhetors envision who is a part of the 
audience and therefore who is able to relate to what they say. When an audience is invoked, 
rhetors emphasize the “created fiction” (qtd. in Ede and Lunsford 82) of audience. Rhetors 
provide “cues which help to define the role or roles the writer wishes the reader to adopt in 
responding to the text” (83). In other words, the rhetor attempts to subtly (or explicitly) 
manipulate the audience into understanding how the audience is to react to the text. In the 
context of this discussion, though, what’s important is that both theories allow for the writer to 
exclude people from being part of the audience. The audience addressed theory doesn’t take into 
consideration the fact that someone may be reading or hearing text that is not directed (or 
supposed to be directed) to them. The audience invoked theory assumes that all audiences are 
universally malleable and will respond in the way that the rhetorician wishes; thus, the audience 
invoked theory makes it difficult for the writer to take into consideration generational, cultural, 
gender, religious, or philosophical influences that may prevent or allow for the audience to 
respond to its role. 
Readers can see easily how audiences are overlooked within Royster’s essay. While the 
second part of Scene One deals with the ways in which scholars research people, the first part 
deals with people who are researched, who may or may not be a part of the targeted audience the 
speaker intends to reach. Royster sets up a dichotomy between herself as an audience member 
and the person who is speaking. Royster is the Other who is silenced by the speaker. But does the 
same dynamic apply equally between speakers and writers? According to Walter Ong, “[The] 
writer must construct in his imagination, clearly or vaguely, an audience cast in some sort of 
role—entertainment seekers, reflective sharers of experience . . . , and so on” (12). The reading 
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audience, in the meantime, “has to play the role in which the author has cast [them], which 
seldom coincides with [their] role in the rest of the actual life” (12). While Ong deals with 
writers and readers, his ideas can also apply to speakers and listeners. As someone who is a part 
of the academy, Royster knows that her role as an audience member in a conference setting is 
limited to listening in a way that is “expressionless” and “well-mannered” (Royster 30). In a 
poignant passage, she writes, “In a metaphoric fashion, these ‘authorities’ let me know, once 
again, that Columbus has discovered America and claims it now, claims it still for a European 
crown” (31). Her accentuation of the word “authorities” indicates a hierarchy between herself as 
an audience member and the speaker to whom she is listening. When Royster asserts that the 
authorities cling to the mythological belief that Columbus discovered America, Royster 
metaphorically references not just the academy’s disregard of the indigenous peoples who 
populated the Americas before Columbus’s arrival, but also the subaltern position of indigenous 
and other peoples now. It is the metaphorical Columbus (or academics) who speaks, not the 
people he “discovered.” In the same way, Royster lets readers know the audience can be forced 
to accept the claims even though the audience may feel powerless to speak back. 
Though Royster shows that her, Cooper’s, and Lorde’s voices have been stifled, this does 
not mean that they cannot speak on behalf of themselves or others. The fact is that though these 
women have lived in societies in which African Americans and women were oppressed, they 
were not, as Spivak would assert in 1988, “subaltern.” According to Kylie Smith, intellectuals 
have traditionally used Antonio Gramsci’s term “subaltern” to describe those without 
“autonomous political power” (39). Gramsci describes the subaltern as a group “subjected” to the 
whims of those who hold more power than them; thus, the subaltern must “defend themselves” 
within the political system in which they are forced to operate (Gramsci 207). In fact, members 
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of Menchú’s community might be considered subaltern since they, according to Menchú, were 
forced by their ladino employers to vote for specific candidates in order to keep their jobs 
(Menchú 25-26).  
Spivak, however, redefines a subaltern, at least a female subaltern, “as [a] female [who] 
cannot be heard or read” (“Subaltern” 308); most importantly “the subaltern cannot speak” 
(“Subaltern” 308). The subaltern, then, is silenced.
12
 Silencing, according to Lynn Thiesmeyer, is 
“a way to use language as a means to limit, remove or undermine the legitimacy of another’s use 
of language” (2). Not only does silencing reinforce social hierarchies, but it also discourages the 
silenced party to confront conflicts, especially as related to justice, bias and favoritism. So while 
the silenced party can speak, it may find the need to engage in self-censorship (hence limiting or 
removing its use of language) in order not to cause conflict within the dominant culture 
(Thiesmeyer 4-9).
13
 Although Spivak’s assertion regarding the inability of the subaltern to speak 
might seem absolute, Jenny Sharpe encourages readers to reinterpret Spivak’s work as an 
“interrogation of the academic effort to give the gendered subaltern voice in history” (Sharpe and 
Spivak 609); in other words, the statement should not be taken literally but as a metaphor for 
how Western intellectuals claim that the subaltern can speak for themselves, when in fact 
Western intellectuals are speaking about them, and in ways that ultimately silence the subaltern 
(Spivak, “Subaltern” 283).  
To expand these ideas further, J. Maggio reminds readers that critics such as Bruce 
Robbins have pointed out how Spivak “attempts to speak for the subaltern” (429). Interestingly, 
Spivak does not give a concrete definition of the subaltern; her description of the subaltern is 
influenced by the general definition of the Other: that is, one who is colonized, has been 
colonized, or is the descendent of the colonized (Maggio 421). Maggio defines the subaltern as 
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“epistemologically below the dominant culture” (427); to Maggio, the subaltern can speak: “We 
are simply unable to hear them” (437). In fact, Jenny Sharpe reminds readers that Spivak actually 
uses her article to critique how theorists and researchers portray the subaltern as a woman of 
color (Sharpe and Spivak 610).  
To Spivak, an example of a subaltern woman is the sati, a Hindu woman who immolates 
herself after the death of her spouse. She gives the reader two voices: the first is that of the 
British who abolished the rite: “White men saving brown women from brown men” (“Subaltern” 
297); the other voice is that of the Indian nativist: “The women actually wanted to die” 
(“Subaltern” 297); what readers don’t hear, says Spivak, “is the women’s voice-consciousness” 
(“Subaltern” 297). What readers do hear is how others speak about women and how they 
interpret women’s actions. This, in turn, leads to the infantilization of women. Maggio, for 
example, compares the subaltern to a child with two feuding parents (425). The parents get to 
speak and yell and debate, but the child does not. This metaphor points to the powerlessness of 
the subaltern and is reminiscent of the belief that the “child should be seen but not heard.” The 
example also points to the fact that speaking about someone does not necessarily allow for that 
person to speak for himself or herself. 
Royster, Alcoff, and Spivak encourage readers to understand how people are not allowed 
to speak for themselves. All point to the fact that certain people—generally white males—are 
accorded a higher status in Western societies and thus seen as experts. Those who are considered 
privileged tend to be heard and believed by an audience.  Royster and Alcoff encourage speakers 
to understand how speeches and writings affect the people who are being talked about. In many 
ways, they seek to reform the rituals of speaking to find a more equal ground among the speaker, 
the audience, and the people who are spoken about. Moreover, I believe that they encourage 
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people to be aware of how they speak on behalf of others, especially since both writers 
acknowledge that speaking about and for others is a rhetorical and ethical issue that people 
should address.    
Spivak, however, questions whether or not the speaker, especially one who is subaltern, 
can even speak. After all, those who are not subaltern can speak but are often misunderstood. As 
an example, Spivak discusses the suicide of Bhauvaneswari Bhaduri, a teenage girl, who 
“hanged herself in her father’s modest apartment in North Calcutta in 1926” (“Subaltern” 307). 
At the time Bhaduri was active in the Indian independence movement and had felt pressure to 
participate in a political assassination. Rather than do this, Bhaduri chose to commit suicide. Her 
family, however, attributed Bhaduri’s decision to commit suicide as “a case of illicit love” 
(“Subaltern” 308). Because Bhaduri was involved in the independence movement and was a part 
of the middle-class, Spivak does not consider her a “true subaltern” (“Subaltern” 308). But when 
people like Bhaduri and Royster, women who have some access to power, can easily be 
misunderstood, then it is no wonder that someone with more authority would attempt to speak 
about them. 
 
Speaking for Others 
 Part of my definition of speaking on behalf of others entails understanding how a speaker 
represents an individual or group. When engaged in representation, as opposed to re-
presentation, a speaker will speak for, not just about a group. Spivak, in fact, makes a distinction 
between “represent” and “re-present.” She uses the term “represent” (or Vertretung) to connote 
political advocacy, generally on behalf of a group. She notes that “representation” symbolizes 
“rhetoric-as-persuasion” (“Subaltern” 277). When a speaker engages in representation, the 
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speaker is assumed to “work in another’s interest” (“Subaltern” 276). Though Alcoff emphasizes 
that speaking for and speaking about are interrelated, Spivak advocates we understand the 
distinction of speaking for (as in represent) and speaking about (as in re-present). The distinction, 
according to Spivak, helps people understand who is accountable for the portrayal or the 
advocacy of an individual or group. 
 
The Speaker as Subject and Advocate 
In the beginning of her essay Royster establishes herself as an African American who is a 
part of the African American community, which she refers to as “my community” (30). In some 
respects, she engages in Spivak’s notion of representation or advocacy for the African American 
community and for those who might be labeled Other. Royster speaks as part of the group and 
she speaks for the group when she criticizes The Bell Curve and its assertion that African 
Americans lack intellect. She writes, “As has been the case throughout our history in this 
country, we are put in jeopardy and on trial in a way that should not exist but does” (30-31). 
Notice that she uses the first person “we” to describe how the community feels about The Bell 
Curve. Referencing the inferiority discussion in The Bell Curve, she implicitly speaks for the 
African American community when she advocates that academics have “home training” before 
engaging in research about communities outside of their own. 
As a self-described “Other” and scholar, Royster speaks to scholars while also speaking 
as a scholar and an Other. Referring to scholars as “strangers,” Royster writes, “As strangers, we 
must learn to treat the loved people and places of Others with care and to understand that, when 
we do not act respectfully and responsibly, we leave ourselves rightly open to wrath” (33). Here, 
Royster advocates for Others by encouraging scholars to engage in socially-responsible research. 
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Additionally, she also points out that, at times, Others do have a voice and the power to refuse 
scholars access to research them or their communities.  
This ability to refuse access to those of a more dominant class indicates that not all 
Others are subaltern and not all Others feel the need to have people represent their interests. In 
fact, Royster encourages scholars to engage with Others by talking with them, not solely about or 
for them (Royster 38). The irony is that though she doesn’t refer to college students and 
educators as Others, she implies that both groups have been othered because both groups have 
had people speak about them and for them. For example, she shows that teachers other students 
by “[insisting] that our students trust us and what we contend is in their best interest” (38). 
Notice that she emphasizes the way in which teachers know what is in the “best interest” of their 
students and that by “contending” this, they speak for them. Ironically, she also points to the fact 
that teachers themselves have been othered in that they have allowed people outside of teaching 
to represent and speak for them. She writes, “Seemingly, we [educators] have been forever 
content to let voices other than our own speak authoritatively about our areas of expertise and 
about us. It is time we speak for ourselves, in our interests, in the interest in our work, and in the 
interest of our students” (39). In other words, Royster is advocating that teachers speak 
for/advocate for themselves and speak for/advocate for their students. 
The reality is that there are many academics who speak for and advocate for others, 
especially those who are considered subaltern. Gary Kline, for example, believes that educators 
who can speak and be heard, should speak up and advocate for those who are politically 
repressed and economically exploited by those in power (11). Alcoff would seem to agree, 
noting that in itself, speaking for others is not necessarily a bad thing. For example, Alcoff’s 
discussion of Rigoberta Menchú’s autobiography in which Menchú states “that her story is ‘not 
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only my life, it’s also the testimony of . . . all poor Guatemalans” (qtd. in Alcoff 18) shows the 
political necessity for speaking for others. Though Menchú is a Quiche Indian, she certainly 
cannot represent all of the Indian (Mayan) groups in Guatamala. But what Menchú does is 
provide readers with first-hand accounts of the genocides and the political instability in 
Guatemala and in so doing, put pressure on the people responsible for genocide to stop what they 
are doing. Though Menchú is not a scholar in the traditional sense of the word, she, unlike some 
other Quiche, is knowledgeable of the Spanish language (Alcoff 18-19). Spivak might say that 
Menchú is a “native informant for first-world intellectuals interested in the voice of the Other” 
(Spivak, “Subaltern” 284). That is, Menchú interprets the subaltern for intellectuals interested in 
Guatemala
14
.   However, unlike the East Indian elites Spivak describes who adopted the elitism 
and colonial mentality of the British, Menchú is described by Alcoff as someone who attempts to 
subvert rather than adhere to colonialism or other oppressive forces. Menchú consciously learns 
Spanish to prevent the intended misinterpretation of her language by the government. Her family 
is friendly towards Europeans who seek to provide agricultural assistance, not because they 
believe Europeans know more about agriculture, but rather,  to “[maintain] friendly relations” 
(Alcoff 19); Alcoff tells readers that Menchú  understands the rhetorical implications of speaking 
for others:   
Thus, Menchú cannot be constructed as a “naïve” speaker unaware of the dangers 
and difficulties of speaking for others; she and her compañeros are well aware of 
the dangers since they have so often been the unhappy recipients of malicious or 
well-intentioned but wrongheaded attempts by others to speak for them. Yet 
instead of retreating from speaking for others, Menchú and her compañeros 
devised methods to decrease the dangers. (Alcoff 19) 
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Menchú speaks, but she speaks using the language of the dominant culture, something J. Maggio 
says those who are considered subaltern have to do (431). This, of course, is important when 
considering, as I do later, the debate regarding SRTOL and the belief that Others (in this case, 
those who do not speak standard English) must speak standard English if they wish to be 
accepted, much less heard within mainstream American society.  
The problematic issue of speaking for others can sometimes center on a narcissistic need 
for a speaker to be seen as a savior. Alcoff writes that “the practice of speaking for others is often 
born of a desire for mastery, to privilege oneself as the one who more correctly understands the 
truth about another’s situation or as the one who can champion a just cause and thus achieve 
glory and praise” (29). Though this point is important to understanding why people may choose 
to speak on behalf of others, readers need to further understand how people who speak on behalf 
of others gain the mastery, the privilege and the right to engage in this practice. In other words, 
readers need to see the rhetorical situations that lead people to speak on behalf of others. By 
seeing the rhetorical situation, readers could, for example, understand better the dangers Menchú 
faced in speaking for others and see rhetorically the methods she used that would lead 
Guatemalan Indians to accept or not accept Menchú’s autobiography.  
 
The Intersections of Speakers, Audiences, and Text 
 The way in which the writer shapes the text has a profound effect on how the 
readers/listeners accept how the writer speaks on behalf of others. Thus, it is important not only 
to study why and when people speak on behalf of others, but how audiences respond to such 
occasions. Alcoff, for example, provides readers with a compelling reason as to why Menchú 
needs to speak on behalf of Guatemalan Indians. What Alcoff does not do is provide readers with 
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an understanding of how audiences reacted to Menchú’s efforts. Arturo Arias tells readers that 
Menchú “was perceived as a representative of the Mayan peoples by non-Mayan members of the 
[political] opposition as well” (79). Because of this, Menchú must adopt “elements of Western 
discourse” (79) and in some ways, “perform” Mayan identity by recounting Mayan traditions 
(79-80). When reading Menchú’s autobiography, readers need to keep in mind that though 
Menchú knew Spanish, her Spanish was considered to be “basic.” Accordingly, her 
editor/mediator, Elisabeth Burgos-Debray, admits to correcting grammar, chronically 
rearranging events to follow a Western (as opposed to a Mayan) chronological sequence, and 
making editorial changes that would “make it a story, so that it could reach the general public” 
(qtd. in Arias 81).  
Of course, it is not unusual for writers and editors to remove cultural linguistic features 
within a text to make it palatable to the targeted audience. In their landmark essay on feminist 
theory and cultural imperialism, María C. Lugones and Elizabeth V. Spelman point to how 
Hispanas (their term) who wish to contribute to and participate in the feminist movement must 
adopt the language of mainstream/white feminists. Addressing the white feminist reader, they 
write, “When we talk to you we use your language: the language of your experience and of your 
theories” (575). They make clear that the English language and white feminist theories cannot 
capture the realities of Hispanas, much less speak for them if this is what they wanted to do. 
Most importantly, the language and theories feminist Hispanas must adopt do not appeal to many 
of the Hispanas they envision as their audience. 
We should thus rephrase Spivak’s question, “Can the subaltern speak?” to “What role 
does the audience play in constraining what the subaltern (or any other person) says?” It is clear 
that the audience is a contributing factor to the shaping of Menchú’s text; the editor felt that 
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Menchú’s “voice” had to be altered in a way that made it acceptable and palatable to Western 
tastes. Menchú, thus, becomes the native informant, someone who, according to Ilan Kapoor, is 
“positioned to speak on behalf of his/her ethnic group or country, typically for the benefit of the 
Western investigator or audience” (630). And yet, as Arias asserts, Menchú’s voice is not 
acceptable to critic David Stoll who uses his 1998 book on Rigoberta Menchú to criticize her for 
not conforming to Western conventions regarding historical facts. Stoll essentially accuses 
Menchú of lying. According to Arias, Stoll believes that Menchú does not speak for the Mayans; 
instead Menchú speaks for the “revolutionary left” (75-76). The fact that her work is considered 
a testimonio makes it equally troubling, for in Stoll’s mind a testimonio should be about the 
gathering of facts and data. A testimonio, according to Arias, is “a collective and communal 
account of a person’s life” (76). And since it is a communal account, the person engaged in 
creating a testimonio is also engaged in re-presenting the “collective and communal account” of 
the community or communities in which he or she lives and interacts with. 
Most importantly, says Kimberly A. Nance, the testimonio “is a project of social justice 
in which the text is an instrument.  . . . Although the genre is frequently characterized as didactic, 
that description fails to recognize that the goal of testimonio is not only to educate readers about 
injustice, but to persuade those readers to act” (Literature 19). Thus, a writer such as Menchú, 
uses the testimonio as a means of advocacy. Though I disagree with George Yùdice’s assertion 
that writers who use testimonials “[do] not speak for or represent a community,” I do agree with 
his point that testimonials “[perform] an act of identity-formation which is simultaneously 
personal and collective” (15).  While Menchú does not discuss in detail the political and 
historical background regarding the Guatemalan Civil War, she does discuss how government 
officials and ladino landowners mistreat Indians. She provides details of government takeover of 
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Indian lands and military torture of Indian resisters. She recounts the horrid conditions of the 
plantations where Indian women, men, and children work and sometimes die due to malnutrition 
and mass spraying of pesticides. As she does this, she provides her personal experiences and 
links her experiences to others to discuss the brutality of what she and her compatriots endured. 
Likewise, she shows how anti-Indian sentiment is engrained within Guatemalan culture. In the 
section in which she discusses her life as a maid, she quotes her employer and her employer’s 
friends as saying, “Indians are lazy, they don’t work, that’s why they are poor. They’re always 
making trouble because they won’t work” (Menchú 99). In another section, she discusses how a 
poor ladino child had said to a nun, “Yes, we’re poor but we’re not Indians” (119). This anti-
Indian sentiment, Menchú implies, dehumanizes Indians and justifies the government’s 
horrendous treatment of them. 
Indeed, Menchú’s text details Indian life and the way in which it was upended first by 
Spanish colonialism and later by the Guatemalan government’s policy of killing Indians (and 
others) who sought political, economic, and social reform. Likewise, it provides justification for 
why Menchú and others engage in military and nonviolent resistance against the government. 
Most importantly, however, it allows Menchú to speak for herself and her fellow compañeros 
who seek justice. She writes, “Our experience in Guatemala has always been to be told: ‘Ah, 
poor Indians, they can’t speak.’ And many people have said, ‘I’ll speak for them.’ This hurts us 
very much. This is a kind of discrimination” (Menchú 228). This kind of discrimination, the kind 
that culturally allows those of a higher socioeconomic group to voice the needs and goals of an 
oppressed group, represents a form of Othering that Royster alludes to in her essay.  
Like the rituals of speaking, Othering allows for someone of a higher status to speak 
about and for others. Speaking for others can disempower the group being spoken for because 
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members of that group cannot explain how their experiences are intertwined with the needs they 
advocate for. For example, Menchú discusses how General Kjell campaigned within Indian 
communities promising to provide educational and health services designed for them. Most 
importantly, he promised land reforms in which Indians would be able to maintain their lands. 
Interestingly, as he was discussing what Indians needed, he kept referencing the importance of 
providing bread. The problem as Menchú sees it—Indians don’t consume bread; they consume 
tortillas. Prior to this scene, Menchú emphasizes the importance of tortilla within her culture and 
the culture’s association of bread to Spanish colonialism. Thus, we see the issue of someone 
(who would later renege on his promises) speaking to and advocating for the needs of Indians but 
not understanding the significance of certain foods within Indian cultures (Menchú 157). 
Though Menchú’s testimonio does not provide information on how readers can get 
involved in the movement to end to the violence against the oppressed in Guatemala, it, like 
other testimonios,“[offers] readers a means of changing their minds about the world, a 
development which may, in turn, lead to activism” (Nance, “Let Us” 68). The possibility that 
speaking for someone can lead others into advocating for someone’s behalf is an important 
component within a rhetorical situation.  
As I will elaborate more fully in later chapters, a rhetorical situation, as defined by Lloyd 
Bitzer, calls for a speaker to highlight an exigence or a problem that needs to be fixed. The 
speaker must encourage the rhetorical audience to urgently address and ameliorate the problem. 
This sense of urgency relates to George Yùdice definition of testimonial writing, which he 
defines as “an authentic narrative, told by a witness who is moved to narrate by the urgency of a 
situation (e.g. war, oppression, revolution, etc.)” (17). In Menchú’s case, she provides readers 
with a detailed account of her life and her culture; she points out the various exigencies, 
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including the torture and killing of Indians; the horrendous working conditions for Indians who 
work in the plantations (or fincas); the governmental attempts to take land away from Indians; 
and the negative views of Indians by the ladinos. Though she does not make suggestions for how 
the audience of readers can help her cause, she shows the multiple ways in which she and various 
organizations attempt to address the exigencies. It is as if she is saying that the people who are 
most affected by the exigencies (that is, those who are Indians, poor ladinos, etc.) should be the 
ones to ameliorate their rhetorical situation. 
According to Proma Tagore, testimonials such as those used by Menchù and Royster not 
only allow writers to focus on their personal experiences but also allow writers to discuss their 
marginalization within the dominant culture, thus confronting the ways in which they may have 
been silenced within the dominant culture (Tagore 3). Royster, in fact, uses the testimony and 
personal experience (alongside objective data) as legitimate forms of research. However, in 
Scene Two, she emphasizes that the audiences she has encountered have questioned her 
methods, and thus her right to speak and speak on behalf of others. Like Menchú, who does not 
theorize according to Western academic standards, Royster acknowledges that she is not 
theorizing in the traditional Western sense of the word:  
In discussing nineteenth century African American women’s work, I bring tales of 
difference and adventure. I bring cultural proofs and instructive examples, all of 
which invariably must serve as rites of passage to credibility. I also bring the 
power of storytelling. These tales of adventure in odd places are the transitions by 
which to historicize and theorize anew with these writers re-inscribed in a rightful 
place. Such a process respects long-standing practices in African-based cultures 
of theorizing in narrative form. (35) 
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In other words, Royster attempts to assert her right to speak and not conform to the audience’s 
expectations of how she is supposed to speak. She prefers to use “African-based” forms of 
theorizing (through the use of stories) that allow her to shape her text. However, Royster knows 
she risks alienating her audience who, like Stoll, may see the narrative or the testimony (the 
testimono) as illegitimate historical data. Royster’s goal, however, is to “subvert the paradigm” 
(35) of what is considered to be acceptable research and theory (Royster 35-36).
15
 In this sense 
she advocates, or speaks for, the use of alternate theories for understanding culture.  
Interestingly, Royster and Alcoff call for an equalization of the speaker, the audience, and 
the people who are being spoken about. Alcoff encourages people to speak and listen to others. 
Alcoff writes, “We should strive to create wherever possible the conditions for dialogue and the 
practice of speaking with and to rather than speaking for others” (23). The issue then becomes 
how people can create these idyllic conditions and how people know when these conditions 
exist. The problem in the academy, as illustrated by Royster’s essay, is that it is difficult to create 
situations where people can simultaneously speak and listen to each other on an equal footing. In 
Scene Three, for example, Royster points out that students sometimes feel so alienated within the 
academy that they cannot speak at all. Though Royster does not say this, it becomes clear that if 
students cannot speak, teachers can end up speaking for them. This becomes problematic in that 
teachers may end up doing what Royster says scholars do when discussing the African American 
community: teachers may act like they “know” students and student cultures, without taking into 
consideration what students may have to say about how they are rendered (38-39). 
Though Alcoff and Royster emphasize the importance of speaking with and listening to 
others, Spivak, as I have already noted, questions whether or not a speaker, especially one who is 
considered subaltern, can even speak. Thus, it would seem that Spivak does not believe that the 
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rituals of speaking can even allow for a more equal footing among the speaker, audience, and the 
group being spoken of, hence her 1988 conclusion that the subaltern cannot speak. But in her 
updated essay, printed in the 1999 book A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of 
the Vanishing Present, she acknowledges that in some ways the subaltern may be able to speak, 
one means of which is voting. However, she is still ambiguous about the subaltern voice and its 
ability to speak. She writes, “When a line of communication is established between a member of 
subaltern groups and the circuits of citizenship or institutionality, the subaltern has been inserted 
into the long road to hegemony” (Critique 310). The “long road to hegemony” represents the 
unequal footing that exists within the rituals of speaking and the fact that the subaltern is on a 
road implies that the subaltern does not have power; thus, it becomes easy for those who are part 
of the hegemonic institutions to still speak for the subaltern. 
And one of those hegemonic institutions is the university or as Spivak refers to it, the 
“knowledge-production factory” (Critique 309). In Royster’s, Alcoff’s and Spivak’s works, the 
writers show how speaking for, about, and on behalf of others seems to be commonplace within 
academic settings. After all, most academics study or write about cultures—whether these are 
educational, political, racial, socioeconomic, scientific, or artistic, cultures—and find themselves 
writing or speaking extensively about (and hence on behalf of or for) groups of people. Likewise, 
most academics use outside theoretical research in which they discuss a particular person so that 
they end up summarizing and speaking on behalf of that person or that person’s research. In fact, 
this chapter serves as a means of speaking on behalf of Royster, Alcoff, Spivak, and others, 
though my ultimate intention is to use their works to illuminate the concept of speaking on behalf 
of others. In other words, speaking on behalf of others is part of the process in academia. 
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A Conclusion and a Beginning 
Because speaking on behalf of others is inherent within academia, it is important that 
scholars engage in and be aware of how they speak about others when writing their works or 
engaging in speaking. In many respects, Alcoff, Royster, and Spivak encourage scholars to be 
more cognizant of how they represent and re-present others, so that they do not mischaracterize 
individuals (as Hairston did) or objectify groups of people as Sarukkai asserts anthropologists 
have done.  
Of course, there are some writers such as Joyce Trebilcot who try to speak for themselves 
without creating the illusion that everyone within their various communities holds the same 
beliefs. Trebilcot consciously eliminates words and phrases such as “we” and “our” that indicate 
she speaks for others. In her discussion of the word “we” in the phrase “we all need love,” 
Trebilcot emphasizes that there might be women who believe that this phrase does not 
correspond to their reality. Thus, she changes the phrase to “I need love” and makes sure that her 
research findings and interpretations only apply to her experiences (4). To Trebilcot, speaking 
for herself allows her “to rewrite the entire world for herself” (6). This, of course, does not mean 
that she does not acknowledge other people’s realities. But this does mean that Trebilcot 
recognizes that her world is not the same as my world. 
At the outset, I questioned whether it was even possible not to speak for others. There are 
those, after all, who say speaking for others is a human phenomenon—one that is done because 
human beings speak and they feel the need to speak for themselves, their families, and their 
communities. And while this may indeed be true, not all cultures accept this idea. For example, 
Bambi B. Schieffelin says that people in Melenasian societies are discouraged from “verbally 
speculating about the intentions, motives, and internal states of others” (431). In Bosavi (Papua 
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New Guinea), children know that adults frown upon gossip (which certainly can include 
speaking on behalf of others) and realize that adults believe it is uncouth to “speak others’ 
thoughts, ones that they have not themselves articulated” (435). Schieffelin hints that though the 
rhetorical traditions among the Bosavi remain intact, new contact with linguistically diverse 
people who lack the grammatical and rhetorical structures of the Bosavi could change the way in 
which the Bosavi think about speaking and speaking on behalf of others (439). 
In this chapter, I have introduced readers to the problem of speaking for others. I have 
drawn on the theoretical insights of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak and Linda Alcoff regarding this 
problem, and I have tried to show how their ideas can be applied to two concrete examples taken 
from the works of Jacqueline Jones Royster and Rigoberta Menchú. One of the purposes in using 
this approach is to illustrate just how complex and nuanced the problem of speaking on behalf of 
others can be. In addition, I desired to call attention to cultural and ethical questions that must be 
considered when writers—student, scholarly, professional, and others—engage in their own 
metacognitive processes of composing. And finally, I wanted to suggest that the problem of 
speaking on behalf of others can be usefully applied to the rhetorical situation of how the 
“Students’ Right to Their Own Language” came to be. This is why I want to bring Lloyd F. 
Bitzer into the discussion at this point. 
Bitzer’s theory regarding the rhetorical situation can help people understand how an 
exigence can serve as the primary motivator for compelling people to speak on behalf of others. 
Bitzer defines exigence as “an imperfection marked by urgency” (“Rhetorical” 6). It is a pressing 
issue that must be addressed, acted upon, and modified. Royster, for example, sees the silencing 
and misrepresentation of African American scholars as exigencies. As she addresses these 
exigencies, she speaks on behalf of African American scholars and the African American 
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community. To be sure, there are different rhetorical motivations writers or speakers have when 
deciding to speak on behalf of people when incorporating others’ research. Nonetheless, Bitzer’s 
theory can be helpful in understanding how speakers use an exigence to speak for (that is, 
advocate) a group of people and encourage a rhetorical audience to act, within certain rhetorical 
constraints.  
One major drawback to Bitzer’s theory, however, is his lack of discussion on identity and 
the way in which the identities of the speaker and/or rhetorical audience affect how the rhetorical 
audience responds to the exigencies. By incorporating Alcoff and Spivak’s theories, especially in 
regards to identity, I hope to enhance Bitzer’s theory of the rhetorical situation. Likewise, I wish 
to use his theory on the rhetorical situation to enhance our understanding of what makes people 
speak and advocate for others. 
In particular, I want to pursue this enhanced understanding by applying Bitzer’s theory of 
the rhetorical situation to the “Students’ Right to Their Own Language” (SRTOL) document. 
Approved by the Conference on College Composition and Communication (CCCC) in 1974, 
SRTOL was designed to discourage teachers from engaging in dialect eradication among 
students speaking dialects other than standard English. Though I will use elements of Alcoff’s 
and Spivak’s theories to show how speaking on behalf of others is done within the document, I 
will also incorporate Bitzer’s rhetorical situation so that readers can see that the CCCC used a 
rhetorical strategy for a specific purpose: to encourage people to do something that would protect 
students. This rhetorical strategy relies on speaking on behalf of different groups so that certain 
groups (namely educators) will be moved by discourse to (in the words of Spike Lee) “do the 
right thing.” 
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Before I show how Bitzer’s theory can be applied to SRTOL and the way the CCCC 
speaks on behalf of and for others, I will use my next chapter to discuss SRTOL more in depth. 
Readers will see how people reacted to the document and how the interpretation of the document 
has changed throughout the years. Moreover, readers will also see how supporters and opponents 
of SRTOL spoke about and on behalf of each other, as well as the people they were against. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
61 
 
  Chapter Two: 
“Students’ Right to Their Own Language”: A Review 
 
When critics discuss “Students’ Right to Their Own Language” (SRTOL), they pay most 
attention to the following: 
We affirm the students' right to their own patterns and varieties of language -- the 
dialects of their nurture or whatever dialects in which they find their own identity 
and style. Language scholars long ago denied that the myth of a standard 
American dialect has any validity. The claim that any one dialect is unacceptable 
amounts to an attempt of one social group to exert its dominance over another. 
Such a claim leads to false advice for speakers and writers, and immoral advice 
for humans. A nation proud of its diverse heritage and its cultural and racial 
variety will preserve its heritage of dialects. We affirm strongly that teachers must 
have the experiences and training that will enable them to respect diversity and 
uphold the right of students to their own language. (CCCC 710-11) 
These lines, generally referred to as “the resolution,” give readers a sense of how the CCCC 
understands language difference. The CCCC views a dialect as a reflection of a community’s 
identity. Dialects point to the regional and racial groups who not only live in the country, but 
also influence it as well. Dialects are indicative of social hierarchies that exist in the United 
States. Those at the top of these hierarchies can determine the validity of a dialect, which, in 
turn, can lead to linguistic oppression of those at the lower ends of the hierarchies.  This, the 
CCCC makes clear, is wrong. That is why the CCCC encourages teachers to understand 
linguistics, respect linguistic diversity, and “uphold the right of students to their own language” 
(CCCC 711). 
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The resolution also provides a snapshot of how the CCCC speaks on behalf of people. 
Notice that the organization uses the first person plurals, “we” and “our.” This indicates that the 
organization is speaking on behalf of its members. Yet the organization is also speaking about, 
and hence, on behalf of, people when it discusses students, language scholars, and a proud nation 
seeking to “preserve its heritage of dialects” (CCCC 711). Moreover, the organization engages in 
Spivak’s notion of representation when it attempts to advocate for dialect speaking students and 
engages in re-presentation when it re-creates an American society in which Americans wish not 
to destroy dialects for fear that they will culturally destroy a part of themselves. In short, the 
CCCC speaks about, and for, its constituent members and for a vision of American society 
committed to language fairness; that is to say it endeavors to speak on behalf of behalf of its 
constituents but also on behalf of an ideal not yet realized.  
Yet the resolution is not the only place where the CCCC speaks on behalf of others. The 
often-ignored background statement (which some critics don’t discuss) examines various issues 
addressed in the document including, but not limited to, sociolinguistics; history of the English 
language; standardized testing and its role in stigmatizing dialect speakers; and English 
textbooks used in the classroom. Within these discussions, the CCCC speaks about and for 
various groups, many of whom I will discuss in upcoming chapters.  
The main problem with SRTOL is that it is written as if every member agrees with the 
document. In fact, just before and after its passage in 1974, several CCCC members voiced 
opposition to SRTOL making it clear that SRTOL did not represent or re-present their 
pedagogical beliefs, and, in some instances, the CCCC as an organization did not represent them. 
Readers, thus, will get a glimpse of how audiences responded both positively and negatively to 
having an organization speak on behalf of them.  
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 The purpose of this chapter, however, is to help the reader understand better the varied 
reactions to the document. On the surface, it seems as if the responses can be categorized 
according to those who are proponents and opponents of the document and those who represent 
gradations in between. This is especially true of essays and letters written in the 1970s to the 
mid-1980s. However, during the late 1980s until today, the nature of debate regarding SRTOL 
shifted from validation or invalidation of the document to analysis and implementation. This 
does not mean that writers and teachers didn’t express their opposition to or support for the 
document; rather it shows that they were struggling to move beyond the polarizing debate about 
the acceptability of the document to understanding what the document means to writing and the 
teaching of writing. 
In all of these discussions, though, what critics have not focused on is the rhetorical 
strategy the CCCC used in its attempts to speak on behalf of teachers and students through 
SRTOL. In fact, I argue that by understanding the ways in which SRTOL speaks on behalf of 
others, writing scholars and teachers can gain a better (and much needed) understanding of the 
implications, both positive and negative, of speaking on behalf of others. Before I delve further 
into the rhetorical implications of SRTOL, I want to review how our understanding of the 
document has changed from its release until today. 
Just as the understanding of SRTOL has changed throughout the years, so too have the 
terms used to describe our nation’s dialects. For example, African American English Vernacular 
(AAEV), commonly used today with the term Ebonics, was referred by critics as “black dialect,” 
“Black English Vernacular,” “dialect of the urban black,” and “Black English” throughout the 
1970s and 1980s. Other terms used, and sometimes used interchangeably by critics, include 
“Edited American English” ([EAE] the term used in the SRTOL) and “Standard English,” also 
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written as “standard English.” Additionally, there is also the term “Englishes” which implies that 
there is no standard English, but instead several varieties of English, whether these emerge 
within our national boundaries or within global contexts. Also used today are terms such as the 
“mother tongue,” which describes the language of the home and the “language of wider 
communication,” sometimes used to describe a standard language. 
 In fact, the committee who created the background statement on STROL makes a 
distinction between EAE and a standard English: EAE is the written dialect “which is meant to 
carry information about our representative problems and interests” (713). The Committee does 
not specifically define a standard English. Instead it provides a definition of what it is not. “ . . . 
most linguists agree that there is no single homogenous American ‘standard.’ They also agree 
that, although the amount of prestige and power possessed by a group can be recognized through 
its dialect, no dialect is inherently good or bad” (713). Thus, what is referred to as Standard 
American English or Standard English or standard English (notice the differences in 
capitalizations) is a misnomer, since different communities may have different ideas of what a 
standard is. Moreover, the committee also recognizes that a standard is associated with prestige. 
Thus, it is not uncommon for the s in standard English to be capitalized to emphasize the 
prestige. Though I will use the terms African American English Vernacular (AAEV) and 
standard English, throughout this study, I will remain faithful to the various terms that authors of 
specific texts use when describing the dialects they discuss.   
Before I go into depth about the initial reactions to the document, I want to provide 
readers with an historical understanding of how the document came into being. I will thus rely on 
first person accounts by three members of the committee: Richard Lloyd-Jones, Geneva 
Smitherman, and Elisabeth McPherson. Intertwined within these accounts are other critics who 
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have written articles and books about the history of the document and supplement the testimonies 
of Lloyd-Jones, Smitherman, and McPherson.  
 
The Advent of “Students’ Right to Their Own Language” 
Sociolinguistics and Civil Rights 
The first person accounts of Lloyd-Jones, Smitherman, and McPherson set the framework 
for how many scholars analyze SRTOL. All three examine the cultural, political, and educational 
events which influenced the formation of the document. To show the importance of SRTOL to 
the history of Rhetoric and Composition, both Lloyd-Jones and Smitherman examine the history 
of the field and how SRTOL fits into it.  By doing this, they provide readers with a better 
understanding of how SRTOL relates to the history of the field, not just to the history of the 
organization that produced it.  
Lloyd-Jones begins his work by emphasizing the importance of the CCCC to the field of 
Rhetoric and Composition. He points out that by the 1960s, the CCCC had been around for 
approximately twenty years. Its journal, College Composition and Communication (CCC), had 
started to transition from a journal devoted mostly to conference summaries and proceedings to a 
journal that emphasized research on pedagogy and writing (1). Like Lloyd-Jones, Smitherman, in 
her essay, “The Historical Struggle for Language Rights in the CCCC,” discusses the importance 
of CCCC. She, however, focuses on the 1951 debate between Kenneth L. Knickerbocker and 
Donald J. Lloyd regarding the teaching of English and the privileging or devaluation of certain 
phrases used by people. She uses this debate as a foray into the discussion of CCCC’s historic 
interest in linguistics and language rights; this enables readers to see that SRTOL did not just 
come about because there was a sudden interest in linguistics and language rights in the 1960s. 
66 
 
What she, in effect, shows is that scholars in Rhetoric and Composition were discussing 
sociolinguistics and language rights two decades prior to the passage of SRTOL (7-9).  
The debate between Lloyd and Knickerbocker, coupled with the growing scholarship on 
AAEV within sociolinguistics, corresponded to the Civil Rights Movement and the Black Power 
of the 1950s and 1960s.  In fact, McPherson, Smitherman, and Lloyd-Jones situate SRTOL 
within the Civil Rights movement. In the first paragraph of McPherson’s piece, she refers to 
SRTOL as “more than a belated response to the civil rights movement; it was an 
acknowledgement that language, too, can be a weapon of prejudice, that language differences 
can shut people out of education” (“Bait/Rebait” 8). Unlike her “Historical Struggle” essay, 
Smitherman begins her “Retrospective” essay by discussing the Civil Rights movement of the 
1950s and 1960s, as well as the Black Power movement (21). By doing this, she positions 
SRTOL within important American and African American cultural and political movements. Of 
course, Lloyd-Jones does not ignore the cultural happenings of the time either. He acknowledges 
that the “sit-ins and marches and murders [of civil rights leaders] in significant numbers  . . . 
make clear that issues of oppression and power had to be settled, and language was an emblem of 
that oppression” (3).  By emphasizing linguistic discrimination within American society, all three 
writers highlight how linguistic discrimination was a Civil Rights issue.  
Interestingly, critics of SRTOL during the 1970s and early 1980s confirmed the existence 
of linguistic discrimination within the classroom. Lou Kelly, for example, focuses on how 
teachers who overemphasized the teaching of grammar to dialect speakers did so to “[preserve] 
the notion that, though all men are created equal, the language you learn in the home and the 
community where you are created stamps you inferior if it is not ‘correct’”(255). In other words, 
such teachers as these had embraced the notion of linguistic inferiority and thus had continued 
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the perpetuation of a linguistic hierarchy. Gloria Glissmeyer echoes Lou Kelly’s sentiments 
when she points to Hawaiian dialect speakers who “[speak] disparagingly of their own speech 
and [tell] of the embarrassment about the wish to conceal the speech of their own parents” (202). 
Thus, the individuals who knew they did not speak “correctly” internalized the sentiments of the 
larger community who viewed their language (and perhaps them) as inferior.  
Just as members of the CCCC began tackling the issue of linguistic discrimination, the 
CCCC, as an organization, began tackling the issue of minority representation within its own 
rank and file. This issue came to the forefront at the 1968 CCCC convention in Minneapolis. In 
fact, both Lloyd-Jones and Smitherman highlight the convention as a decisive moment in the 
history of the CCCC and an influential one in the development of SRTOL. At the 1968 CCCC 
convention, attendees learned of Martin Luther King’s death. Lloyd- Jones writes that because of 
King’s assassination, the “second day of the Convention was put aside for the discussion of the 
implications of his murder” (3). Unlike Smitherman, he does not provide specifics about what 
occurred within the convention. Smitherman recounts that at the convention, Ernece Kelly 
delivered an address in which she criticized CCCC for not having minority representation at the 
conference and within its publications. Then Kelly made this important point: white scholars 
were  dominating the discussion on African American English Vernacular and seemed to be 
more interested in how “we can upgrade or, if we’re really successful, just plain replace [the 
dialect]” (qtd. in Smitherman, “Historical” 14).  
Like Smitherman, other noted scholars point to Kelly’s speech as an important historical 
event leading up to the creation of SRTOL. While they don’t go into detail about the rhetorical 
ways in which Kelly spoke on behalf of others, they do point to the importance of Kelly’s 
response to those who spoke about AAEV speakers. Keith Gilyard, for example, infers that the 
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CCCC special interest group, the Black Caucus, came into being in the 1970s because Black 
Caucus members, like Kelly in 1968, voiced their concerns regarding how white scholars 
became certified “instant experts” in African American literature and language (“African 
American” 636). Unlike Royster who felt “compelled to listen” (Royster 30) while white 
scholars analyzed and critiqued the African American community, Black Caucus members felt 
compelled to speak; in fact, they worked together to compose a resolution that “criticized the 
academic colonization of Black topics and also called for efforts to improve working conditions 
at historically Black colleges and universities and for publishers to increase the quality of their 
Black-oriented products” (Gilyard, “African American 636). Known as the Seattle Resolution, 
this document allowed the Black Caucus to speak about causes and speak for people important to 
them. Most importantly, it gave African American scholars a voice in an organization that 
seemed to privilege the voices of white scholars (Gilyard, “African American” 636).  
Kelly’s speech also plays an important role in an article by Carmen Kynard.  Not only 
does Kynard discuss the speech Kelly gave at the 1968 convention, but she also goes into depth 
about Kelly’s work with the newspaper Black Libre and the journal Negro American Literature 
Forum. Through these publications, Kelly was able to discuss the education of African American 
college students who spoke and wrote in dialect.  Kynard notes that Kelly’s work made “clear 
that black student-composers and black teacher-compositionists were engaging a praxis that fell 
outside of what white compositionists and CCCC were making central in the field at the time” 
(362).  
By emphasizing Ernece Kelly’s role at the convention, Kynard, Gilyard, and Smitherman 
speak on behalf of Kelly, by stressing Kelly’s contributions and importance to the field of 
Rhetoric and Composition and the formation of SRTOL. Most importantly, they emphasize the 
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role that African Americans played in influencing the CCCC to address the issue of linguistic 
discrimination. Though they make clear that the number of African Americans in the CCCC was 
much lower in the 1960s than today, they also show how African American members sought to 
respond to how white scholars were speaking about and on behalf of African American students. 
Through the formation of the Black Caucus and the speech Kelly gave at the convention, black 
CCCC members were able to speak about AAEV, African American students, and the way in 
which they were educated. 
One of the ways in which the CCCC responded to the critique that the organization 
valued white scholars more than African American ones was to devote its December 1968 issue 
of the College Composition and Communication (CCC) journal to matters related to AAEV and 
the pedagogy of African American students. In this particular issue, the CCCC was able to bring 
special attention to several writers, including four African American ones, who wrote articles on 
African American English Vernacular and the pedagogy of African American students. 
Smitherman concludes that the one of the main purposes of this CCC issue was for members to 
hear the voices of African American scholars (“Historical” 15-17). Smitherman writes, “The 
‘Students’ Right’ resolution followed logically on the heels of the dramatic 1968 annual meeting 
of CCCC and the subsequent December 1968 issue of CCC, which were themselves affected by 
the social movements, political events, and assassinations in the world beyond academe” 
(“Historical” 17-18). Additionally, Smitherman emphasizes that CCCC was one of many 
academic organizations interested in promoting social justice within and outside of the academy. 
She notes that scholars affiliated with organizations such as the American Psychological 
Association, the Modern Language Association, and the American Sociological Association 
were interested in “working within their professional societies . . . to bring about mainstream 
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recognition and legitimacy to the culture, history and language of those on the margins” 
(“Retrospective” 21-22). Like these organizations, members of the CCCC wanted to address 
linguistic discrimination as a societal issue, not solely an educational one.  
One of the ways in which linguistic discrimination could be tackled during the 1960s and 
1970s was to make the public aware of linguistics research. In fact, Smitherman and Lloyd-Jones 
discuss how new theories within sociolinguistics contributed to the understanding of language, 
and thus, began to influence Rhetoric and Composition. Lloyd-Jones recounts that 
socio-linguistics and psycho-linguistics—theories of language--began to edge out 
the formalism of syntax and phonology as our main studies. From philology we 
had learned that language changed in response to the social and political climate 
so it was easy to associate dialects with groupings of people, and to recognize that 
language responds to the realities of power. (1)  
In other words, members of the CCCC became less interested in sentence structure and more 
interested in how language operates and changes through time. He mentions linguists that those 
in Rhetoric and Composition were reading: Noam Chomsky, Ferdinand de Saussure, Leonard 
Bloomfield, and Martin Joos, among others. He also discusses Black English and the conflicted 
feelings some CCCC members felt about Black English and the teaching of standard English to 
African American dialect-speaking students (1-3). By highlighting sociolinguistics, Lloyd Jones 
re-creates the CCCC as an organization dominated by members more interested in language and 
politics rather than creativity and technology. 
Like some of the CCCC members who had to work through their conflicted feelings 
about AAEV and standard English, linguists were also examining their conflicted feelings about 
the teaching of standard English. Smitherman notes that linguists were challenging the 
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conventional method of using bidialecticalism to teach dialect-speaking students.  “Some 
language scholars had begun to question bidialecticalism as a goal for the linguistically 
marginalized. They argued that the bidialecticalism philosophy was only being promoted for 
those on the margins. Further, since linguistic research had demonstrated the linguistic adequacy 
of ‘nonstandard’ dialects, why wouldn’t the ‘system’ accept them?” (“Historical” 18) To these 
progressive scholars, bidialectalism promoted the supremacy of standard English to those who 
did not speak standard English and legitimized the system—that is the educational, political, and 
social systems—that prevented the “linguistically marginalized” from achieving the American 
dream of educational and economic betterment.  
 
Teaching Students Standard English 
We see this debate regarding bidialecticalism in the Patrick Bruch and Richard Marback 
2005 anthology, The Hope and the Legacy. Their work is a collection of essays, focusing on 
SRTOL and the issues that SRTOL addresses. Their first section, to which I will focus particular 
attention, is entitled “The Context of ‘Students’ Right to Their Own Language.’” Here they 
present readers with essays that academics were reading; thus, we get a brief glimpse of what is 
going on in the 1960s and the early 1970s, just before the passage of SRTOL. 
The editors highlight essays that emphasize the bourgeoning research on AAEV and 
bidialecticalism within Rhetoric and Composition. By doing this, they also implicitly link 
SRTOL to the Civil Rights movement especially since some of the essays deal with the 
intertwining of racism and linguistic discrimination. In the first essay, Ossie Davis discusses how 
the English language was “one of the prime carriers of racism” (4) through its positive synonyms 
regarding “whiteness” and its negative synonyms regarding “blackness” (4). In the section, 
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“Why Teachers Fail,” Davis does not go into detail about pedagogy or curricula; rather he 
insinuates that Americans, not necessarily just teachers, did not want to acknowledge the 
presence of racism within the United States; teachers, however, could learn from the children 
they taught: Teachers could “learn from a subjugated people what its value, its history, its 
culture, its wealth as an independent people are” (8).  
Just as Davis’s essay is an indictment of racism within the English language, Wayne 
O’Neil’s essay is an indictment of bidialecticalism. He asserts that bidialecticalism was a 
pedagogical strategy that inherently posited the superiority of standard English over other 
dialects. White, middle-class standard English speakers didn’t have to learn another dialect; it 
was always the speakers who used dialects other than standard English who had to undergo this 
pedagogy (11). Not surprisingly, the editors include Melvin J. Hoffman’s piece defending 
bidialecticalism. After presenting arguments from James Sledd and Thomas Kochman criticizing 
bidialecticalism, Hoffman notes the existence “of standardness [sic] in language” (28). He writes 
that in many parts of the world “bi-dialecticalism is normal and accepted” (30). Most 
importantly, Hoffman highlights how proponents and opponents of bi-dialectalism were 
themselves bidialectical or polydialectical (32). 
The very first line of Grace Holt’s article attempts to show what was happening in the 
African American community at the time: “The current drive by black people to affirm their 
cultural identity has important implications for theoretical bases of speech-language teaching 
functions in relationship to the quest for black awareness” (19). Thus, she establishes early on 
that her article will explore the disconnect between the teaching of English and the cultural pride 
some African Americans had for Black English (the term she uses). She believes the Ethno-
Linguistic Approach, designed to teach and improve the language skills of black students in 
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inner-city Chicago, provides a holistic way of helping students learn standard English while 
allowing students to maintain their linguistic identity (20-21). The program was a “modified bi-
dialectical” approach that did not call for a total separation of dialects (22). 
Finally, J. Mitchell Morse’s article is designed to challenge what he perceives to be 
“romanticism” associated with the use of Black English. According to him, students were 
increasingly insisting that white universities not only accept Black English but use Black English 
“as a language of instruction” (37). He then goes on to defend the existence of standard English 
and notes that whites, too, have their own dialects. The difference, Morse emphasizes, is that 
white dialect speakers who attend college are willing to learn standard English in order to ensure 
their own educational and employment success (40).  
Of course, Morse recognizes the psychological pain some students endure upon 
discovering that their dialects are considered inferior by the larger society; however, he believes 
that teachers should not tolerate college students who refuse to speak and write standard English 
in the classroom (41). As he sees it, Black English “is not a satisfactory medium for the 
communication of precise information or the development of clear ideas” (42). He then points to 
African Americans of the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries who used standard 
English when writing and speaking. Towards the end of the article, he characterizes Black 
English as the “language of slavery”—a language that represents the illiteracy of both the poor 
white overseer and the poor black slave (42-43). 
All of the authors in this section of the Bruch and Marback book seek to address the 
education of black students who speak and write in dialect. While Ossie Davis gives a first-
person account of what it is like to be African American, Morse tells his readers how African 
Americans feel about standard English.  In this respect, he speaks on behalf of African 
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Americans by articulating and critiquing their thoughts on standard English. Holt, meanwhile, 
speaks on behalf of African Americans by describing how they currently feel about their dialect 
and attempts to show how African Americans contribute to the education of black dialect 
speaking students. In other words, African American parents and their children are proactive 
when it comes to their education. 
 Like The Hope and Legacy, Stephen Parks’ Class Politics: The Movement for the 
“Students’ Right to Their Own Language” captures the historical educational events of the 1960s 
and 1970s and how these events contributed to the formation of SRTOL. He specifically focuses 
on the formation of educational organizations that spoke about and for a variety of constituencies 
including students, professors, impoverished communities, and professional organizations. Parks 
pays particular attention to four main organizations that addressed issues which overlapped with 
the SRTOL committees: Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), Black Panther 
Party (BPP), Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and New University Conference (UNC).  
All of these organizations engaged in Spivak’s notion of representation in that they attempted to 
provide enfranchisement to those traditionally shut out of the political, economic, and 
educational spheres. While the goals of the individual organizations were distinct, they were also 
relatable to the issues that the CCCC would address in SRTOL. 
The Black Panther Party, for example, fought for African Americans to not only have 
economic and political equality, but also have voice. Parks notes that the BPP was heavily 
influenced by the SNCC chairperson Stokely Carmichael’s theories on Black Power.  In his 
famous 1966 “Black Power” speech, Carmichael asserts that black people have to “define 
themselves as they see fit, and organize themselves as they see fit.” His speech was an 
acknowledgement and a repudiation of how others, namely whites, had spoken on behalf of 
75 
 
African Americans. Carmichael also emphasizes that “black people must be in positions of 
power, doing and articulating for themselves.” In other words, black people have to speak for 
and about black people. The BPP did this namely through its publications and its organized 
protests, as well as through its food, clothing, medical and legal drives established for 
impoverished African Americans (Carson x-xi; Parks 36-37).  
Though most people look at the BPP as a social organization, the BPP was also an 
educational one as well. The organization promoted an educational system, that, in the words of 
its October 1966 Black Panther Party Platform, “exposes the true nature of this decadent 
American society. We want education that teaches us our true history and our [African 
American] role in the present-day society” (2).  To this end, the BPP mandated members take 
“political education classes” and BPP leaders read for at least two hours daily (“Black Panther” 
6).   
The BPP influenced other educational organizations such as the New University 
Conference. NUC, formed in 1968, consisted of academics who stressed “political action within 
universities” (Parks 56). NUC, Parks writes, “[aligned] itself with the Black Panthers” (37) and 
established caucuses within academic organizations affiliated with sociology, psychology, 
anthropology, et cetera. NUC’s program, OUTS (Open Up the Schools), was a critique of how 
“higher education now served the function of training future employees for corporate America” 
(58); to address this issue, NUC suggested that colleges and universities recruit nontraditional 
students (single parents, for example) and end the educational tracking of students. Like the 
Black Panthers, NUC, emphasized education and “education that teaches us our true history and 
our role in present day society” (qtd. in Parks 58-59). 
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In fact, Parks devotes a good portion of the book discussing how NUC influenced the 
CCCC. He points to NUC’s sponsorship of workshops on composition, linguistics, and curricula 
biases at the 1969 CCCC conference (Parks 133). He also points to resolutions presented to the 
1969 CCCC Executive Committee. A memo entitled “The NUC at CCC and a Look ahead to 
NCTE” included the following resolution: 
CCCC and NCTE meetings and NCTE Executive Committees should work 
actively to make nonstandard dialects acceptable in all schools from kindergarten 
on and create an active articulation between the elementary schools, secondary 
schools, junior colleges and universities to deal with this problem. Linguists and 
English teachers should concentrate not on trying to teach everyone to speak and 
write upper middle class white dialect but rather on changing the attitude of 
society that discriminates against other dialects. Their efforts should be devoted to 
teaching the truths that all dialects are effective and valuable and that no dialect is 
any more indicative than any other of intelligence or even language ability on the 
part of the speaker. (qtd. in Parks 139) 
According to Parks, this resolution attracted the most attention at the Executive Committee 
meeting and “had spawned a formal CCCC committee” that would examine social dialects (140).  
Most importantly, this resolution called for the CCCC and NCTE to speak for those who speak 
nonstandard dialects. The NUC resolution called for the organizations to engage in advocacy by 
promoting the equality and importance of dialects.  
Though this resolution did not explicitly focus on the integration of schools and 
universities, it did implicitly show one of the problems occurring during the initial integration of 
schools and universities. For the first time, many teachers who did not have to work with 
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linguistically diverse students found themselves educating students who did not speak or write 
solely in standard English. Realizing that teachers needed to be proactive in understanding 
linguistics and the teaching of dialect-speaking students, McPherson says that the committee 
who created the SRTOL wrote the background statement because “universities have not provided 
linguistic training to help teachers understand [SRTOL]” (“Bait/Rebait” 10). Additionally, 
Smitherman points out that many CCCC members “[needed] to be educated about the current 
research on language variation, usage, and the history of American English” (“Retrospective” 
22). Thus, not only were CCCC committee members who created SRTOL interested in 
linguistics, but they were also interested in how linguistics could inform teaching. Linguistics, 
McPherson implies, is important to helping teachers understand the dialects their students speak 
and how to “deal sympathetically with all their students” (“Bait/Rebait”10). Lloyd-Jones comes 
out more forcefully when he states that teachers who work with the “nontraditional student” are 
ready to understand “Black English” (3) and advocate for the linguistic training among teachers. 
One advocate for linguistic training among teachers, Sister Mary Louise Vandover, at the 
1975 CCCC conference, argued that teachers needed to help students understand the flexibility 
of language and how people use it. She says, “In order to stress language, it will be necessary to 
educate and or reeducate many teachers in the principles discussed in the background statement 
to the resolution [SRTOL]. It will be necessary to reeducate parents and the general public on the 
nature of language itself” (4). Vandover not only addresses the lack of knowledge regarding 
language, but also the lack of knowledge of how language relates to rhetoric: “We should 
develop courses that teach the skills necessary for students to size up their audiences in order to 
select the most appropriate language for the situation” (3). In other words, students need to 
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realize that medical jargon is appropriate for doctors who talk to doctors, but not appropriate for 
doctors who talk to patients. 
Even those who opposed SRTOL during the 1970s acknowledged that teachers found 
themselves encountering not only students who did not speak standard English, but also theories 
on how to teach these students. These theories, of course, were based on an understanding of 
linguistics. David L. Shores, in fact, highlights three main approaches of helping students learn 
standard English: eradication, bidialeticalism, and “tolerance of dialectal variation” (11). Shores 
is against the last, for he emphasizes what he called a “sociolinguistic fact”: “Even in the most 
egalitarian and fluid of societies, usually a standard emerges and becomes a part of the 
sociolinguistic diversity. As a rule, that standard is the variety spoken and written by educated 
people” (13). While he doesn’t argue outright for eradication or bidialecticalism, he does believe 
that the CCCC uses SRTOL to “denigrate the acquisition of Standard English,” which he claims 
leads to a new type of language “despotism” (14). What I want to emphasize from the Shores’ 
article is what Geneva Smitherman emphasizes in her “Language Rights” article: teachers were 
encountering students who spoke and/or wrote in a different dialect than their own, and teachers 
needed guidance on how they should address this challenge, something SRTOL sought to 
address.  
One of the things I notice in Smitherman’s, McPherson’s, and Lloyd-Jones’s articles is 
that they do not adequately address the ways in which teachers worked with AAEV speakers, 
Appalachian speakers, et cetera, prior to the Civil Rights Movement. What they address is how 
teachers respond (or don’t respond) to dialect speakers in the classroom during the early days of 
integration.  While they may have been right about the lack of linguistic education among many 
English teachers, the implicit assumption is that most teachers did not understand how to work 
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with dialect speakers, when, in fact, some teachers had been teaching dialect speakers long 
before Brown v. Board of Education.  Thus, their re-presentation of teachers is limited. Though 
Smitherman does discuss bidialecticalism as a response to how to work with AAEV speaking 
students during the 1950s and 1960s, (therefore, showing that teachers were working with 
AAEV speakers), the major image I am left with from these articles is that all teachers just did 
not have much exposure to AAEV, Appalachian, and/or Chicano English speakers and little to no 
experience with how to provide instruction for dialect speaking students.    
This type of re-presentation of the English teacher excluded the experiences of thousands 
of teachers who not only worked with dialect speakers, but also worked with first-generation 
college students at historically black colleges and universities (HBCU). Thus, when Lloyd-Jones 
and Smitherman discuss the influx of “nontraditional” students in college during the 1970s, they 
seem to ignore the fact that HBCUs had been working with “nontraditional” students since their 
establishment during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Just before the creation of SRTOL, 
Lloyd-Jones says that there were several members of the CCCC, especially those who taught in 
community colleges, who “daily dealt with first generation college students, with older students, 
with people generally who felt like outsiders—these faculty mostly in community colleges were 
ready to relate their teaching of language to social concerns” (3). They wanted linguistic training 
that would help them discover ways to help the traditionally excluded academically succeed in 
the academy. SRTOL, Smitherman states, was a “[response] to a developing crisis in college 
composition classrooms, a crisis caused by the cultural and linguistic mismatch between higher 
education and the nontraditional (by virtue of color and class) students who were making their 
imprint upon the academic landscape for the first time in history” (“Historical” 19). Notice that 
she uses the word “crisis” twice to highlight the urgency or the exigency of the situation being 
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addressed. But notice, also, that she assumes that “nontraditional” students had not been a part of 
“the academic landscape.”  
While the works of Smitherman and Lloyd-Jones emphasize the emergence of the 
nontraditional student into the college classroom, they do not go in depth regarding open 
admissions policies many colleges adopted during the 1960s and 1970s. The most famous of the 
open admissions universities was City University of New York (CUNY). According to the 
former CUNY president, Robert Marshak, the open admissions policy “did not guarantee a place 
at City College (or any other senior college at the City University) to every graduate of a New 
York City public high school” (Marshak and Wurtemburg 14). Rather, the open admissions 
process allowed public school graduates in New York City to attend one of the community 
colleges; additionally, “students who maintained an 80 percent average or better, or who finished 
in the top half of their graduating class could enter a CUNY senior college” (14). This policy was 
put into place when the Board of Higher Education realized that contrary to its mission of 
educating working class students, its restrictive admission policies prevented many low-income 
students from entering the educational institution (Marshak and Wurtemburg 14-15). According 
to David E. Lavin and David B. Crook, this realization came partly as a result of a 1969 student 
protest (led by African Americans, Latinos, and progressive whites) regarding the lack of 
minority representation at CUNY (392). While many in the media assumed that open admissions 
would primarily benefit blacks and Latinos who came from working class families, Lavin and 
Crook assert that it was beneficial to whites as well; “almost a third of white senior-college 
freshmen were open admissions students” (399). Moreover, their study shows that white open 
admissions students were more likely than minority students to receive a bachelor’s degree (415-
16). Thus, Lavin and Crook use their article to correct the misre-presentation of CUNY and the 
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people who benefitted from the open admissions policy. However, the important thing to 
remember is what Mina P. Shaunghessy emphasized in her work 1977 Errors and Expectations: 
The students who came to CUNY represented “academic winners and losers from the best and 
worst high schools in the country, the children of the lettered and illiterate, the blue-collared, the 
white-collared, and the unemployed . . .” (2). The students also represented communities where 
people spoke and wrote in dialects other than standard English.  
Thus, we can see that during the 1960s and 1970s, teachers were encountering students 
who spoke dialects other than standard English; additionally, the CCCC was being influenced by 
members who took an interest in sociolinguistics and wanted to the CCCC to take a stand on 
language discrimination within the educational system. Hence, we see the pressure the CCCC 
felt to take a stand and address issues related to students’ right to their own language. Because I 
will provide more in-depth information regarding the creation of SRTOL in subsequent chapters, 
I will begin my next section exploring the reactions to SRTOL during and after its creation. 
 
Reactions to “Students’ Right to Their Own Language” 
Although the formal membership of CCCC approved SRTOL in 1974, the CCCC 
actually mailed its members the first formal draft of SRTOL entitled “Student’s Right to His 
Own Language” in 1972.  This resolution, which had been accepted by the Executive Committee 
in March of 1972, elicited various responses from CCCC members. Many of these responses 
were initially published in the College Composition and Communication (CCC), the official 
journal of the CCCC. In 1972, William H. Pixton wrote that the document would “result in a 
chaos of dialects that will hamper communication and promote ignorance” (Letter 300). As if 
showing how this could be achieved, John R. Henrickson proclaimed, “Praiz be for I hav live to 
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see grandpas personl-type Tibetan-Amurican inglish vidikated” (300). Robert P. Saalbach 
believed that STROL advocated an “anything goes” approach to the teaching of writing (416). 
And Garland Cannon, in his 1973 article, “Multidialects: The Student’s Right to His Own 
Language” maintained that the “proposed resolution may not be realistically implemented in the 
classroom” especially since teachers were not trained in linguistics nor cross-cultural 
communication (383). As readers can see, Pixton, Henrickson, and Cannon re-present SRTOL as 
pedagogically dangerous since, from their perspective, the document promotes “ignorance” and 
is unrealistic.  
Despite criticism of the document, “Student’s Right to His Own Language”—later 
renamed “Students’ Right to Their Own Language” –was passed by the official membership in 
1974. Of course, its passage was controversial, especially since it (a) passed with only seventy 
nine votes (Parks 173) and (b) probably “could not have been voted on and probably would not 
have passed” had the CCCC’s Executive Committee not modified, in 1972, the original rules 
about what was considered a quorum and a majority at its CCCC conference business meetings 
(Parks 198).
16
 Not only did the document undergo a name change replete with changes in the 
pronouns (going from a male gender to the neutral plural), but it also included a background 
statement on linguistics and education. 
When SRTOL officially passed, several critics wrote articles and letters regarding the 
document, especially within the first ten years of its adoption. Many of these publications 
focused on the writer’s stance and took on a “you’re either for or against” SRTOL tone.  From 
1984-1994, the number of publications regarding SRTOL dwindled. Despite this, the articles that 
did come out focused on the nuances of the document and how the document influenced 
teaching. Since 1994, there has been an uptick in the number of publications devoted to the study 
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of SRTOL. Unlike the first decade of SRTOL’s release, many of the critics view SRTOL in a 
favorable light. 
In reviewing the critical responses to SRTOL, I discovered that many could be 
categorized by the following: 1) the role of teachers in helping students achieve higher education 
and employment; 2) the philosophy of language; 3) the use of SRTOL in teaching; and 4) the 
teaching of students of color. Though some publications can easily encompass two or more 
categories, I have decided that using these main categories will make it easier for the reader to 
understand the various interpretations and reinterpretations of the document. 
 
Teachers’ Role in Employment and Educational Preparation 
Many of the early articles and letters generally focused on the roles that teachers had in 
helping students achieve access to higher education and employment. SRTOL opponents, such as 
Pixton, Susan Passler Miller, Shores, and J. Mitchell Morse felt that SRTOL was inherently 
antithetical to the teaching of a standard English. They felt that if teachers did not teach standard 
English, students would find themselves ghettoized educationally and socially. Though Thomas 
J. Farrell believed that SRTOL was justified in advising teachers to not emphasize the teaching 
of EAE to novice writers, he asserted that SRTOL did a disservice to students since SRTOL 
“[appears] to be against attempts being made at any time in the instructional process to get 
students to learn to write in—or at least to ‘edit in’—the conventions of syntax, spelling, and 
punctuation that constitute EAE” (349). Farrell, like the aforementioned writers, seemed to 
believe that EAE was better especially because it was a “more readable than unconventional 
forms of writing” (348). However, what he failed to acknowledge is that EAE appears to be more 
“readable” because it is in a form that he and others are used to reading.  
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Interestingly, both Pixton and Morse, like Henrickson, engaged in derision to make their 
points.  In his “Open Letter of Congratulation to the NCTE for the 1974 Resolutions” Pixton 
sarcastically congratulated his NCTE “colleagues” for “passing the resolution affirming students’ 
own rights to their language, for the implementation of this sound resolution will help students 
remain as blissfully ignorant in the future as they are in high school, and thus, they will never 
know anything of history, philosophy, mathematics, politics, government or English” (93).  Here 
he implied that students would be intellectually deficient, and thus, unable to enjoy future 
educational and perhaps economic prospects. In a 1976 editorial to the New York Times, J. 
Mitchell Morse mocked SRTOL by publishing what he implied were writings by college 
students. After each excerpt, he wrote: “Students have a right to their own language, says the 
Council,” thus re-representing the CCCC as an organization that condones misspellings, subject-
verb disagreements, and other syntax issues (“Riting” 38). 
Notice how Pixton and Morse engage in the rituals of speaking. By making fun of NCTE, 
the umbrella group for the CCCC, and the CCCC itself, they assert their superiority over the 
organization that created SRTOL. By doing this, they re-create the CCCC as an irresponsible 
organization that cannot and should not speak for students. Additionally, they also make the 
students for whom they speak, seem “blissfully ignorant” about the conventions of written 
language and the role that not mastering these conventions play in their ability to get into and 
succeed in college. 
 
Philosophy of Language 
During the 1970s and 1980s, critics also commented on the philosophical issue of 
language and what it meant for people to have a “right to their own language.” This debate 
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highlighted not just the philosophical beliefs about language but also the pedagogical belief 
about how language should be taught. This, in turn, led critics to try to understand how SRTOL 
informs or does not inform the teaching of writing.  
SRTOL proponents, including Glissmeyer, Lawrence Freeman, and James Sledd wrote 
articles highlighting their philosophical views on language and the way in which SRTOL 
conformed to their beliefs. Taking a post-colonial perspective, Gloria Glissmeyer believed that 
there was an “individual” right to language. To Glissmeyer, language was “a tool for our own 
and not someone else’s imposed use” (203). Language, Glissmeyer emphasized, could lead to 
personal growth because it allowed the individual to express himself or herself (206-07). 
Freeman took the philosophical  discussion of language a step further to argue that SRTOL’s 
belief in the individuals’ “right to their own language” was justified through the First, Ninth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States (25).  James Sledd, meanwhile, discussed language 
from a sociopolitical standpoint. Standard English was the “bosses’ language” (669); this 
language, he implied, should not be forced upon students who do not wish write or speak it. The 
students he primarily focused on were those who were impoverished economically: he wrote that 
these students “have much greater concerns than the details of usage, the study of socially graded 
synonyms” (673). Though he said that the document was not perfect, he, nonetheless, praised the 
Committee for recognizing the diversity of student experiences; the protection of students when 
their dialects are attacked or ridiculed; and recognizing the need to improve current pedagogy 
(673-75). 
Like Vandover, Glissmeyer, and Kelly, Milton Baxter supported and saw the need for 
SRTOL. According to Baxter, SRTOL could encourage dialogue between teacher and student, 
and, if implemented correctly, would help teachers “run the risk of learning their [students’] 
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language” (681). His issue was that the “right to language” had not been adequately addressed in 
the document. Baxter, for example, pointed to the fact that SRTOL focused on written and 
spoken language, but not necessarily on cultural behaviors used for rhetorical purposes. Should a 
teacher uphold his/her students’ right to their own language when students rhetorically engage in 
behaviors (such as “eye rolling”) not completely accepted in mainstream America? 
The idea that language was rhetoric and a “social act” led some critics to question the 
idea that an individual had a “right” to language. Allen Smith, in fact, called language a “social 
act.” He believed that individuals “did not have a right to ‘their own’ language” (155). If an 
individual’s language were looked upon as a “right,” then Smith asserted, “[We] have no right to 
change it at any point” (156). For Smith, language was about the rhetoric between a speaker (or 
writer) and an audience. Like Pixton and Morse, Smith believed that teaching “clarity, precision, 
specificity, and logic” (158) were important; and like them, he implied that all of the 
aforementioned could be accomplished though the knowledge of standards and an exposure of 
the “best writing from the past” (157). 
The idea that language was a form of communication that must be understood by two or 
more people was evident in the pro-con article, published in the 1974 issue of Inside English: 
Journal of the English Council of California Two-Year Colleges. Discussing the need for 
students to understand EAE, the anonymous writer, speaking on behalf of society, explained, “I 
for one will not lead the student to expect that society will trouble itself much to accommodate 
him” (“Students’ Right” 2). In other words, the student must accommodate to society. This, of 
course, is reminiscent of Allen Smith’s belief of language being a “social act” and is a critique of 
the way in which SRTOL assumes that standard English speakers should accommodate the 
linguistic needs of those who speak variants of standard English. 
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Since 1994, there have been more publications on the history and acceptance of SRTOL. 
Many of these accounts have already been discussed earlier. Though Keith Gilyard’s article, 
“Holdin’ It Down: Students’ Right and the Struggle for Diversity” is a critique of Stephen Parks’ 
work, he questions how a student’s right to language can be institutionalized. In some ways, 
Patrick Bruch and Richard Marback address that issue. 
Examining SRTOL as a document which specifically addressed racial justice through 
dignity, Bruch and Marback sought to show that “dignity” was not just a moral concept, but was 
also a form of “political practice.” In their 1997 article, “Race Identity, Writing, and the Politics 
of Dignity: Reinvigorating the Ethics of ‘Students’ Right to Their Own Language,’” the authors 
explored how dignity was a determining factor to how people “interact democratically.” While 
the authors acknowledged the SRTOL promoted the dignity of students who use dialects other 
than standard English, they also said that SRTOL endorsed the assimilation of students through 
its confirmation of EAE as a common language. Thus, SRTOL ultimately encouraged the 
institutionalization of students within the dominant language culture. 
Not only did Bruch and Marback examine the concept of dignity within SRTOL, but they 
also examined the ever-changing understanding of “rights” in their 2002 work, “Race, Literacy 
and the Value of Rights Rhetoric in Composition Studies.” For example, “rights” could be 
limited to or could encompass voting rights, citizenship rights, civil rights, et cetera. Bruck and 
Marback raised several questions about rights as discussed in SRTOL. “When we, as teachers, 
acknowledge the rights of others, how far must we go in order to protect and advocate for those 
rights? Should our advocacy aim at a kind of social engineering that works to shift the accepted 
status of mainstream conventions, marginalized conventions, or both?” (662) Thus, Bruch and 
Marback questioned how far a teacher could go in terms of speaking on behalf of others and how 
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far teachers could go in promoting their own philosophy of language to their students and to the 
society.  
 
The Use of SRTOL for Teaching 
Though it seemed that many critics interpreted SRTOL as a justification for not teaching 
standard English, critic Lou Kelly in his article, “Is Competent Copyreading
17
 a Violation of the 
Students’ Right to Their Own Language” discussed how SRTOL could be used to inform 
teaching. He asserted that copyreading was not a violation of SRTOL. Students should be 
allowed to “speak their own language on paper, with their own voices, without worrying about 
the social conventions” (258). Afterward, teachers should discuss with students how audiences 
might respond rhetorically to student writing and how students could influence the way the 
audience responded to it. 
As mentioned earlier, during the late 1970s and early 1980s, writers made clear whether 
or not they supported or opposed SRTOL.  In 1985, Eleanor Kutz articulated a more nuanced 
approach to SRTOL in her article, “Between Students’ Language and Academic Discourse: 
Interlanguage as Middle Ground.” Instead of focusing her article on AAEV speakers (as others 
had done), she instead discussed the need for all students to learn academic discourse, which she 
surmised most students did not know when they entered college. According to Kutz, teaching 
academic discourse was not antithetical to SRTOL. In fact, Kutz argued that SRTOL justified the 
teaching of academic discourse because it encouraged the development of multiple styles of 
writing, rather than a replacement of a writing style (388). To her SRTOL did not represent an 
“everything goes” approach to teaching writing, a charged leveled by opponents of SRTOL. 
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Instead, she asserted that SRTOL promoted an “everything goes somewhere” approach to 
writing (386).   
Other critics asserted that SRTOL was applicable to the teaching of voice and style. 
Though his 1988 paper presentation at the CCCC did not spend considerable time discussing 
SRTOL, Randall Albers believed that SRTOL could be used to teach voice. Deeming that the 
story workshop method was the most effective way to teach voice, Albers said that this method 
worked best if teachers accept “students’ right to their own language, their cultural background, 
and their skill level” (10).  Paul Butler, in his 2008 article, believed that SRTOL’s interest in the 
students’ “dialect of their nurture or whatever dialect in which they find their own identity and 
style,” reinforced the belief that style was important component of content in writing. He argued 
that Rhetoric and Composition had not paid enough attention to how SRTOL addressed style not 
only in the classroom but also in the public sphere (Butler 68-70). Thus, we see the beginnings of 
how SRTOL is re-presented as a document that can be used to teach writing. 
Though there were articles written during the late twentieth century arguing that SRTOL 
could be used to teach writing, there were few books or articles showing how SRTOL could be 
incorporated into the curricula. During the early twenty-first century, however, that changed. 
Scott Wible’s 2006 “Pedagogies of the ‘Students’ Right’ Era: The Language Curriculum 
Research Group’s Project for Linguistic Diversity” examined the pedagogy of the Language 
Curriculum Research Group (LCRG) whose goal, during the 1960s and 1970s, was to “create 
exercises and writing assignments for a composition textbook that would allow students to learn 
about the language varieties of their communities as well as how to edit their prose to reflect the 
SE conventions expected by most teachers in college courses” (446). By providing concrete 
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examples of writing assignments and readings found in this unpublished textbook, Wible showed 
his readers what SRTOL-inspired exercises looked like.  
Like LCRG that used principles promoted by SRTOL to create pedagogy, Valerie Felita 
Kinloch also used principles found in SRTOL to shape her class. In her 2005 work, “Revisiting 
the Promise of Students’ Right to Their Own Language: Pedagogical Strategies,” Kinloch set out 
to show readers how she interpreted SRTOL within her composition classroom. Kinloch 
structured her composition course so that students could help select reading materials.  The 
materials they selected dealt with pedagogy and language issues. The texts were used to 
explicitly discuss SRTOL and issues related to the document.  
While it seemed that many of the writers during the 1990s and 2000s were supportive of 
SRTOL, readers need to be cognizant that not everyone was enthusiastic about the document. In 
2004, Allen Berger, for example, wrote that the document was outdated in regards to its 
discussion of language acquisition and the relationship between dialect and employability (19-
20). Likewise, Jeff Zorn, in 2010, asserted that the SRTOL “feeds into a reactionary politics of 
ethnic-cultural chauvinism” (313).  
One of the major issues regarding the acceptability of SRTOL revolves around teacher 
understanding of the document, and, more importantly, teacher knowledge that the document 
exits. In 1993, Terry Lynn Irons presented research regarding acceptance of the principles of 
SRTOL at three unnamed colleges. He received 423 responses, around 90% of them from 
students and around 9% from instructors. Unfortunately, the study did not indicate the type of 
colleges (teaching institution, research institution, Ivy League, et. cetera.) participating in the 
survey, nor did it discuss the region(s) where the colleges were located. Having this information 
could give people a sense of whether SRTOL was accepted more at specific types of higher 
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education institutions as well as give people a sense of whether there were regional differences in 
terms of acceptability.  
Irons acknowledged that the vast majority of the respondents were white and represented 
“essentially white attitudes” (64). The survey showed that 50% of the respondents agreed that 
“students should be able to use in school the variety of language they grow up speaking at 
home”; 45% agreed that “students should be able to speak their home language in the 
classroom”; and 27% agreed that “students should be able to write in their home language in the 
classroom” (70). Irons pointed out in his discussion that 96% agreed that “the function of the 
schools is to teach Standard English.” He asked about what this percentage meant in light of the 
linguistic diversity SRTOL advocated (62). Unfortunately, Irons did not reveal if the students 
and instructors filling out the form were in fields related to Rhetoric and Composition or to 
literature or if they read all of the SRTOL document (including the background statement) or 
only the SRTOL resolution. 
The next major study done on SRTOL was conducted from 1996-1998 and was published 
in 2003. In her article “Race, Class(es), Gender, and Age: The Making of Knowledge Diversity,” 
Elaine Richardson noted that despite the numerous publications about SRTOL in academic 
journal articles related to Rhetoric and Composition, the survey showed that 41.6 % of CCCC 
members and 79.3% of NCTE did not know about SRTOL. Additionally, 38.5% of those 
teaching on the university level were not aware of SRTOL and 55.6% of those teaching on the 
community college level were not familiar with SRTOL. Thus, this article allowed readers to 
think about not only the lack of knowledge about SRTOL among professionals of English, but 
also how SRTOL—and the CCCC—failed to influence the teaching of writing among teachers at 
the time (58-62). 
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The Teaching of Students of Color 
Just as we do not have many studies on teacher acceptance of SRTOL, we also do not 
have many studies on student acceptance of SRTOL. In addition to the Irons article I discussed 
earlier, another article I found examining student acceptance was Valerie Kinloch’s article, “’To 
Not Be a Traitor of Black English’: Youth Perceptions of Language Rights in an Urban 
Context.” One section of the article explored how two Harlem-based students viewed their own 
dialects in light of SRTOL. Her research showed that the students had contradictory attitudes 
towards SRTOL. Philip liked how SRTOL valued dialect speakers and their contributions to 
society, but he wondered how SRTOL would be used to help dialect speakers, especially African 
Americans, achieve a quality education. Like Philip, Khaleeq appreciated SRTOL and its 
emphasis on preserving linguistic cultures. However, he felt that SRTOL could potentially be 
used to justify “vulgar language” and a refusal to learn standard English: “No person has a right 
to have that power in taking away others’ culture, but the students don’t have a right to use 
vulgar language because of anger or to not learn how to use standardized English to get ahead” 
(qtd. in Kinloch 122-123). 
While Kinloch’s article is important in terms of showing us how students respond to 
SRTOL, most articles that discuss students and SRTOL speak about students without 
incorporating student voices. This is especially true during 1970s and early 1980s with the 
proliferation of “pro and con” articles about SRTOL. These articles not only justify the 
dichotomy between supporters and proponents of SRTOL but they also allow proponents and 
opponents to define themselves and the students for whom they advocated.   
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One of the most interesting “pro-con” articles involved a re-imagining of a conference. 
This re-imagining allowed for the writer to speak on behalf of other people. In Stephen Judy’s 
“Editor’s Page: The Students [sic] Right to Their Own Language: A Dialogue” Judy imagined a 
convention debate among a high school English teacher, a parent, a journalist, and a linguist. Not 
surprisingly the linguist and the high school English teacher defended SRTOL and the parent and 
journalist opposed SRTOL. They debated the definition and existence of standard English; the 
purpose of school and how schools prepared students for the world; and exactly who benefitted 
from SRTOL. What is most fascinating about the article is how Judy attempted to re-present  a 
typical teacher, parent, journalist, and linguist. For example, the parent said, “I can be a pluralist, 
too. I see why, for example, Black people have been insisting on having their own literature 
included in the schools. Black pride and all that” (7). By doing this, Judy hinted that the parent 
was white, without actually saying it, and looked at “Black pride and all that” from a racist, if 
not, sarcastic perspective. The teacher, on the other hand, was defensive when the journalist said 
that the teacher would not “impose standard English” on students, but instead “frighten them into 
using [a standard dialect]”: “I am not passive with my kids,” the teacher said. “I have them 
writing all the time, speaking all the time. They are constantly engaged in using language in new 
situations” (8).  By the end of the debate, nothing was resolved. This non resolution is important 
for it hints that SRTOL, by the publication of this 1978 article, had not resolved any debates 
regarding the pedagogy of English and would not resolve it in the near future. 
In fact this debate was carried on in the 1980 through the “Bait/Rebait: ‘The Students’ 
Right to Their Own Language’” article published in the English Journal. This time, Elisabeth 
McPherson, one of the key CCCC members who helped create SRTOL, argued that SRTOL was 
not about restricting the use of EAE; rather it was about students understanding how to use a 
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variety of dialects in a variety of situations. Moreover, SRTOL was designed to encourage 
teachers to study language issues as a part of their pedagogical training so that they would be 
able to work with students who did not speak and/or write in standard English (8, 12).  
At the other end of the spectrum, C. Lamar Thompson and Juanita V. Williamson pointed 
out the problems teachers had in evaluating students based on SRTOL. As an example, they 
wrote of the teacher “who said at a meeting of college English teachers, ‘When my Black student 
writes ‘he done it,’ I smile and tell him that is his dialect. When my white student writes, ‘he 
done it,’ I call him in and tell him that is not his dialect” (qtd. in McPhearson, Thompson, and 
Williamson 9). Of course, one of the issues that Thompson and Williamson inadvertently pointed 
out and unfortunately did not comment on was that the teacher in the example clearly did not 
have the linguistic training to understand that whites too could speak African American English 
Vernacular, especially if they lived in a community where it was  spoken; moreover Southern 
English shares some similarities to AAEV and if the student in the example spoke Southern 
English and the teacher did not know it, then she would definitely need linguistic training. What 
was not said but was understood was that SRTOL, according to Thompson and Williamson, 
allowed for black students to be graded more leniently than white students. 
Notice how the pro-con articles assume that the primary beneficiaries of SRTOL are 
African American students. Though the resolution itself does not specify a race of people to 
protect and the background statement alludes to a variety of dialects including African American 
English Vernacular, the general assumption is that SRTOL is for black students. Both Thompson 
and Williamson and the imagined mother in the Judy piece treat African American students as 
the “Other.” The imagined mother and Thompson and Williamson assume to know how African 
Americans speak and the perspectives African Americans have about language. Of course, 
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Thompson and Williamson and Judy are not the only critics to link SRTOL to African 
Americans. Pixton, Sledd, Kelly, and Baxter do as well. By defining the beneficiaries of SRTOL 
as black, the critics re-create the United States as a country with two dialects—standard English 
and AAEV; they also ignore the various forms of Spanglish, Hawaiian Creole, Cajun, and other 
dialects that Americans use in their daily lives. 
Additionally, some critics also assume that there is only one way to communicate within 
academic circles. The focus on students needing to know standard English takes a back-seat to 
the fact that some scholars have been able to blend standard English and other languages and 
dialects.  In 1991, one critic, D. Alexander Holiday, believed SRTOL was important not only for 
students, but for teachers. In this autobiographical essay, Holiday wrote of being “whitewashed” 
as a college student and feeling compelled to give up his voice (16). What makes this work 
important is that it is an academic piece which merges elements of AAEV into it. Holiday thus 
shows that AAEV can coexist within academic discourse. In fact Holiday wrote, “I have taken a 
few liberties with my language to present a discourse in your language” (16). This, he went to 
say, represented a form of double-consciousness, an attempt to reconcile AAEV with EAE 
(16).
18
 
Holiday’s paper helps readers understand how an African American writer feels about 
SRTOL and how he would have appreciated SRTOL being incorporated into his school 
curriculum. Sensing that African Americans would approve of SRTOL, Elizabeth Fitts, in her 
1991 paper presented to the Meeting of the Alabama Association for Developmental Education, 
attempted to speak on behalf of African American students when she wrote, “Many of our 
African-American students would quickly agree with the Language Statement of CCCC and the 
thinking of the members of the socio-politico-linguistic camp” (6). The problem I have with 
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Fitt’s statement is the assumption that African Americans students would automatically agree 
with the statement. Unlike Kinloch, Fitts did not interview African American students to get their 
perspectives on SRTOL.  
Though there were critics who defined the SRTOL student as being African American, 
there were also critics who asserted who the SRTOL student is not. Bruce Horner, for example, 
argued that SRTOL was not designed to help English Language Learners. He posited that 
SRTOL privileged English and dialects of English, especially since SRTOL background 
statement only mentioned early settlers coming from Britain, but not other countries where 
English was not spoken. He also criticized SRTOL for assuming that each dialect of English was 
“discrete and homogenous” (743). As far as he was concerned SRTOL promoted an “English 
Only” policy in the classroom. Thus, the only students who had a “right to their own language” 
were those who spoke English. 
Though there are scholars today who link SRTOL to African American students, more 
scholars are examining the document in relationship to other groups of people. A collection of 
essays, Affirming Students’ Right to Their Own Language, features articles showing how SRTOL 
responds to the historical legacies of English Standard schools in Hawaii and Native American 
boarding schools. Additionally, the book also shows how SRTOL is being undermined by 
current educational policies such as No Child Left Behind. Unlike Horner, who asserted that 
“Students’ Right” only applied to dialects of English, several scholars in Affirming Students’ 
Right apply SRTOL to English Language Learners.  What makes Affirming Students’ Right 
unique, however, is the transnational focus of SRTOL. Several scholars write of how the 
principles of SRTOL are carried out in countries including Greece, India, and South Africa. By 
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and large, the purpose of Affirming Students’ Right is to show teachers how SRTOL can inform 
pedagogy and to provide concrete examples of how SRTOL can be used in the classroom.  
Though it seems from many of the essays and books published that critics assumed 
African American students as the beneficiaries of STROL, newer interpretations of STROL 
show that English language learners, Native Americans, Latinos, and others also benefit from 
STROL. Of course, the term “beneficiary” may not be the best term given the fact that statistics 
show that many English teachers do not know about SRTOL; thus, who benefits from the 
document is questionable. What is not questionable is the fact that critics today are trying to find 
ways of making STROL relevant for today’s classroom. Whereas in the 1970s, the articles 
regarding SRTOL placed emphasis on the nontraditional college student, today the emphasis is 
also on the elementary and secondary school student who may not be black, who may be an 
immigrant, who may be poor, who may have an accent, et cetera. In other words, who SRTOL 
speaks for is changing. 
 
Conclusion 
Although this chapter does not represent all that has been published regarding SRTOL, it 
does represent some of the major themes that critics have addressed. Moreover, the chapter 
serves as an examination of how critics responded to and interpreted SRTOL.  By highlighting 
how critics have responded to SRTOL, I have also highlighted the “rituals of speaking” within 
the discussion of the document. As Alcoff states, “The rituals of speaking that involve the 
location of the speaker and listeners affect whether a claim is taken as a true, well-reasoned, 
compelling argument or a significant idea” (13). As you probably noticed in reading the history 
of SRTOL, critics not only spoke to the CCCC through the articles they submitted to 
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publications read by members of the CCCC, but they also indicated what they saw as “truths” 
and “falsehoods” within SRTOL.   
Additionally, I have used this chapter to show how critics engage in speaking on behalf 
of others. I noted the way in which we can see Spivak’s and Alcoff’s concepts of speaking on 
behalf of others within the publications on SRTOL. What I have not done, but what I will do in 
the next three chapters, is show how speaking on behalf of others can be seen from the context of 
the rhetorical situation.  
As I noted in the introduction, Bitzer’s rhetorical situation plays a prominent role in this 
study. As such, I will begin the next chapter by introducing Bitzer’s rhetorical situation and 
discuss how a speaker’s social location affects the way a speaker presents the exigences within a 
text. I will pay close attention to how the CCCC envisions its own social location (or identity) 
within the academy and among its members and theorize the impact that this social location had 
on how the CCCC presented the exigencies within SRTOL. Most importantly, I will identify 
how the CCCC speaks on behalf of others as it discusses the exigences within SRTOL. By doing 
this, I hope to give a rhetorical context of how speaking on behalf of others is done with SRTOL. 
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Chapter Three: 
The Rhetoric of Speaking on Behalf of Others: The Exigencies 
 
While Alcoff’s and Spivak’s theories on speaking for and about others are valuable, what 
they do not focus on is the rhetorical urgency some people have to engage in this practice.   
Both, for example, highlight how those who have power speak on behalf of those who don’t and 
what that means for those who cannot speak. Additionally, they focus on individuals who speak 
on behalf of others, not organizations that do so. This complicates the discussion considerably 
because an organization is a collective unit made up of individuals who may or may not agree 
with all of the goals of the organization.  Further complicating the discussion is that the 
audiences (invoked, or imagined, or addressed) may not necessarily take into consideration 
individual disagreement and therefore assume that everyone has the same point of view. This, of 
course, is what makes the discussion of how the CCCC speaks on behalf of others through 
SRTOL so complex. 
What I want to do is highlight a rhetorical theory that emphasizes how speaker, subject, 
and audience combine to produce a situation in which the rhetor feels compelled to speak on 
behalf of others, not only because he or she has the power to, but also because he or she wants 
the audience to effect a needed change in a situation. I argue that Bitzer’s rhetorical situation can 
help readers understand not only how rhetors engage in speaking on behalf of others, but also 
how it is that audiences accept the rhetors’ role in speaking on behalf of others.  Despite the 
criticism Bitzer’s theory has received for over forty years, Bitzer does provides us with a 
sophisticated model of the rhetorical situation, one that elaborates its three salient features---
exigence, audience, and constraints. Of these, he observes that a rhetorical exigence has the 
power to move or prompt the rhetor to take verbal action in order to address an urgent crisis or 
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problem. What Bitzer does not do is acknowledge that in taking action, the rhetor may be, and 
often is, compelled to speak on behalf of others.  
Instead the rhetorical situation, as explained by Bitzer, is used to help people visualize 
“the nature of those contexts in which speakers or writers create rhetorical discourse” 
(“Rhetorical” 1). Unfortunately, Bitzer and other commentators of the rhetorical situation have 
not explicitly discussed the way in which rhetorical discourse is used to speak on behalf of others 
in a given rhetorical situation. Since the creation of STROL occurs within a rhetorical discourse 
and writers both for and against seem to have a shared understanding of issues which influenced 
the creation of SRTOL (namely the integration of AAEV speakers in predominately schools and 
new theoretical understandings of the legitimacy of nonstandard English dialects), the rhetorical 
situation seems to be the best way to understand the motivations rhetors have to speak on behalf 
of others and how audiences respond to this actuality. 
 Bitzer defines rhetoric as “a mode of altering reality, not by direct application of energy 
to objects, but by the creation of discourse which changes reality through the mediation of 
thought and action” (“Rhetorical” 3). For the committee who created SRTOL, the resolution and 
the background statement act as means of challenging the belief (or the “reality”) that teachers 
and school systems should be responsible for delegitimizing dialects other than standard English. 
To Bitzer, rhetorical discourse does not come out of the blue; rather it comes because of a 
situation that the rhetor feels compelled to respond to.  In fact, he emphasizes that rhetorical 
discourse “comes into existence because of some specific condition or situation which invites 
utterance” (“Rhetorical” 4). The condition or situation is “objective, publicly observable, and 
historic” (“Rhetorical” 11). 
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 The idea that the rhetorical situation is objective has been rebuked by several critics, 
namely Richard E. Vatz and Scott Consigny. Vatz, for example, believes that the rhetor 
perceives and interprets the rhetorical situation; because of this, the rhetor has the power to 
determine the meaning of the exigence (156-57). To Vatz, “utterance strongly invites exigence” 
(159): that is, how one discusses the situation determines how one constructs the exigence within 
the situation. Though Consigny disagrees with Vatz’s belief that “the rhetor [is] completely free 
to create his own exigencies at will” (178), he also disagrees with the simplicity of Bitzer’s belief 
that a rhetor within a given rhetorical situation is working within a “determinate context.” 
Consigny believes that a rhetor works within an “indeterminate context” that allows him or her 
to interrogate the situation and “to formulate or discover relevant possible problems in an 
indeterminate situation” (177).  
In this chapter, I will explore the identity of the CCCC and how that identity related to 
how it approached the discussion of the exigencies SRTOL addressed. Throughout chapter two, I 
noted how several critics discussed the exigencies that the CCCC explored in SRTOL. These 
included the existence of linguistic discrimination, the lack of linguistic training for teachers of 
English; and the theories regarding the teaching of students who speak and write in dialects other 
than standard English. Because critics saw the exigencies, they seem to exemplify Bitzer’s belief 
that the rhetorical situation is objective. 
 
Understanding a Situated Discourse 
 In a rhetorical situation, an utterance occurs because an exigence exists and needs to be 
modified through discourse; to repeat, Bitzer defines exigence as “an imperfection marked by 
urgency; it is a defect, an obstacle, something waiting to be done, a thing which is other than it 
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should be” (“Rhetorical” 6). In other words, the exigence is a problem that the rhetor wants to 
address with the audience so it can assist in the “positive modification” of the exigence. The 
exigence, Bitzer goes on to say, “functions as the organizing principle: it specifies the audience 
to be addressed and the change to be effected” (“Rhetorical” 6-7). As an example of an exigence, 
Bitzer points to pollution. A rhetor is motivated to address pollution as an exigence and 
encourages the rhetorical audience to do what it can to reduce pollution. The rhetorical audience, 
Bitzer emphasizes, is comprised of people who “influenced by discourse” can serve as 
“mediators of change” (“Rhetorical” 7). In this situation, the rhetorical audience can be 
government agencies and/or environmental groups that can establish and promote policies to 
reduce pollution.  
Within the rhetorical situation is the constraint, which, as Bitzer explains, can be made up 
of “persons, events, objects, and relations,” any of which can “constrain action needed to modify 
the exigence” (“Rhetorical” 8). In the aforementioned example of a rhetor encouraging the 
reduction of pollution, the rhetor may find that a lobbyist for pollution-producing factories can 
serve as a constraint, especially if the lobbyist is able to convince government agencies that 
pollution from factories is not a major problem.  But then again, if pollution-producing factories 
have a bad reputation among various groups, the rhetor can use this constraint to his or her 
advantage. The rhetor can encourage the rhetorical audience not to support the factories. 
Likewise, the constraint can come from outside the rhetor and within the rhetor. For example, if 
the rhetorical audience doesn’t trust the rhetor or finds his or her argument illogical, the rhetor 
himself or herself becomes a negative constraint. However, if the rhetor has a good reputation 
and is able to connect with the rhetorical audience, the rhetor reputation becomes a positive 
constraint. 
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 In sum, when we think about the rhetorical situation that influenced the production of 
SRTOL, we need to think about three interrelated components: the exigencies, which serve as the 
unifying components of the situation; the rhetorical audience, which has the ability to hear and 
react to discourse; and the constraints, which can prevent or help the rhetorical audience from 
affecting change (Bitzer, “Rhetorical” 7-8). Additionally, we need to remind ourselves that the 
rhetorical situation is a responsive situation. The rhetor responds to the exigence and the 
rhetorical audience responds to the rhetor and his or discussion of the exigence. Thus, the 
rhetorical situation involves responsibility. Spivak describes responsibility like this:  
I can formalize responsibility in the following way: It is that all action is 
undertaken in response to a call (or something that seems to us to resemble a call) 
that cannot be grasped as such. Response here involves not only “respond to,” as 
in “give an answer to,” but also the related situations of “answering to,”  as in 
being responsible for a name (this brings the question of the relationship between 
being responsible for/to ourselves and for/to others). (“Responsibility” 22) 
If we look at the rhetorical situation from the perspective of responsibility, it is possible to 
interpret the exigence as the implicit “call” the rhetor responds to and articulates to the rhetorical 
audience. The exigence thus serves as a means of “answering to” the group of people being 
spoken about and spoken for, as well as answering to the rhetorical audience (which may or may 
not be the same people). But since the rhetorical audience must respond to the exigence, it is 
important for the rhetor to “give an answer to” the problem. The rhetor is literally the one who 
bears the responsibility for initiating and encouraging communication (whether verbal or 
nonverbal) within the rhetorical situation. 
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Additionally, we need to think about how the exigencies affected the way in which the 
CCCC engaged in speaking on behalf of others. What I argue here is that the CCCC spoke on 
behalf of teachers and students not only because it presumed it had the power to do so, but also 
because the exigencies served as motivation for it to do so. Using SRTOL as a mechanism for 
speaking on behalf of others, the CCCC could show teachers, universities, and public school 
systems that there was a united front in how to address the exigencies bearing upon the 
production of this document.  
 
Identity and Representation 
 To understand the exigencies which bore upon the rhetorical situation encompassing 
SRTOL, it will be helpful to understand the speaker (or rhetor) position as a function performed 
by two professional organizations, the CCCC, and its parent group, NCTE. Both organizations 
are educational in that they promote and provide teacher training opportunities to teachers of 
English. Yet both organizations are distinct in that they have their own conferences, committees, 
goals, and, most importantly, cultures. The CCCC serves primarily college professors; NCTE 
serves teachers from kindergarten through college. The CCCC serves those in the field of 
Rhetoric and Composition; NCTE serves those in the fields of literature and Rhetoric and 
Composition. While both organizations have overlapping goals, both organizations have distinct 
goals that reflect the distinct needs of the constituents they serve. 
 In sum, each organization has its own identity and their identities center upon the 
identities of the people who make up the organization. Thus, it is important to understand the 
identity of the speaker or rhetor so that readers can understand how a rhetor discusses the 
exigence (and addresses the rhetorical audience and constraints).  Because this project focuses on 
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education, I believe it is important to briefly look at how the concept of educational identity, 
especially as it relates the identity of the organization that created SRTOL. 
James Paul Gee’s article, “Identity as an Analytic Lens for Research in Education” does a 
good job of discussing the complexity of identity within educational contexts. He defines 
“identity” as being “a certain ‘kind of person.’ . . . [All] people have multiple identities 
connected not to their ‘internal states’ but to their performances in society” (99). In other words, 
a person’s identity is primarily social and is not fixed. For example, I am an African American 
female lecturer at a large Midwestern university. Students may see my gender and assume that 
because I am female I am supposed to be “nice” and perhaps “maternal.” I, on the other hand, do 
not believe that college teachers should be maternal, and I, in fact, see myself as strict. Strictness, 
I perceive, is a trait many college professors have. After all, many college professors at the 
Midwestern university where I teach have attendance policies; performance expectations of 
students; rules regarding proper research and formatting of papers, and the like. Additionally, I 
am also a product of a historically black college in which many African American students 
expect their teachers to be “mean,” i.e., “rigorous.” (See Lisa Delpit’s Other People’s Children 
on African American expectations of teachers.)  The university where I teach also has 
expectations of teachers that are different from students. The university expects teachers to serve 
on committees, contribute to the community, and be accountable to the department, division, 
school, college, et cetera.  Thus, readers can see the intersectionality of identity and how that 
intersectionality is influenced not just by my own perception of identity but by the perception 
other people have of how I should act.
19
 In fact, Gee suggests we view identity from four distinct 
and interrelating perspectives: 1) nature identity; 2) institutional identity; 3) discourse identity; 
and 4) affinity identity. 
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 For the purposes of this chapter, I want to focus on institutional identity and affinity 
identity.  Institutional identity (I-Identity) is determined by a person’s “position” within a 
particular institution. Thus, a professor’s identity is determined by the “authorities” within the 
higher institution where he or she works (Gee 102-03). The affinity perspective identity (A-
Identity) comes about when a group of people share a special devotion “to a set of common 
endeavors or practices and secondarily to other people in terms of shared culture or traits” (Gee 
105). These individuals form an identity group, which can be institutionalized (e.g. support 
groups) or non-institutionalized (e.g. Internet followers) (Gee 106). 
 Although Gee discusses I-Identity in regards to individuals, we can discuss I-Identity in 
regards to CCCC as an organization and examine its positionality in relationship to the academy 
in general and the field of English in particular. As mentioned earlier, the CCCC is an 
organization consisting primarily of college English teachers who specialize in Rhetoric and 
Composition (and sometimes Communication Studies). The CCCC is part of NCTE which is the 
advocacy organization for English teachers who serve in any educational capacity. This, of 
course, is important for it brings up the issue as to whom the document should be attributed—the 
CCCC, which created the committee to formulate the document, or NCTE, the umbrella 
organization of which the CCCC is a part. Related to the issue of authorship is the issue of which 
organization is speaking on behalf of its members—NCTE or CCCC? For the purposes of this 
dissertation, the CCCC will be named as the author, and the primary advocate for SRTOL. In my 
earlier discussion of Spivak, I mentioned that Spivak discusses two forms of representation. The 
first form of representation refers to advocacy and representation; thus, the CCCC speaks for and 
represents English teachers and Composition Studies.  The second form refers to re-presentation, 
which, in this instance, means how the CCCC attempts to re-present (or portray) the English 
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teacher. When engaging in re-presentation, the CCCC speaks often and extensively about the 
English teacher.  
In fact, a cursory examination of the CCCC’s Web site indicates that it calls itself “the 
world's largest professional organization for researching and teaching composition, from writing 
to new media.” Additionally, the organization states what it considers to be its main goals:  
CCCC supports and promotes the teaching and study of college composition and 
communication by 1) sponsoring meetings and publishing scholarly materials for 
the exchange of knowledge about composition, composition pedagogy, and 
rhetoric; 2) supporting a wide range of research on composition, communication, 
and rhetoric; 3) working to enhance the conditions for learning and teaching 
college composition and to promote professional development; and 4) acting as an 
advocate for language and literacy education nationally and internationally. 
As an organization that seeks to both “promote professional development” and serve as “an 
advocate for language and literacy education nationally and internationally,” it makes itself 
responsible for speaking on behalf of English teachers and the field of Rhetoric and 
Composition. In fact, by assuming this responsibility, it forges an institutional identity (I-
Identity) (within the field of Rhetoric and Composition and English Studies) centered on 
advocacy. Just as a professor’s I-Identity is determined by the officials in the university where he 
or she works, the I-Identity of CCCC is determined by those in the field of Rhetoric and 
Composition. The academy (that nebulous term to mean those in higher education) recognizes 
the legitimacy of the field of Rhetoric and Composition, and those within in the academy who 
are in the field of Rhetoric and Composition recognize the importance and legitimacy of the 
CCCC. Discussing the identity of Composition and the CCCC, William F. Irmscher declared in 
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1987, “Composition has established an identity of its own, not solely as a practitioner’s art, but 
as a subject for scholarly study. The burgeoning membership of the Conference on College 
Composition and Communication testifies to wide professional interest. The organization has 
done more to advance composition studies than any other” (81 italics mine). The fact that the 
organization’s institutional description calls for the advancement of the field of Rhetoric and 
Composition further illuminates its role in institutionalizing Rhetoric and Composition within 
higher education and within the public sphere.  
In addition to its I-Identity, the CCCC has within its organization various interests groups 
that represent A-Identities, or affinity groups. For example, it has specific caucuses that address 
various issues related to African American, Asian, Latino, Native American, and LGBTQ 
communities. It also has special interests groups related to writing centers, writing-across-the-
curriculum, transnational composition, service learning, basic writing, and more. While these 
affinity identities can help create a sense of community for individuals within a large and 
complex organization, they can also create chasms, especially when groups feel like that they 
have competing interests and must vie for attention within the larger organization.  Furthermore, 
the voice of the organization can be dominated by one or more of these affinity groups, thus 
making the organization susceptible to accusations that it does not speak for all members. 
 An organization with various affinity identities can thrive if affinity groups feel like they 
can not only adhere to the goals of the organization but also contribute to carrying out or even 
establishing goals. One of the ways in which the CCCC carries out its goals and promotes issues 
that are important within affinity groups is through its official journal, College Composition and 
Communication (CCC). CCC came into being one year after the formation of the organization in 
1949. According to Phillips, Greenburg, and Gibson, CCC initially published articles ranging 
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from teaching techniques to reading materials in a composition class. During the 1950s, several 
issues were devoted to articles on the importance of knowing linguistics in order to teach 
writing; by the 1960s and 1970s, articles about social issues that emphasized the teaching of 
minority and “remedial” students, democratization of the English classroom, the emerging 
discipline of Rhetoric and Composition, and, of course, “Students’ Right to Their Own 
Language” took center stage (454-57). By encouraging writers in the field of Rhetoric and 
Composition to publish articles in CCC, the CCCC gave teachers a forum in which to debate and 
present issues that were important to them.  
Like most academic journals, CCC is not geared towards the general public. Rather, it is 
geared towards the practitioners in the field. Like other academic journals, CCC has a technical 
lexicon and style that people in the field of Rhetoric and Composition use and understand. As 
Eugene A. Nida asserts, technical language (like those found in academic journals) “serve as a 
system of social solidarity and a sign of belonging” (478). For an organization like the CCCC, 
the journal not only serves as a means for publishing articles that are of interest to its affinity 
groups, it also serves as a means of establishing its institutional identity, since the journal is 
linked to the organization. Because the CCCC is an academic organization and the CCC is the 
official publication of the academic organization, it serves as a means of helping the larger 
academic community understand the various issues within the field of Rhetoric and 
Composition. Thus, the CCCC has an I-Identity within the field of Rhetoric and Composition 
and within the academy, but it also has an A-Identity within the larger academic community, 
since it is an institutionalized affinity group. 
Although the CCCC is an academic organization, it does provide information on its Web 
site for those in the public who may be interested in learning more about the organization. Of 
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course, any public can be nested within larger publics. In this context, the public can consist of 
academics outside of CCCC (such as members of Rhetoric Society of America or Linguistic 
Society of America) who relate to the organization’s concerns; or the public can consist of 
people outside of academia (such as reporters, government officials, or parents) who are 
interested in the organization’s stances on various issues. Because the CCCC makes clear in its 
mission statement that it represents and advocates for English teachers within the field of 
Rhetoric and Composition, the public(s) may also (subconsciously) assume that English teachers 
agree with the stands that the CCCC takes, much in the same way the public(s) may 
(subconsciously) assume that an elected official advocates and represents the views of the 
majority of people who voted for him or her. What the public(s) may not necessarily understand 
is that the CCCC, in its creation of position statements and resolutions, can also engage in the re-
presentation of the English teacher. In other words, it can redefine what the roles and 
responsibilities of the English teacher are to its members and to those outside of the organization. 
 
Identity and Re-presentation 
When the CCCC engages in the representation and re-presentation of the English teacher, 
it does so through individuals who help establish the I-Identity of the organization. To fully 
understand I-Identity of CCCC at the time of SRTOL, readers also need to understand what 
influenced the members of the organization who created the document and why supporters 
agreed with the document. According to Lawrence Freeman, members of the CCCC, especially 
those who created SRTOL, were influenced greatly by fields outside of English such as 
sociology and psychology (Freeman 25). Geneva Smitherman further asserts that members were 
influenced by the “social protest” and “street activism” taking place during the Civil Rights 
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movement of the 1960s. Thus, according to Smitherman’s re-presentation, CCCC members, like 
others in the academy, wanted to seek (language) rights, not merely discuss (language) rights 
(“Retrospective” 21). Stephen Parks goes one step further and identifies various groups including 
the Black Panthers and New University Conference which advocated for the legitimacy of Black 
English (the precursor term for African American English Vernacular) as being influential to the 
committee that created SRTOL (17-18).  Moreover, if readers examine the book The Hope and 
the Legacy, the editors make clear that issues of bidialecticalism and Black English were 
prevalent among those in education and thus may have influenced the committee to want to 
address how teachers should work with students who do not speak or write standard English 
(Bruch and Marback xiv). Therefore, it was not surprising that scholar Elizabeth Fitts defined 
supporters of SRTOL as being a part of the “socio-politico-linguistic camp” (6) or affinity group 
within the CCCC.  
Geneva Smitherman, who served on the committee that oversaw the creation of STROL, 
refers to the committee (and the supporters) of the document as “progressives” (“Retrospective” 
24). While she acknowledges that others who served on the committee had ideologies that could 
be considered “radical,” “moderate,” and “conservative,” the overriding belief, at least by critics 
such as Donald Lazere and Stephen Parks, was that supporters of the document were (and are) 
liberal. Stephen Parks, in fact, refers to avowedly political organizations (such as New University 
Conference, Black Panther Party, Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, and Students for 
a Democratic Society) that influenced the formation of SRTOL as being “leftists.” For Parks, 
leftists are most concerned with not only helping the working class obtain affordable housing, 
decent employment and a good education, but also concerned with critiquing the political, 
sociological, and economic forces that prevent the working class from obtaining any real 
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socioeconomic and political power (7-9). Furthermore, Lazere refers to people who championed 
SRTOL and Freirean critical literacy as “leftist educational theorists” (7).  
By relating the CCCC and supporters of SRTOL to political progressives, leftists, and the 
like, writers essentially re-present the CCCC as a progressive organization committed to not only 
teaching students but influencing the way society relates to the students and the teachers who 
teach them. In this respect, CCCC as a whole assumes an affinity identity (within the larger 
academic community) that is predominately constructed by those concerned with language and 
political rights. As Bruch and Marback contend in “Race Identity, Writing, and the Politics of 
Dignity,” it is important for researchers to examine SRTOL and Rhetoric and Composition’s 
“dilemmas of language, race identity, education, and justice in terms of racial inequality and 
injustice in the broader society.” Keith Gilyard believes that is important to “check in on those 
working in the spirit of this groundbreaking document [SRTOL], those ‘holdin’ it down,’ which 
really means lifting up their practice to secure gains in thinking about teaching and linguistic 
diversity” (“Holdin’” 115). Thus, readers may interpret the CCCC as an organization committed 
to fighting injustice not just in the classroom, but also in the overall society. Supporters of the 
document seek to “secure gains” for language rights and diversity. And James Sledd, while 
acknowledging that the CCCC had people who wanted to rescind the document, also says: 
“Radical teachers and progressive caucuses no doubt do what they can to keep the vision and the 
hope alive, but if working within the System to right the System’s wrongs ends constantly in 
failure, why should one not say, ‘Smash it all!’” (675). Thus, CCCC supporters believe SRTOL 
helped institutionalize the CCCC as an organization consisting of people who sought to right a 
wrong within a System that perpetuates inequality. 
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 By understanding the identity of an organization such as the CCCC and the informal 
affinity groups within it, we can better understand how organizations approach various issues. In 
the case of the CCCC, we can see that there had been an informal affinity group of members who 
coalesced around educational issues, especially issues related to language. This affinity group 
was active within the organization and influenced the organization to eventually create and 
support SRTOL. Most importantly, this affinity group helped re-present the CCCC, so that those 
outside of Rhetoric and Composition might interpret the CCCC as an activist organization, not 
just an educational one.  
 
Genre and Exigence 
 Just as human beings and organizations have an identity, so, too, do texts. Many readers 
identify a text by the genre and the author. The genre of a text helps readers understand not only 
the purpose of the text, but also how they should understand the text (Devitt 12). For example, if 
I read a children’s book, I understand that the book will most likely look a certain way; that is, 
the book will probably have pictures, large font, perhaps a rhyme scheme, and other generic 
conventions that would identify it as a children’s book. Likewise, I may also assume that the 
children’s book is designed to teach a larger lesson about life. For example, the residents of 
Whoville in How the Grinch Stole Christmas! understand that Christmas is not about 
materialism; rather it is about community.  If I know that the children’s author is Dr. Seuss, I can 
expect (perhaps rightly or wrongly) that the book may not feature a multiracial town or focus on 
issues related to socioeconomic class.  
 Not all texts, however, are easily identifiable by author and genre. Both Sledd and 
Smitherman have pointed out that readers of SRTOL assume that NCTE is the author of the text 
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(Sledd 667; Smitherman, “Historical” 35); this mistake, (most likely the result of people not 
understanding the organizational distinction between NCTE and CCCC), does not take into 
consideration the unique cultures of both NCTE and CCCC and how these cultures contributed 
to the different approaches each organization used to address language issues. In addition to the 
confusion that exists regarding the authorship of the document, there is some confusion 
regarding the genre of the resolution, especially as it relates to SRTOL. On the one hand, readers 
of the Fall 1974 issue of the CCC can read a note from CCCC Chairperson Richard Lawson 
asserting that in 1971 CCCC officers sought to create a “position statement on students’ 
dialects.” On the other hand, readers can see how Lawson refers to the SRTOL as a “resolution 
and background statement”; within the document, the CCCC refers to SRTOL as a resolution on 
at least four occasions. Thus, it is important to understand the way in which the CCCC interprets 
the differences between a resolution and a position statement. 
 
What is a Resolution? 
To understand the purpose of a resolution, we need to first understand how a resolution is 
defined. Oxford English Dictionary defines the term as “The action or an act of finding the 
answer to a question, the solution to a problem, etc.; the elimination or easing of doubt. Also: the 
fact of such an answer, solution, etc., having been found” (“Resolution,” def. 14a).  Though this 
definition does not have the term exigence in it, the definition reflects the sense of urgency that 
the term exigence connotes. Bitzer says that an exigence is “something waiting to be done” 
(“Rhetorical” 6).  Much like the definition of a resolution, the exigence is the problem that awaits 
a solution; the exigence, like the resolution, is the reason why someone seeks to find a solution to 
a problem. If readers recall, the CCCC makes clear that SRTOL is designed to address the 
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question of how teachers can help students who speak and write in dialects other than standard 
English. The document not only suggests that teachers receive training in language and 
linguistics, but also encourages teachers to examine the negative assumptions they and society 
have about students who speak in dialects. It provides information on how certain dialects are 
privileged over others and gives suggestions as to how teachers can work with students who have 
stigmatized dialects.  
Besides the definition already discussed, the Oxford English Dictionary provides one 
additional definition of resolution: “A formal decision, determination, or expression of opinion 
by a deliberative assembly, committee, court, public meeting, etc. (in early use also by 
individual)” (“Resolution,” def. 15a). Thus, the definition of resolution not only encompasses the 
solution to a problem, but also encompasses an organization of individuals who express an 
opinion as one body. In this second definition, a resolution is, in general, a rhetorical act 
designed to speak on behalf of the organization and its members.  
Though not all resolutions are passed unanimously, most resolutions are written to 
convey a consensus opinion within an organization. Thus, resolutions will normally have the 
words “we” and/or “our” to express the organization’s sense of solidarity. Resolutions such as 
SRTOL are designed to address beliefs and concerns of an organization. Today, most resolutions 
provide information regarding a problem and then give one or more declarative statements as to 
how the problem should be resolved. Some resolutions are written using the “Whereas”/ “Be It 
Resolved” clauses which help readers see the clear distinction made between the problems and 
the solutions or actions that are to take place.  Thus, the genre of the resolution seems to be one 
of advocacy or Spivak’s notion of representation. The organization discusses the problem(s) or 
exigence and then provides a means for finding a solution to it. 
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SRTOL is not set up as a conventionally formal resolution (which one would see today) 
because it is not structured on the “Whereas” and “Be It Resolved” clausal pairings, and 
therefore, it seemingly rejects the genre expectations of the resolutions. David Russell reminds 
readers that “genre” can be defined as “the ongoing use of certain material tools (marks, in the 
case of written genres) in certain ways that worked once and might work again, a typified tool-
mediated response to conditions recognized by participants as recurring.” In other words, genres 
such as resolutions use certain phrases and formats to alert readers of how they are to respond to 
and use the tool (such as the resolution). 
If CCCC expected its members to read the resolution and discover a “solution to a 
problem” or an “elimination or easing of doubt,” it had a rude awakening. Some members felt 
that the resolution did not solve the problem of how to work with students who had stigmatized 
dialects. Moreover, the controversy regarding the document epitomizes how members of the 
organization as a whole did not agree with the “expression of opinion” of the CCCC.  
Significantly, perhaps, the NCTE did not seem to agree with the CCCC’s SRTOL 
statement. Rather than initially support SRTOL, NCTE created its own—and in the words of 
Smitherman—“weaker version” of SRTOL, which NCTE passed in 1974 (“Retrospective” 22). 
Ironically, NCTE’s version of SRTOL looks more like a traditional resolution. The NCTE 
document has two sections—the “Background section,” which highlights the problem, and the 
“Resolution” Section, which highlights the solution.  The “Background” section has one main 
sentence followed by the “Be it therefore” clause. It looks like this: 
Members of NCTE and its constituent group, the Conference on College 
Composition and Communication (CCCC), became concerned in the early 1970s 
about a tendency in American society to categorize nonstandard dialects as 
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corrupt, inferior, or distorted forms of standard English, rather than as distinct 
linguistic systems, and the prejudicial labeling of students that resulted from this 
view. Be it therefore  
The “Resolution” section begins with the sentence: “Resolved, that the National Council for the 
Teachers of English affirm the students’ right to their own language—to the dialect that 
expresses their family and community identity, the idiolect that expresses their unique personal 
identity.” Afterward the NCTE lists three affirmations; within the “Resolution section” is a 
solution section that contains the phrase, “Be it further Resolved, that, to this end,” and it lists 
two goals the NCTE wishes to accomplish.  
 To understand why there are two different versions of SRTOL, we need to consider the 
organizational culture of both groups. From my interpretation of Stephen Parks’ work and 
Geneva Smitherman’s articles, both writers imply that though NCTE is a progressive 
organization, it is more conservative (and less radical) than the CCCC. We can see this in the 
1971 (unpublished, though circulated among the CCCC Executive Committee) NCTE 
Commission on Language “Concerning the Teaching of Usage” report.
20
 (This report is also 
referred to as the “Statement on Usage.”) 
This seven page long report is a precursor to SRTOL.  The purpose of the report is to 
discuss the issues related to the teaching of standard English usage. The Commission on 
Language spends a considerable amount of time discussing what standard (American) English is, 
who uses it, the differences between formal and informal standard English, and the need for 
students who have not mastered standard English to acquire it. Likewise, it also mentions the 
importance of dialects to communities and the need for teachers to respect dialects. However, it 
seems that the purpose of the document is not to affirm students’ right to their own language, but 
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to affirm the complexity of the English language in regards to usage. It calls for NCTE to make 
the public aware “that the problem of standards of usage is not a simple one. It is one that 
demands of every user of the language greater alertness of observation and sensitivity of 
judgment” (7).  
Parks writes that at a CCCC officers meeting held March 5, 1972, it was noted that 
several officers disagreed with numerous sections within the Commission on Language report 
and recommended against promoting and publishing the report. Though the CCCC officers 
accepted the Commission on Language’s ideas regarding the importance of teachers 
understanding linguistics and the history of the English language, the subcommittee reviewing 
the report did not wish to “[endorse] the [Committee on Language’s] argument about standard 
English nor its vision of how standard English should be used to supply students to the U.S. 
economy” (162).  
Although this report was discussed more in depth at the officers’ meeting in 1972, it had 
been mentioned earlier at a CCCC Executive Committee meeting in 1971; at the 1971 meeting, 
the Executive Committee decided to “make another effort at a statement affirming the student’s 
right to his own language”; after this decision, one member told the Committee that the NCTE 
Commission on Language “had issued a very mild statement” (Secretary’s Report No. 65 322).  
The use of the phrase, “a very mild statement” could mean that NCTE did, indeed, put out a 
statement commenting on students’ right to their own language and it was the statement that the 
CCCC needed to consider. Or, according to Stephen Parks, it more likely meant that NCTE was 
too scared or too conservative to compose a more forceful document. Parks notes that “from the 
outset,” the CCCC endeavored to create a stronger position on the issue and “saw itself 
principally opposed to the NCTE’s previous statement” (161).  
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The CCCC, however, explicitly supported the concept of students’ right to their own 
language; unlike the Commission on Language’s report, which focused primarily on the function 
of the English language, the CCCC seemed to want to focus more on students and their 
relationship with language. SRTOL, thus, served as an implicit response to the Commission on 
Language report. Like the Commission on Language report, SRTOL was written more like a 
report and less like a resolution.  
In fact, if readers compare CCCC resolutions written during the 1970s (and today), 
readers will see that SRTOL looks nothing like the typical CCCC resolution. For instance, 
included in “Secretary’s Report No. 66” were several resolutions discussed during the Executive 
Committee and CCCC Business meeting in 1972. Two of the resolutions had the “Whereas” 
clause and ended with the “Be It Resolved” clause; one resolution began with the clause, 
“Resolved,” which was used twice; and another included a one sentence background statement 
and concluded with the phrase, “Resolved.” Though the resolutions had slight variations, they 
consistently used the phrase “resolved” to indicate an attempt to solve—or at least address—an 
exigence (327-28).  
Unlike the CCCC’s SRTOL, if readers examine the NCTE’s version of SRTOL, readers 
see how NCTE conforms to the traditional resolution by explicitly highlighting out what it seeks 
to resolve:  
that NCTE make available to other professional organizations this resolution as 
well as suggestions for ways of dealing with linguistic variety, as expressed in the 
CCCC background statement on students’ right to their own language; and 
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that NCTE promote classroom practices to expose students to the variety of 
dialects that comprise or multiregional, multiethnic, and multicultural society, so 
that they too will understand the nature of American English and come to respect 
all dialects. (italics mine)  
Notice that the NCTE resolution endorses the SRTOL background statement, but not the actual 
resolution itself. According to Geneva Smitherman, this was not surprising, for NCTE had a 
history of supporting prescriptive language policies and ridiculing dialects (“CCCC” 372). 
Though NCTE, throughout the mid and late twentieth century, modified its stances on dialects 
and prescriptive usage, Smitherman seems to imply, and Keith Gilyard seems to agree, that 
NCTE was a more centrist organization than the CCCC (Gilyard, “Getting” 543). In fact, during 
the process of creating SRTOL, CCCC members lobbied NCTE to adopt the CCCC’s version of 
SRTOL. Smitherman describes the negotiation process as this: “The struggle waged by CCCC 
leaders and members to get NCTE support for the [SRTOL] resolution was acrimonious and 
fierce—in-yo-face” (“CCCC” 371). In the end, NCTE settled for another resolution, which was 
written in the conventional style of a resolution.  
 
What is a Position Statement? 
SRTOL is referred throughout the document and in many articles as a resolution; 
however, the CCCC, on its Web site, calls SRTOL a position statement. According to the Oxford 
English Dictionary, a position statement is “a statement setting out the considered position or 
policy of an organization, group, etc., with respect to a particular matter” (“Position Statement,” 
def.) Like the resolution, the position statement is written as if all members agree with the 
“position or policy” of the organization.  If readers go to the CCCC Web site and click “Find a 
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Position Statement,” they will see a section on creating a position statement. Here is how CCCC 
describes a position statement: 
Characteristically, a position statement is a short summary of what is currently 
known about an issue and the organizational beliefs about that issue.  Generally, 
in addition, the statements include the history and background of the issue, the 
exigency for the statement, supporting information, and a short reference 
list.  Statements also often include implied suggestions for putting 
recommendations to practice.  
Notice that its description includes the phrase, “the organizational beliefs about that issue.” This 
phrase implies that members within the organization share a similar way of thinking regarding a 
specific issue. Like the resolution, which emphasizes the discussion of the problem, the position 
statement requests a discussion of the problem or “exigency” as the CCCC calls it. Notice, too, 
that the CCCC indicates that position statements “often include implied suggestions for putting 
recommendations to practice.” This sentence is fascinating because it indicates that the position 
statement, unlike the resolution which calls for an explicit call for action, only needs to have 
“implied suggestions or recommendations”; thus, a position statement does not have an audience 
modify the exigence.  Moreover, this sentence points to the conventional understanding that a 
position statement does not have to lay out a problem and a solution; it merely has to state a 
claim. Additionally, if we examine SRTOL in its entirety, we see that the document includes a 
background narrative on the issue and supporting references. While SRTOL does offer 
“suggestions for sounder, alternate approaches [to teaching],” (711), the Committee also makes 
clear that SRTOL is not designed to be a “teaching guide” (711). Yet, as was seen in the previous 
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chapter and as I will show in subsequent chapters, many critics responded to SRTOL as if it were 
a resolution designed to solve a problem. 
On the surface, CCCC seems to indicate that resolutions and position statements can 
serve similar purposes. They, in fact, highlight a particular stance the organization holds. In this 
respect, they may be seen as variants of (what I like to call) the organizational stance genre.
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The main difference between the two genres seems to be how the genre is shaped and who gets 
to shape the genre. According to the CCCC Web site, position statements, such as SRTOL, 
originate within the CCCC Executive Committee; resolutions originate within the larger 
membership of the CCCC. Though some people may say that the words of the document are 
more important than the genre itself, we need to remember that genres help readers understand 
how to interpret the document (Devitt 21). If the CCCC wants its members and the public to 
understand particular exigencies, it needs to use a genre or genres that can highlight the 
exigencies. Certainly, the resolution and the position statement do just that; if the CCCC wants 
its members to modify the exigencies, then it needs to use a genre that will help the audience see 
that it is to modify the exigence. The question is which genre does that?   
 
Exigencies and Genre 
  To me, the exigencies within a document such as SRTOL serve as controlling ideas. As 
Devitt, Reiff, and Bawarshi point out, “The controlling idea controls the paper [document], 
working within a particular genre to help the writer determine what content is relevant and 
needed and how that content should be organized” (73). The fact that Bitzer claims that the 
exigence serves as “the organizing principle” which “specifies the audience to be addressed and 
the change to be effected” (“Rhetorical” 7) helps bear this point out.  Like Carolyn R. Miller, I 
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believe that exigencies, thus, help writers understand the “rhetorical purpose” for composing a 
text (157), while helping readers understand the urgency of the text and what they must do to 
address the exigence. If one views an exigence from the perspective of Richard Vatz, in his piece 
“The Myth of the Rhetorical Situation,” then one might conclude that exigencies are not the 
objective phenomena that Bitzer seems to believe, but are creations of the rhetor (157). 
Moreover, according to Vatz, rhetors may even create exigencies based on their understanding of 
a situation.  For example, during the 1960s and early 1970s, African Americans who spoke 
and/or wrote in AAEV began entering predominately white college classrooms.  Many teachers 
who encountered these students attempted to teach them standard English by discouraging 
students from writing in AAEV and penalizing students who exhibited AAEV in their writing. A 
rhetor could interpret this discouragement and penalty as forms of linguistic discrimination, 
which would be an exigence that needed to be addressed.  Another rhetor could reinterpret the 
rhetorical situation and the exigence very differently. For that rhetor, the exigence could be the 
fact that the students entering the classroom had not mastered standard English and had to master 
it if they were to succeed in higher education and in the workforce.  Thus, if we examine the 
discussion of the exigencies from Vatz’s perspective, it is possible to conclude that the CCCC 
used SRTOL as a means of interpreting the exigencies. In other words, the CCCC might have 
created SRTOL so that it could define, discuss, and advocate for language rights from a 
progressive perspective.  
 
Exigencies in SRTOL 
In SRTOL, CCCC focuses on three main exigencies: linguistic discrimination; lack of 
linguistic training for teachers; and the pedagogical form of teachers who teach those who do not 
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speak or write in standard English.  In this section I will examine the aforementioned exigencies 
and show how the CCCC addresses these exigencies by speaking on behalf of others. 
 
Exigency One: Linguistic Discrimination 
  In the actual resolution, the CCCC speaks on behalf of “language scholars.” After the 
first line of the resolution, the CCCC writes, “Language scholars long ago denied the myth of a 
standard American dialect. The claim that any one dialect is unacceptable amounts to an attempt 
of one social group to exert its dominance of another” (710-11). Then the organization articulates 
what it thinks about linguistic domination. In doing so, it addresses the exigence of linguistic 
discrimination by showing that scholars who specialize in language do not believe in the 
oppression of people based on language. 
Here, the CCCC speaks about what language scholars think; not surprisingly, some of the 
members on the Committee were language scholars (Smitherman and Chairperson Melvin 
Butler, among others) who thought the same way. However, there are multiple ways in which we 
can interpret for whom the CCCC speaks: one interpretation is that the CCCC is speaking on 
behalf of linguists. After all, linguists are language scholars who are very aware of the role that 
the acceptability of dialect plays in determining who considers a dialect valid or invalid. It is 
certainly possible (though not likely) that members of the organization may have envisioned all 
language scholars to be linguists. The second interpretation is that the CCCC is speaking on 
behalf of teachers. Since the CCCC is composed of college professionals interested in the 
teaching of writing and rhetoric, it would make sense that publics not affiliated with the CCCC 
could easily interpret “language scholars” to mean “teachers of writing.”  After all, writing 
teachers are certainly interested in the way in which language is used within written and verbal 
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rhetoric. Wouldn’t English teachers logically understand dialect since they themselves teach 
texts (such as Huckleberry Finn) which have dialect in them? And the third interpretation is that 
the organization is simply speaking on behalf of its members, whom readers might construe as 
language scholars, broadly understood.  
After CCCC speaks on behalf of language experts, the organization then does something 
fascinating: instead of speaking solely on behalf of its members and teachers, it attempts to speak 
on behalf of Americans: “A nation proud of its diverse heritage and its culture and racial variety 
will preserve its heritage of dialect” (711). Here, the organization tells Americans: if you love 
your country and you love the diversity of the country, you will not engage in linguistic 
domination or discrimination against racial or cultural groups. In other words, the Committee is 
speaking on behalf of Americans and advocating to Americans not to engage in oppressive 
behavior.  
This stance can be further seen in the background statement wherein the CCCC addresses 
linguistic discrimination: “. . . when speakers of a dialect of American English claim not to 
understand speakers of another dialect of the same language, the impediments are likely to be 
attitudinal” (712). In other words, when there is a communication problem, speakers need to be 
aware how much of their inability to understand each other is based not on dialect but rather on 
attitudes about the dialect. The CCCC continues: “The initial difficulties of perception can be 
overcome and should not be confused with those psychological barriers to communication which 
may be generated by racial, cultural, and social differences and attitudes” (712). Here the CCCC 
addresses the exigence and offers a reason why the exigence exists: speakers may have “racial, 
cultural, and social” attitudes that inhibit them from wanting to understand fellow speakers. 
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In this instance it is difficult to pinpoint for whom the CCCC is speaking on behalf. After 
all, the CCCC does not point to a specific group; rather the discussion on linguistic 
discrimination is presented in general terms. The organization does, however, speak on behalf of 
students when it discusses what motivates students to acquire or change dialects:  
Dialect switching is complicated by many factors, not the least of which is the  
 individual’s own cultural heritage. Since dialect is not separate from culture, but 
 an intrinsic part of it, accepting a new dialect means accepting a new culture; 
 rejecting one’s native dialect is to some extent a rejection of one’s culture. 
Therefore, the question of whether or not students will change their dialect 
involves their acceptance of a new—and possibly strange or hostile—set of 
culture values. Although many students do become bidialectical, and many do 
abandon their native dialects, those who don’t switch may have any of a number 
of reasons, some of which may be beyond the school’s right to interfere. (714) 
Here the exigence regarding linguistic discrimination takes on a sense of urgency. Notice that the 
organization italicizes the words “will” and “do.” The italics indicate that the students, not the 
teachers or school systems, should make a choice on whether and how they should acquire a new 
dialect. Students can, for instance, want to accept a new culture. But also notice that CCCC 
speaks for students who do not wish to alter their dialect or accept the standard. At first, CCCC 
provides the reader with a possible explanation: the student does not want to accept a dialect 
from a culture that has traditionally been hostile to his or her culture. Additionally, CCCC infers 
that not only would they (the teachers and school administrators) never understand, but also that 
they (the teachers and school administrators) should not have a “right to interfere.” By teachers 
and school districts not interfering in a student’s decision to not acquire a dialect, teachers and 
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school systems can lessen the probability that they themselves engage in linguistic discrimination 
or linguistic domination. 
 
Exigency Two: Lack of Linguistic Training for Teachers 
In the resolution, the CCCC speaks on behalf of the organization when it declares, “We 
affirm strongly that teachers must have the experiences and training that will enable them to 
respect diversity and uphold the right of students to their own language” (711). The CCCC uses 
the phrase, “We affirm strongly” to highlight the urgency that teachers must have “experiences 
and training” in understanding language and linguistics. In the background statement, the CCCC 
writes, “All English teachers should, as a minimum, know the principles of modern linguistics, 
and something about the history and nature of the English language in its social and cultural 
context” (723).  The belief is that if teachers understand linguistics, they can understand better 
why students write and speak the way they do; additionally, teachers themselves can understand 
why certain dialects are more valued than others. The CCCC uses this as an example: 
The planter’s daughter who asks in a pronounced drawl to be “carried” home 
from the dance is charming; the field hand who says “That’s shonuff a purty 
dress” becomes an object of amusement or scorn. The teacher who realizes that 
the difference is not in the superiority of either dialect, but in the connotation we 
supply, can avoid judging students’ dialects in social or economic terms. (724) 
Here the CCCC shows that someone in a higher socioeconomic group is valued over the other 
who is from a lower socioeconomic (and racial) group. The belief is that once teachers 
understand what their own prejudices are, they will learn not to judge their students. In many 
respects, this example represents the CCCC speaking on behalf of the linguistically 
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marginalized. The CCCC shows how one dialect that is not the standard (notice the emphasis on 
the “pronounced drawl”) is still valued over the other dialect that is “scorned.” 
 In fact, when it comes to the discussion of teacher training, CCCC seems to speak about 
teachers as a means of speaking on behalf of them.  Some examples include:  
Teachers should be equally as willing to recognize that English can also increase 
the richness of its word stock by a free exchange among its dialects. If teachers 
had succeeded in preventing students from using such terms as “jazz,” “lariat,” 
and “kosher,” modern English would be poorer. (724) 
 
Teachers should know that semantics is the study of how people give meaning to 
words and the way many of those meanings affect us emotionally rather than 
rationally. Teachers well grounded in modern semantics can help their students 
examine their word choices, not from the standpoint of right wrong, proper or 
improper, but by analyzing the impact possible choices will have on listeners or 
readers. (725) 
 
Teachers need to ratify their book knowledge of language by living as minority 
speakers. They should be wholly immersed in a dialect group other than their 
own. (726) 
The organization speaks on behalf of teachers by not only discussing what teachers know and do 
not know, but also what they need to know. In effect, the CCCC argues for a pedagogical 
enhancement of the teaching of English that includes not only the study of diction and semantics, 
but also the direct study and participation within the culture of the students whom they teach. 
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Notice some of the words used to indicate urgency: should as in “Teachers should know” and 
“Teachers should be willing”; and need as in “teachers need to.” These words, according to 
Robert Longacre, are characteristic of hortatory discourse, that is, discourse used by rhetors to 
“influence conduct,” from the audience (“Discourse” 109). 
 
Exigency Three:  
Teaching Students Who Speak and Write in Dialects Other than Standard English 
In the very first paragraph of the background statement to SRTOL, the CCCC mentions 
the issues teachers face when trying to teach students who speak dialects other than standard 
English: 
  Differences in language have always existed, and the schools have always   
  wrestled with them, but the social upheavals of the 1960’s, and the insistence of  
  submerged minorities on a greater share in American society, have posed the  
  question more insistently and have suggested the need for a shift in emphasis in  
  providing answers. Should the schools try to uphold language variety, or to  
  modify it, or to eradicate it? (709) 
Notice that the CCCC mentions the exigence not just in the form of a rhetorical question, but 
also one that is posed insistently: “Should schools try to uphold language variety, or to modify it, 
or to eradicate it?” Some people might say that the answers to these questions depend on how 
people respond to the exigencies of linguistic discrimination and the lack of linguistic training 
for teachers. If people are opposed to linguistic domination and lack of linguistic training for 
teachers, then the answer is to uphold the language variety. To modify or eradicate a dialect 
would go against the claim in the SRTOL resolution: “The claim that any one dialect is 
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unacceptable amounts to an attempt of one social group to exert its dominance over another” 
(710-11). 
 To address this issue, the CCCC speaks on behalf of teachers. In one part of the 
background statement, the organization says, “We have also taught, many of us, as though the 
‘English of the educated speakers,’ the language used by those in power in the community, had 
an inherent advantage over other dialects as a means of expressing thought or emotion, 
conveying information, or analyzing concepts” (710). Notice that not only does the organization 
write “we,” but it also writes, “many of us.” This is done to emphasize that the members of 
CCCC are also teachers and that “many” CCCC members have engaged in linguistic 
discrimination. Later on, the organization emphasizes that “many of us have taught as though the 
function of schools and colleges were to erase differences” (710).  Again, the focus is on how the 
organization consists of teachers and how the organization can write about the relationship 
teachers have to how a school or college functions.  
 Thus, CCCC focuses on how teachers have traditionally been taught to address those who 
speak dialects other than standard English; have looked at those who speak dialects other than 
standard English as incapable of engaging in the collection, analysis, and critique of information, 
thought, or emotion; and have tried to “erase differences,” since that is the goal of education. Of 
course, there were some who took offense to this critique, and I will discuss those later in the 
dissertation. However, the point is that the CCCC chooses to address this exigence by speaking 
on behalf of English teachers. Despite the fact that it uses the word “many” to signify that not all 
English teachers have these experiences, it is easy for readers to overlook the word when they 
come across statements like this:  
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As English teachers, we are responsible for what our teaching does to the self-
image and self-esteem of our students. We must decide what elements of our 
discipline are really important to us, whether we want to share with our students 
the richness of all varieties of language, and encourage linguistic virtuosity . . . 
(710). 
If anything, this is a rallying cry by teachers for all teachers to reexamine their pedagogy in 
regards to language and how the promotion of one type of dialect might impact those who do not 
or choose not to learn it. Again, notice that CCCC uses certain words and phrases that indicate 
urgency: “we must”; “we want;” and “encourage.” 
 To address how teachers should teach students who speak in different dialects, the CCCC 
says in the first line of the resolution: “We affirm the students’ right to their own patterns and 
varieties of language—the dialects of their nurture or whatever dialects in which they find their 
own identity and style” (710). In other words, we must accept students and the ways in which 
they speak. The “we,” however, can be confused for teachers, as opposed to the organization 
itself. In Everything’s a Text: Readings for Composition, the editors introduce the resolution by 
emphasizing that the CCCC is “made up of thousands of composition and communication 
teachers” (79). Additionally, they quote Richard Larson who writes that “’dedicated members of 
the CCCC’ worked for years ‘toward a position statement on a major problem confronting 
teachers of composition and communication: how to respond to the variety in their students’ 
dialects” (qtd. in Melzer and Coxwell-Teague 79). By emphasizing that CCCC is comprised of 
teachers and ignoring the controversy regarding the resolution, the editors of the book make it 
sound as if teachers wrote it (they did) and all teachers of approved of it (they did not).  
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 After encouraging teachers affirm or approve of the student dialect, the CCCC 
encourages teachers to understand American English. In the section on grammar handbooks, the 
organization writes, “We know that American English is pluralistic. We know that our students 
can and do function in a growing multiplicity of language situations which require different 
dialects, changing interconnections of dialects, and dynamic uses of language” (718). The “we” 
is designed to affirm what should be considered a common fact between the audience of teachers 
and authors of the text. Here, the organization speaks on behalf of teachers by simultaneously 
speaking to teachers. Additionally it subtly reemphasizes the need for teachers to understand how 
students use language, utilize dialects, and communicate in situations within and outside the 
classroom. 
 In the section on dialect options, CCCC provides advice to teachers about assignments 
and discussions that allow for dialect options. It suggests teachers provide assignments that allow 
students to “make shifts in tone, style, sentence structure and length, vocabulary, diction, and 
order” (719). By the end of the section, CCCC speaks on behalf of and to teachers:  
By building on what students are already doing well as part of their successes in 
daily living, we can offer them dialect options which will increase rather than 
diminish their self-esteem, and by focusing on the multiple aspects of the 
communication process, we can be sure we are dealing with the totality of 
language, not merely with the superficial feature of “polite usage.” (720) 
Here it seems that the CCCC uses the polite command; by that I mean that the organization 
insists that teachers take a course of action by politely suggesting that they do it. By using the 
word “can,” it allows for teachers to feel that they have a choice. But by using the word “we,” it 
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makes it sound like the suggestion should be taken since “we are dealing with the totality of 
language” (720).  
 
Exigencies and Responsibility 
 By speaking to and on behalf of teachers, the CCCC attempted to convince teachers to 
respond to the exigencies. The organization knew that not all teachers would agree with 
SRTOL—hence, its admission that “the resolution would create controversy” (711). And it also 
knew that teachers would have questions about SRTOL, which is why it created and anticipated 
questions about dialect, reading, handbooks, and teaching that it knew needed to be answered. 
This section, a 1970s version of the “Frequently Asked Questions” section on found on today’s 
Web sites, allowed the organization to address its exigencies within the confines of 
question/answer categories. These questions, clearly, were determined by the Committee that 
created the document, but they were influenced by the questions that the Committee imagined 
the general membership would have. Thus, the Committee practiced a form of collective 
subjectivity in that it imagined the “context, ways of knowing, . . . and experience” (Royster 29) 
of the general membership. It thought about what the audience would and would not know about 
language and the teaching of linguistically diverse students.  
These exigencies and the way in which the CCCC responded to them through the STROL 
motivated it to speak on behalf of others in order to effect change in the way dialect speakers 
were treated in society and within the school system. By speaking on behalf of teachers, the 
CCCC legitimized its influence on issues regarding language and the teaching of English. Most 
importantly, it encouraged its rhetorical audiences to reexamine the ways in which they, as 
teachers, had engaged in linguistic discrimination. It argued that by giving teachers training in 
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linguistics, it would find ways of addressing the exigence of working with speakers who did not 
speak and/or write in English. 
Earlier in this chapter, I quoted Spivak’s discussion of responsibility. I focused on how 
Spivak conceptualizes responsibility as a form of communication in which someone responds to 
an implicit call, which I interpreted as an exigence. As I conclude this chapter, I wish to return to 
Spivak so that I may discuss an additional insight that will help illuminate my foregoing 
discussion. I am referring to Spivak’s claim that “Responsibility annuls the call to which it seeks 
to respond” (“Responsibility” 19). I believe she says this because she recognizes that 
responsibility, understood in a certain way, encourages the silencing of individuals, especially 
those classified as subaltern. In her article about responsibility, she says that “Development is the 
dominant global denomination of responsibility: the story is that the rich nations collectively 
hear the call of the ethical and collect to help the poor nations by giving skill and money” (52). 
The rich, thus, get to re-present the poor by Europeanizing them. Poor nations get the “skills,” 
which will help them achieve the European conception of success. Yes, responsibility involves 
an “answering to,” but to whom is the answer given? The rich, to Spivak, do not have to answer 
to the subaltern and they do not have to listen to the subaltern. More likely, the rich respond as a 
rhetorical audience to appeals by made by those who are similarly privileged and wealthy.  
In the context of this discussion, the rhetorical audience does not have to consist of the 
people who are spoken about and for. Ideally it may be beneficial for those who are spoken about 
and for to have an opportunity to participate in the rhetorical situation by being the ones to effect 
change. However, the rhetorical audience can consist of people more powerful than those who 
are spoken on behalf of. Remember, the rhetorical audience (not the general audience) is the one 
that must have the ability and the power to modify the exigence. 
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Readers will notice that within my discussion of exigencies I focused primarily on how 
the CCCC speaks about and re-presents various groups of people. I emphasized the way in which 
the CCCC described how students negotiated dialects and how teachers taught (and should 
teach) English. But I also commented on the genres that the CCCC used to discuss the 
exigencies. The genre—whether one refers to SRTOL as a position statement or a resolution or a 
mixture of both—served as a tool for advocacy that allowed the CCCC to speak for and about 
others.   
 In the first chapter, I noted that when rhetors speak for others, they also simultaneously 
speak about others. There is no doubt that the CCCC does this in SRTOL. As Alcoff notes, “One 
may be speaking about others as an advocate or a messenger if the persons cannot speak for 
themselves” (9). Notice that Alcoff uses two distinct terms, “advocate” and “messenger.”  The 
advocate is someone who is engaged in the form of representation that Spivak discusses in her 
work on the subaltern. That is, an advocate is someone who serves as a “representative” for 
another—someone who has the authority to speak for the needs of others (“Subaltern” 276-77).  
The CCCC uses its I-identity as an organization that can speak for the needs of its members and 
the students. And it certainly does that with the use of the resolution/position statement.  Yet the 
CCCC also attempts to act as “messenger” by describing the experiences of students and 
teachers. Thus, when the CCCC engages in re-presentation, it does so as a means of portraying 
what it considers to be the truth or the reality of those the organization speaks on behalf of.  
 
From Exigence to Rhetorical Audience 
 In his article, “Functional Communication: A Situational Perspective,” Bitzer goes more 
in depth about the relationship between the rhetorical audience and the exigence. In fact, Bitzer 
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provides various theories as to how the rhetorical audience might respond to an exigence. 
Ideally, the speaker will help the rhetorical audience understand the “factual conditions” that 
exist within a situation (29). Thus, the CCCC’s “job” is to show rhetorical audience the 
exigencies that exist within the educational system. The audience must therefore agree with the 
CCCC when it declares that educational institutions must address the issue of dialect diversity, 
especially since educational institutions are experiencing an increase in the number of students 
coming from various dialectical backgrounds.  
 If the rhetorical audience and speaker can agree that the factual condition exists, then the 
speaker must convince the rhetorical audience of the importance of addressing and modifying the 
exigencies within the factual condition. The issue, of course, becomes problematic if the 
audience doesn’t agree with the speaker regarding the urgency of the exigence or does not feel 
compelled to address the exigence. Bitzer hints that the speaker’s use of pathos is important to 
getting the audience to emotionally connect with the speaker’s message, but he also hints that if 
the audience is “apathetic” to the speaker, then the exigence may not get addressed (“Functional” 
29-30). In many respects the CCCC creates pathos by utilizing the first person words “we” and 
“our” to discuss the exigence and establish a connection with the audience. In the examples that I 
provided, the CCCC uses these first-person words in conjunction with verbs that connote 
urgency: “must” and “should.” The problem is that if the rhetorical audience does not feel that 
emotional connection, then it could lead the “speaker and audience [to] thus experience different 
exigencies because the interest component differs” (Bitzer, “Functionality” 30). In other words, 
the rhetorical audience may not even consider “linguistic discrimination,” “need for linguistic 
training for teachers,” and “teaching students who speak or write in dialect” to be rhetorical 
exigencies that need to be addressed—at least right away. 
137 
 
 Of course, one of the most important ways a rhetor can connect with the rhetorical 
audience is to frame the discussion of the document to make it understandable to the audience 
and to help the audience understand how it should respond to the exigence. The CCCC framed 
the discussion initially as a resolution, thus proposing as solutions to the exigencies expressed in 
students’ right to their own language. However, today, the CCCC makes it clear that SRTOL is a 
position statement—a genre that, the CCCC implies, has an exigence, which does not mandate a 
positive modification of the exigence. Interestingly, both supporters and opponents of SRTOL 
treated SRTOL as a resolution—one in which teachers were expected to modify the exigencies.
 In my next chapter, I will examine the various rhetorical audiences that can modify the 
exigencies that the CCCC addressed in the document. I will also discuss how some of the 
audiences reacted to the CCCC speaking on their behalf and what can be learned about speaking 
on behalf of others. 
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Chapter Four: 
The Rhetoric of Speaking on Behalf of Others: Rhetorical Audience 
 
 In the previous chapter I discussed the exigencies that SRTOL addressed and the way in 
which the CCCC spoke on behalf of others while addressing the exigencies. In this chapter, I will 
discuss the rhetorical audiences and the way in which they reacted to how the organization spoke 
on behalf of them. To recap, Bitzer describes the rhetorical audience as one that consists of 
members who not only heed the rhetor’s overall message but also carry out a “positive 
modification” to the exigencies the rhetor discussed in his or her text. Thus, the rhetorical 
audience is not the same as an audience. Why? Because only the rhetorical audience needs to 
address or modify an exigence. 
 
What is Audience?  
 People often assume an audience is the reader, hearer, or receiver of information. But this 
basic definition is too simplistic. In fact, the definition of an audience must take into 
consideration how a rhetor relates to and composes text for the audience. When it comes to 
speeches, for example, the audience of listeners can provide verbal and nonverbal cues to the 
speaker, which, in turn, can help speakers immediately modify or clarify points as the speech is 
delivered (Elbow, Writing 177; Kroll 174). In some situations, the audience members actually 
participate in the creation of the speech by heckling, cheering, laughing or applauding the 
speaker. When this happens, the line between the active speaker and the passive audience is 
blurred (McIlvenny 27-29). In writing, however, the line between writer and audience is more 
fixed. As Peter Elbow makes clear, “the readers aren’t with us [writers] as we put the words on 
paper” and readers “don’t have us [writers] as they read” the text (Writing 177). In other words, 
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most readers of a published text do not have the opportunity to respond to and thus participate in 
the creation of the text.  
 Some critics make a distinction between the readers and audience of a written text. 
Walter Ong, for example, notes that published writers have no way of knowing their readers, that 
is, the actual individuals who read the writers’ texts. But writers do take note of the audience—a 
collective group of people to whom they address the text, even if the audience must be imagined 
(Ong 10-11). Along similar lines, Douglas B. Park notes that the term “readers” is assumed to be 
literal, while the term “audience” is assumed to be theoretical. The audience, Park states, is “an 
ideal conception” (250). He says that audience can mean the “actual people external to a text, the 
audience whom the writer must accommodate” or it can mean “the text itself and the audience 
implied there, a set of suggested or evoked attitudes, interests, reactions, conditions or 
knowledge which may or may not fit the qualities of actual readers or listeners” (249). In other 
words, the writer writes to an audience, a group of people he or she imagines reading the text. 
Likewise, the writer accommodates his or her discourse and style to that “ideal conception” of 
the group. An actual reader does not have to be a part of this ideal conception. 
 For this chapter, I am going to focus on the definition of audience from the perspective of 
a writer. Thus, I define audience as those who not only read and receive information, but also 
those who respond to it as well.
22
 Audiences can respond in any number of ways to writers: for 
example, audiences may agree or disagree with the writer; they can promote the writer and his or 
her viewpoints by sharing the writer’s work with others; or audiences may even ignore the 
writer’s work if they feel doing so is warranted.  In this respect, we must, in the words of Park, 
think of audience in terms of “how we talk about what writers do” (248). After all, most writers 
write text in order to elicit a specific response from a reader. For example, Barry Kroll tells us 
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that writers who compose argumentative essays may envision their audience as possible 
antagonists who have to be converted to the writers’ position; or writers who believe writing is 
informational may feel that the audience has to have information conveyed to it in a specific way 
so that the audience processes the information properly (174-76).  
 Thus, it seems that in some respects, the audience influences the way in which the writer 
constructs the text. But when exactly does the writer think about the audience and at what point 
does the audience influence how the text is written?  When it comes to writing, Elbow says that 
“writing is solitary. The readers aren’t with us [writers] as we put the words on paper so we are 
liable to use our own frame of reference and ignore theirs” (Writing 177). Here he references not 
only the physical non-presence of the reader, but also the unconscious or conscious non-
conception of an audience when a writer initially writes a text. In his essay, “Closing My Eyes as 
I Speak: An Argument for Ignoring Audience,” Elbow argues that writers should, at times, 
ignore audience, especially when the audience causes writers to experience writer’s block (51). 
 Of course, there are other critics who assert that writers should be conscious of the 
audience even before writing a word. The audience, as often envisioned within the field of 
rhetoric, is what Park calls “people-as-they-are-involved-in-a-rhetorical-situation” (249). These 
are the individuals whom the rhetor wants to address, not the individuals who happen to hear the 
rhetor’s message. Because the rhetor expects these individuals to interact with the text, the rhetor 
may make stylistic choices that will engage the audience. 
In some instances, the stylistic choices the writer makes may also depend on whether or 
not the author seeks to address or invoke his or her audience. As discussed earlier, Lisa Ede and 
Andrea Lunsford point out that the audience addressed theory assumes that the writer already 
knows about the audience who will read the text. The writer may be conscious of the 
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socioeconomic, cultural, and/or political background of their readers. As a result, the writer 
attempts to use appropriate discourse and style to speak and appeal to the addressed audience. 
Throughout the composition and revision of the text, the writer considers how the audience 
might respond. This represents what Ede and Lunsford call the “internal dialogue” in which 
“writers analyze inventional problems and conceptualize patterns of discourse” (158).  
 In order for the writer to engage in the internal dialogue, the writer has to imagine what 
the addressed audience is like.  Though Ede and Lunsford do not conclude that the very act of 
imagining an addressed audience can lead to stereotyping or essentializing of the audience, the 
reality is that sometimes writers do this (Long 74).
23
 For example, if a writer writes an 
argumentative paper on the importance of abortion rights, and the writer sees the audience as 
antagonistic pro-lifers, then the writer may address a specific audience with certain values, 
beliefs, religions, et cetera, that some pro-lifers may not have. In fact, the writer’s stereotype (of 
pro-lifers) can serve as a means of speaking on behalf of pro-lifers. Thus, if a writer imagines 
pro-lifers as white, middle-class, Midwestern or Southern, religious, and Republican, this is the 
image that speaks on behalf of pro-lifers and this is the image that the writer addresses. 
 Of course, the writer can also invoke an audience.  The audience invoked theory calls for 
the writer to persuade the audience to assume a role that the writer has for it (Ede and Lunsford 
160). Instead of using style and discourse to speak to an audience, the writer uses style and 
discourse to get the audience to imagine itself as, say, sympathizers to a mother who feels as if 
she must have an abortion. Just as stereotyping and essentializing can occur when a writer 
addresses an audience, stereotyping and essentializing can also occur when a writer invokes an 
audience. In order to foster audience sympathy for the mother about to get an abortion, does the 
writer have to create a white mother or black one? A poor mother or a middle-class one? A 
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teenager who has not finished high school or a college student who is two semesters away from 
completing a degree?  The answers to these questions depend on how a writer utilizes 
stereotyping and essentializing to get the audience to feel sympathy, anger, or fear for the 
woman.
24
 
 Now, I want to make clear that Ede and Lunsford, as well as Ong (whom they use to 
develop their audience-invoked theories) do not believe (or conclude) that the invocation of an 
audience is a negative phenomenon, though my discussion of stereotyping and essentializing 
may make a reader conclude that. What I want to do is make people aware that when invoking—
or, for that matter, addressing—an audience, we as writers, at some point, can sometimes 
generalize (or stereotype) a group of people by giving them characteristics that individual readers 
may not have. For example, in order to invoke an audience—to imagine the role writers want it 
to play—writers need to think about the group of people the audience will be and how that group 
will react to a given situation. In other words, in the act of speaking to an audience, the writer 
speaks about that audience and the roles the writer wants the audience to play. Consequently, in a 
roundabout way, the writer actually speaks on behalf of the audience when addressing or 
invoking that same audience.  
  Thus, it is important for writers to recognize the diversity of opinion and experiences 
within a given audience. In fact, Russell C. Long encourages writers who write persuasive essays 
to adopt Richard Easton’s “moral field” system in which a writer considers the various 
constraints that make an audience accept and not accept a writer’s positions. Once the writer 
considers an audience’s multiple longings and fears or aspirations and failings, then the writer 
can identify the array of audience opinions and attitudes towards a given topic (75-76). Thus, the 
143 
 
moral field will help writers understand that not all pro-lifers think a certain way, nor do they all 
have the same ideas about what an abortion is and what even constitutes pro-life. 
Like Long, Mary Jo Reiff also argues for writers to understand the complexity of 
audience experiences and subjectivities, especially within a social setting (410). This is 
especially important, since SRTOL was created by a committee and that committee met and 
responded to readers on a regular basis. Reiff tells us that in situations in which a writer is 
communicating with (and writing for) multiple readers, all parties can expect to engage in 
conflict and negotiation (Reiff 414). This is especially true when writers are trying to create a 
rhetorical audience. In fact, the creation of a rhetorical audience involves understanding the 
conflicts that may exist between audience and writer and removing those conflicts so that the 
rhetorical audience will not only respond to the writer, but will also respond to the exigence.  
 
Understanding Audience within a Rhetorical Situation 
 In his articles on the rhetorical situation, Bitzer describes two audiences: the audience and 
the rhetorical audience (which he sometimes refers to as the “functional” audience). The 
audience hears a rhetor’s message and understands the importance of addressing the exigencies 
suggested by the rhetor. But the rhetorical audience actually addresses the exigencies by 
attempting to positively modify them.  Writes Bitzer, “Since the audience must be capable of 
modifying the exigence positively, it follows that listeners incapable of this modifying influence 
will not count as a rhetorical or functional audience” (“Functional” 23). The problem with 
Bitzer’s “you’re either a rhetorical audience or you’re not” framework is that it does not fully 
take into consideration how rhetorical audiences come into being.  
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In their article on Bitzer’s rhetorical situation, David M. Hunsaker and Craig R. Smith, 
for example, highlight the complexity of audience within a given rhetorical situation. Unlike 
Bitzer, who segments audience into those who rhetorically modify the exigence and those who 
don’t, Hunsaker and Smith segment the audience into those who hear and understand the rhetor’s 
message (situational audience); those to whom the rhetor targets his or her message (actual 
audience); and those who modify the exigence (the rhetorical audience). Needless to say, some 
of these audiences are overlapping, but that does not mean that it is impossible to examine each 
separately, as I will do now.   
 
Situational Audience 
Thus far, I have identified a number of different audiences, but of these I prefer Hunsaker 
and Smith’s terms because they show how people can become a rhetorical audience.  In fact, I 
will use their terms to discuss how the rhetorical audience comes into being. A look at each of 
their audiences will illuminate this point. 
The first term they use is situational audience. Hunsaker and Smith describe the 
situational audience as those who serve as “witness to the rhetorical situation: knowledge of the 
rhetorical exigence is direct” (148). In this respect, the situational audience understands the 
exigence and thus also understands why the rhetor would encourage the audience to modify it.  
In chapter two, I discussed various individuals and groups of people who comprised the 
situational audience. They not only witnessed the rhetorical situation, but they also influenced it 
as well. These individuals and groups laid the foundation for the CCCC to address exigencies 
related to linguistic discrimination, lack of linguistic training for teachers, and teaching students 
who speak and write in dialects. For example, at the 1968 CCCC conference, Ernece B. Kelly 
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encouraged CCCC members to acknowledge how their racial biases contributed to the 
discrediting of AAEV speakers (106-07). A year later, members from New University 
Conference (NUC) participated in the CCCC conference and encouraged the CCCC and NCTE 
to examine and take a stand against linguistic discrimination in schools and society (Parks 139). 
In 1971, the NCTE Commission on Language circulated an internal report which called for 
teachers to “respect the speech that the student brings to school with him” (4). This document 
encouraged teachers to receive pedagogical training on the teaching of English and dialect 
speakers of English (6). All of these individuals and groups made it possible for the CCCC to not 
only be part of the situational audience, but also contributed to the CCCC deciding to become a 
rhetor. 
Of course there were other individuals and groups who witnessed the same exigencies 
during this time period, yet were not affiliated with the CCCC. For example, Gloria Anzaldúa, as 
a student at Pan American University during the 1960s, experienced linguistic discrimination 
when she and her fellow Chicanos were forced to take speech classes designed “to get rid of 
[their] accents” (76). Stokely Carmichael, in 1965, taught a course at the Work-Study Institute in 
Mississippi where he and his students discussed prevailing social attitudes regarding standard 
English and dialects spoken by African Americans and poor whites (Parks 106); and the College 
Language Association, starting in 1957, began publishing articles in its official journal about 
how to best teach African American students who spoke and wrote in dialect (Gilyard, “African 
American” 632-33). Though CLA, Gloria Anzaldúa, and Stokely Carmichael did not work with 
the CCCC, they witnessed, experienced and had first-hand knowledge of the exigencies which 
the CCCC addressed.  
146 
 
 To be a situational audience, individuals have to have experience with the exigencies; this 
is why Hunsaker and Smith assert that a rhetor, such as the CCCC, generally comes from the 
situational audience (148, 152). The rhetor is then responsible for choosing the audiences who 
will hear and respond to the message. In this respect, the rhetor imagines the actual audience(s) 
by visualizing who is most likely to be receptive to the message.  
 
Actual Audience 
An actual audience, Hunsaker and Smith emphasize, is the “object of the [rhetor’s] 
discourse” (150). In fact, the actual audience is the audience the rhetor addresses and the 
audience that the rhetor expects or hopes will modify the exigence. The main difference between 
the actual audience and the situational audience is that the situational audience may have people 
the rhetor either does not seek to directly influence or may not have considered influencing. Thus 
the situational audience is general, while the actual audience is the specific audience targeted by 
the rhetor. 
 
Rhetorical Audience 
 The last audience Hunsaker and Smith focus on is the rhetorical audience. According to 
Hunsaker and Smith, the actual audience, under the right circumstances, “becomes a rhetorical 
[audience]” (151). In order for a rhetor to convince the actual audience to act—to essentially 
become a rhetorical audience—the rhetor must anticipate and address conflicts within actual 
audience (Hunsaker and Smith 151-53). If these conflicts cannot be resolved, the conflicts, most 
likely, will prevent people from the actual audience from carrying out the positive modification 
of the exigence.  
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One of the ways in which the rhetor can convince the actual audience to become the 
rhetorical audience is to connect with the audience. Unlike the presumably well-defined line 
between writer and audience, the line between rhetor and rhetorical audience is indistinct. 
According to Mary Garret and Xiaosui Xiao, the rhetor (whether speaker or writer) is a part of 
the rhetorical audience, and, like the rhetorical audience, the rhetor is expected to participate in 
the positive modification of the exigence (Garret and Xiao 39). This highlights Bitzer’s 
contention that the rhetorical audience and rhetor are “personally involved” in the exigence 
(“Functional” 32).  
 To iterate, the rhetorical audience understands the message being addressed. That 
message generally centers on the exigence or the “defect”; if the rhetorical audience and the 
rhetor both see, understand, feel, and/or observe the exigence, the exigence, in effect, serves as a 
means of motivating the rhetorical audience to act. Ideally, the rhetor and the rhetorical audience 
will feel “personally involved: they feel somehow responsible for it [the exigence] or understand 
that the exigence or its modification will bring about good or evil for them, their families or 
friends” (Bitzer, “Functional” 32). Most importantly, the rhetorical audience interprets, 
contextualizes, and, unlike the situational or actual audience, always acts on the writer’s or 
speaker’s text.  
The rhetorical audience is an audience that is both invoked and addressed. Just as an 
invoked audience specifically calls for the audience to be persuaded to take on a role, Bitzer’s 
rhetorical audience is encouraged to take on the role of “mediators of change.” Without the 
rhetorical audience, Bitzer tells us, “messages would be futile” (“Political” 239). In other words, 
the rhetorical audience makes the discussion of the exigence and the overall message significant. 
After all, it is the rhetorical audience that responds to the message by performing the role the 
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rhetor has for it. At the same time, the rhetor must speak to or address the audience directly. 
Assuming that the audience is diverse, the rhetor would have to consider the multiple 
subjectivities and experiences within the rhetorical audience. It may be that the rhetor realizes 
that certain members of the rhetorical audience may have to do one thing to respond to the 
exigence and other members of the rhetorical audience may have to do something completely 
different. As Hunsaker and Smith make clear, the speaker must “select an actual audience” 
(152); however, the speaker has to be careful about stereotyping the audience. Thus, it becomes 
important for the speaker to understand the various perceptions the audience may have regarding 
the rhetor, exigencies, and the solutions to the exigences (Hunsaker and Smith 151).  
To understand the rhetorical audiences that exist for SRTOL, it is important to first 
understand the situational audiences and the actual audiences and examine how the actual 
audiences become the rhetorical audiences. In other words, the situational and actual audiences 
can be regarded as incipient rhetorical audiences. To make this argument, I will focus first on 
two actual audiences: the Executive Committee of the CCCC and rank and file teachers of 
writing.  
   
Actual Audiences 
 
Actual Audience One: Executive Committee of the CCCC 
 The first actual audience for the SRTOL was the Executive Committee of the CCCC. In 
the 1971 and 1972 Secretary’s Reports published in the CCC, readers get a glimpse of the initial 
goals of SRTOL, the audiences the CCCC wanted to reach with SRTOL, and the negotiations 
committee members made regarding style and discourse. 
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  At the 1971 Executive Committee meeting held in Las Vegas, CCCC member Richard 
Larson suggested that the CCCC establish a sub-committee to create a document supporting 
students’ right to their own language. The goal was to create a document that would “be helpful 
to teachers” (“Secretary’s Report No. 65” 322). Although there had been discussion of creating a 
resolution affirming students’ right to their own language in 1969, a formal document had never 
come into being (“Secretary’s Report No. 66” 323). The CCCC chairperson, Edward P.J. Corbett 
selected Richard Lloyd-Jones as chair and assigned Geneva Smitherman, Darnel Williams, Myra 
Harrison, and Ross Winterowd to serve on the task force (Parks 161). Thus the writers of the 
initial SRTOL consisted of a subcommittee and the actual audience consisted of the Executive 
Committee to whom they had to report. 
Though the Secretary’s Report indicated that a “mild statement” regarding students’ right 
had already been made by NCTE (“Secretary’s Report No. 65” 322), there seemed to be 
concerns that the NCTE “Statement on Usage” did not reflect the CCCC beliefs about standard 
English. According to Stephen Parks, members of the Executive Committee did not agree with 
the “argument about standard English nor its vision of how standard English should be used to 
supply students to the U.S. economy” (Parks 162). 
  The following year the Executive Committee met; CCCC member Lloyd-Jones had been 
communicating with the sub-committee to determine if the Executive Committee of the CCCC 
should even issue a language rights statement. According to Stephen Parks, the Executive 
Committee had already established that this would be the case (Parks 162). Discussion then 
turned to who should be on the committee to draft the statement, whether or not the CCCC 
should address spoken and written dialects, and how the NCTE should be involved. It was 
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decided that the subcommittee needed to come back the next day with a report (“Secretary’s 
Report No. 66” 324). 
The next day, Lloyd Jones had surmised that the actual audience of SRTOL consisted of 
all teachers: “Lloyd-Jones reported that the sub-committee he chaired thought its goal [was] to 
provide a brief statement on language that would give teachers on all levels and under a variety 
of local conditions a guide” (“Secretary’s Report No. 66” 324). Though there had been some 
question about the feasibility of having a statement, Lloyd-Jones apparently provided the 
Executive Committee with a rough draft which “he emphasized was not the report of his total 
committee nor did represent consensus by the committee” (“Secretary’s Report No. 66” 324). 
Thus, readers can see that because there was not a consensus, there might have been conflicts 
among the writers; while there is no information as to what the disagreements focused on, the 
lack of consensus foreshadowed the lack of consensus CCCC members would have regarding the 
controversial nature of the text. 
Though the “Secretary’s Report” did not include in-depth discussions of conversations 
held at the Executive Committee regarding the statement, it did indicate that members of the 
Executive Committee discussed the draft and provided suggestions on creating an official 
committee for SRTOL that would be more inclusive of CCCC membership. Moreover, the 
Secretary’s Report showed that there had been some conflict regarding the resolution and how it 
should be interpreted: “In a lengthy discussion, it was pointed out that this [was] not an 
abandonment of standards and that a larger document was desirable so that a complete 
background statement and suggestions for implementation (including the training of teachers) 
could be included” (“Secretary’s Report No. 66” 325). Notice that the discussion was described 
as “lengthy” and that the sub-committee had to negotiate with the Executive Committee (the 
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audience) on to how to improve the document. In fact, the report included the Executive 
Committee revision of Lloyd-Jones statement, but not Lloyd-Jones’s original statement.  
According to Stephen Parks, one draft made clear that it was the CCCC Executive Committee 
rather than the general membership of the CCCC which affirmed students’ right to their own 
language. However, by the time the final revision was made, the first official SRTOL statement 
would “speak on behalf of all CCCC members instead of just the Executive Committee” (Parks 
164). The modified statement was published in the secretary’s report: 
  We affirm the student’s right to his own language—the dialect of his nurture in  
  which he finds his identity and style. Any claim that only one dialect is   
  acceptable should be viewed as attempts of one social group to exert its   
  dominance over another, not as either true or sound advice to speakers and  
   writers, nor as moral advice to human beings. A nation which is proud of its  
  diverse heritage and of its cultural and racial variety ought to preserve its heritage 
   of dialects. We affirm strongly the need for teachers to have such training as will  
  enable them to support this goal of diversity and this right of the student to his  
  own language. (“Secretary’s Report No 66” 325)  
According to Parks, the last sentence of this paragraph had, in one of the SRTOL drafts, also 
been written as, “We affirm strongly the need for teachers to have such training as will enable 
them to support this part of our cultural pluralism” (qtd. in Parks 165). He surmised that the 
phrase “cultural pluralism” might have been considered too controversial since the phrase was 
commonly associated with assimilationist politics (166). Likewise, he also noted that the 
statement did not specify which nation was being addressed and that it did not “offer a specific 
linguistic or nationalist paradigm through which to understand the resolution’s intent” (167).  
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This, Parks believes, was done to ensure that the CCCC “[make] a moral argument about 
diversity” rather than a sociopolitical statement about the cultural happenings of the time (Parks 
166). Thus we see an attempt to not only speak on behalf of others, but to also do so by carefully 
avoiding language and terms that would be considered off-putting to its actual audience of 
teachers.  
 
Actual Audience Two: Teachers 
 After the Executive Committee approved the one paragraph statement, Elizabeth 
McPherson, the chair of the CCCC, selected Marianna Davis to lead the subcommittee, which 
became known as the Task Force. The Task Force was responsible for selecting individuals 
“knowledgeable in the necessary fields for the purpose of working on explanation and methods 
of implementing this statement” (“Secretary’s Report No. 66” 326). In other words, these 
individuals would work on the background statement and bibliography that would help teachers 
understand the purpose of SRTOL. We know that the final committee which wrote SRTOL 
consisted of representatives from colleges and ex-officio members from NCTE. Thus, everyone 
on this committee either represented NCTE or represented educational institutions ranging from 
community and historically black colleges to Ivy League and Research One institutions. 
 As teachers, the committee members not only articulated the exigencies, but while doing 
so, established themselves as part of the actual audience. Earlier in the dissertation, I discussed 
the way in which the CCCC used first person pronouns to establish a connection between the 
organization and the actual audience. In this respect, the CCCC was engaging in what Kenneth 
Burke calls identification and consubstantiation. In his discussion, Burke makes clear that though 
person A and person B are two separate individuals, A can identify with B when A believes that 
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there are common interests worth pursuing.  Thus A becomes “substantially one with a person 
other than himself” (Burke 180). It can also mean that person A and person B can form its own 
discourse community, which can be understood as “communities [that] offer the opportunity for 
conversations about common goals according to shared methods and standards” (Tomlinson 86). 
 If we look at person A as the CCCC and person B as teachers, we see how the CCCC 
sought to interact and seek input from the actual audience of teachers. For example, soon after 
the CCCC crafted the one-paragraph statement at its 1972 meeting, it mailed the statement to its 
members and subsequently published their replies in its October 1972 issue of CCC.  In some 
respects, this constitutes a form of peer review in which readers provide feedback to the CCCC, 
which the CCCC can then use to improve the text. According to Barbara Tomlinson, peer 
reviewed articles can also serve as a means of consubstantiation between writer and audience 
within an academic discourse community (89). After all, the writer ideally seeks to use a 
common discourse—that is, language, standard, and style—shared between himself or herself 
and the audience. During the peer review process, the writer interacts with editors of the journal 
who seem to understand the audience and can help the writer effectively communicate within the 
discourse community.  
 Notice I use the terms “ideally” and “seem” to highlight the idyllic conditions under 
which consubstantiation can occur. Not surprisingly, identification and consubstantiation can 
also involve conflict. After all, Burke notes that “a way of life is an acting-together; and in 
acting together, men have common sensations, concepts, images, ideas and attitudes that make 
them consubstantial” (181). The problem is that sometimes people encounter conflict in order to 
find these commonalities. Burke, in facts, uses the term “division” to describe the conflict that 
occurs before cooperation (and perhaps consubstantiation) can occur (181); additionally, both 
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parties’ location of similarities also involves subordinating important interests in order for 
identification to occur. 
 In fact, several replies to the one-paragraph statement criticized the CCCC for the 
statement and showed that readers refused to engage in identification with CCCC. Among other 
issues, William Pixton’s response focused on what he saw as vague terms—“dialect of his 
nurture,” “identity and style,” and “moral advice to humans.” In fact, in a parenthetical note he 
wondered if the CCCC meant “identity” when it used the word “dialect.” Likewise, he 
questioned what he saw as the appropriateness of using the “dialect of his nurture” in various 
situations such as job interviews (Letter 299-300).  
 The other responder, John R. Hendrikson, engaged in mockery as a means of not only 
criticizing SRTOL but also as a means of ridiculing CCCC. He wrote, “Of corse this aint rote in 
the dialect of my nurture or any other sombitch I know about unles its som wasp imperialist but 
is ok anyways because it aint gonna be nobodies langwich in a few yeers it never shud of bin” 
(300). Not only did Hendrikson choose to disengage in the seemingly shared academic discourse 
within the community, but he also intentionally engaged in conflict in order to prove his point 
that SRTOL was a political tract emphasizing what he interpreted as SRTOL’s lessening of 
standard English (wasp imperialism)  (300).  
 In fact, Hendrikson’s article represents the complexities of discourse communities. Not 
everyone within a given discourse community utilizes the same discourse to communicate.  As 
Tomlinson notes, readers who respond to peer reviewed articles can emphasize how the writer is 
not a part of the discourse community by pointing out the writer’s stylistic, thematic, and 
research “errors” and flaws (91). This is certainly what Pixton and Hendrikson do. But readers 
can also misinterpret articles (Tomlinson 92) as SRTOL committee member Adam Casmier 
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accuses Robert P. Saalbach of doing when Saalbach implies that SRTOL has an “anything goes” 
approach to language (Saalbach 416). In actuality, Casmier asserted that “Saalbach’s response is 
dangerous . . . because it makes a reasonable, and long overdue, resolution seem radical” (227). 
 I want to highlight Casmier’s de-emphasis on the radicalism of SRTOL. Casmier’s de-
emphasis reinforces Parks criticism that the one-paragraph statement “removed the teacher from 
the immediate terrain of the 1970s classroom. It offered no concrete meaning for teachers facing 
an increasingly varied and politically active student population” (166-67). The statement, thus, 
was devoid of the discussions of the effects of racial integration in school, the arrival of first 
generational students, and student participation in Vietnam protests, all issues that were 
perceived to be radical in nature. In this respect, it is similar to the NCTE Commission on 
Language statement, which also carefully avoided these issues. 
 And despite the attempt to depoliticize and deradicalize the statement, the responders, as 
shown above, were able to see the (radical) politics inherent within the paragraph.  This is 
because the paragraph emphasized divisions among not only among social groups: “Any claims 
that only one dialect is acceptable should be viewed as attempts of one social group to exert its 
dominance over another” (“Secretary’s Report No. 66” 325), but also teachers and students: “We 
affirm strongly the need for teachers to have such training as will enable them to support this 
goal of diversity and this right of the student to his own language” (“Secretary’s Report No. 66” 
325).  
 In fact, Stephen Parks shows that McPherson also responded personally to letters written 
to the CCCC. Though he does not republish the letters written to the CCCC, he does note that 
critics complained about SRTOL’s “practical effects and scholarly support” (176).  As a result, 
the resolution was amended to the resolution we see today
25
: 
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We affirm the students’ right to their own patterns and varieties of language—the 
dialects of their nurture or whatever dialects in which they find their own identity 
and style. Language scholars long ago denied that the myth of a standard 
American dialect has any validity. The claim that any one dialect is unacceptable 
amounts to an attempt of one social group to exert its dominance over another. 
Such a claim leads to false advice for speakers and writers, and immoral advice 
for humans. A nation proud of its diverse heritage and cultural and racial variety 
will preserve its heritage of dialects. We affirm strongly that teachers must have 
the experiences and training that will enable them to respect diversity and uphold 
the right of students to their own language (CCCC 710-711).
26
 
Because the CCCC received input from the actual audience of teachers, the CCCC decided to 
address their concerns by including phraseology specifying research. For instance, language was 
soon described as consisting of “patterns and varieties,” two key terms that harken to linguistics. 
Moreover, the organization specifically talked about linguists or language scholars: “Language 
scholars long ago denied that the myth of a standard American dialect has any validity” (CCCC 
710). After discussing what language scholars said, the document immediately talked about “the 
claim.” As Parks notes, because the organization removed the original phrase “any claim” and 
replaced it with the phrase “the claim,” it made it sound like it was language scholars who were 
talking about a specific claim, rather than the organization talking about a generalized claim 
(Parks 177). 
 In addition to tweaking the resolution, the Task Force subcommittee, now chaired by 
Melvin Butler, had to produce a background report. According to McPherson’s note sent to 
Butler, the subcommittee’s product “will be extremely important to college English instructors 
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and to the students they teach” (qtd. in Parks 179).  This background statement would include the 
scholarly information that had been missing from the original draft. However, by the time the 
Task Force and the Executive Committee of the CCCC met, the actual audience for the 
document expanded.   
 
An Attempted Actual Audience: The General Public 
 In his 1993 speech regarding the history of SRTOL, Lloyd-Jones asserted that “the prime 
purpose of the resolution was to challenge and educate the public at all levels” (5). This assertion 
was highlighted in the November 22, 1972 Executive Committee meeting which indicated that 
the Task Force wanted the final document to be geared towards those in business as well as 
education. According to the minutes, the Executive Committee and the Task Force spent 
considerable time discussing who the audience of SRTOL would be (“Secretary’s Report No. 
67” 333). By the time of the next meeting in April of 1973, the Executive Committee made it 
clear to the Task Force that the audience needed to include other groups of people including 
parents (“Secretary’s Report No. 68” 338). 
Moreover, if we examine the background statement, we’ll see that on the surface, SRTOL 
addressed the general public. A part of the background statement read: 
The members of the Committee realized that the resolution would create 
controversy and that without a clear explanation of the linguistic and social 
knowledge on which it [STROL] rests, many people would find it 
incomprehensible. The members of the Executive Committee, therefore, 
requested a background statement which would examine some common 
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misconceptions about language and dialect, define some key terms, and provide 
some suggestions for sounder, alternate approaches. (CCCC 711) 
 Notice that the CCCC used the generic term “people” as opposed to the more restrictive terms of 
“members” or “teachers.” This was important, for the organization not only addressed the 
members and teachers, but it also suggested that there was some attempt here to address a more 
general public. After all, the actual resolution itself alluded to American diversity, hinted at 
American oppression of groups and discussed how the “claim that any one dialect is 
unacceptable” was not just bad for speakers and writers but constitutes “immoral advice for 
humans” (711).  This certainly confirmed Lloyd-Jones contention that the ultimate purpose of the 
document was to “challenge and educate the public at all levels” (5).  
If we examine the document from a generic standpoint, one can say that the document as 
a position statement is designed to help the public at large understand how an organization 
assumes a stance towards the topic; as a resolution, the document is designed to help the public 
see how the organization addresses and proposes to resolve an issue. But, if the document, as a 
resolution, is designed to “challenge and educate the public,” and if the document encourages the 
general public to “do something,” that is, to address the recognized exigencies of the situation, 
then that would mean that the general public would first become an actual audience who 
witnesses the exigencies and then later become a rhetorical audience who acts on the urgencies 
of the situation.   
The reality, however, is that the general public (in this instance) cannot serve as the 
rhetorical audience. As Bitzer points out, the rhetorical audience must be able to effect change 
and modify the exigence. Some of the challenges in having the general public as the rhetorical 
audience may be identified: attracting mainstream media to the issue; making sure the audience 
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understands the exigencies the CCCC is trying to address; convincing the audience that what the 
CCCC is saying is true; and helping the audience understand the need to address the exigencies, 
especially in regard to linguistic discrimination. Most important, it is difficult to transform the 
general public into an “agent of change.” Like the rhetorical audience, an agent of change has the 
ability to address the issue the rhetor wants him or her to address. However, as Karlyn Kohrs 
Campbell and Susan Schultz Huxman make clear, the “agent of change” is someone who has the 
political, economic, and/or social power to modify the exigencies (186-87). The general public, 
which consists of people from all classes, ethnicities, regions, nationalities, educational levels, 
religions, political affiliations, et cetera, is, needless to say, difficult for a rhetor to influence. 
After all, a rhetor has to make sure that the general public understands and agrees to the 
modification of the exigency.  
The problem is that the CCCC could not turn the general public into an actual audience 
because it was unable to attract mainstream media attention to its cause. Therefore, people such 
as Anzaldúa, Carmichael, and supportive members of CLA, who might have witnessed and 
wanted to modify the exigencies addressed by the CCCC, would have had difficulty learning 
about SRTOL. In fact, my study shows that influential newspapers or magazines did not run 
major stories on SRTOL. When newspapers and magazines did write about SRTOL, the 
coverage was negative. For example, J. Mitchell Morse’s 1976 New York Times commentary 
lambasted the organization for the passage of the resolution; Merrill Sheils’ 1975 Newsweek 
article entitled “Why Johnny Can’t Write” referred to SRTOL as a “political tract” not a “set of 
educational precepts” (Sheils); and Thomas H. Middleton’s 1986 Los Angeles Times article, 
“Disrespect of Language Takes Its Toll” critiqued the way in which SRTOL, in his opinion, was 
used to justify “the loss of respect for any established standards” (3). In 2003, the Rutland 
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Herald in Vermont published Peter Berger’s article in which he interpreted SRTOL as NCTE’s 
“[recommendation] that teachers ignore writing errors.”
27
 
 Though there had been discussions among CCCC members about attracting a general 
public and transforming that public into a rhetorical audience, the reality is that this did not 
occur. For one, several key members focused on specific actual audiences. McPherson’s note to 
Butler focused on the importance of SRTOL to teachers; Lloyd-Jones initial impression was that 
the purpose of SRTOL was to help teachers; and Stephen Parks concluded that Lloyd-Jones’ 
early draft seemed to indicate that the document was to represent all members of the CCCC, a 
specific group of teachers.  
 
Converting Situational and Actual Audiences into Rhetorical Audiences 
 To convert a situational and actual audience into a rhetorical audience, the rhetor must be 
able to convince the situational and actual audiences to rhetorically modify the exigence. In the 
discussion of the rhetorical audience, Craig R. Smith and Scott Lybarger iterate two key points 
from Hunsaker and Smith: “the goal of the rhetor is to find an audience with two key properties: 
first, the power to correct or improve the exigence, and second, agreeing with the perception or 
susceptibility to persuasion” (200). When Hunsaker and Smith discuss perception, they refer to 
how both the rhetor and audience recognize and interpret the exigence (151). Lloyd Bitzer 
provides a listing of how rhetors and audiences respond to exigencies, and their responses, in 
many respects, correlate with their perceptions of the exigencies. Though Bitzer’s list, which he 
calls “Responsiveness to Exigences,” does not talk about identification and consubstantiation, it 
is clear that rhetor and audience need to identify with each other and, as Burke would emphasize, 
become “substantially one” (Burke 180).  
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 One of the ways in which the CCCC committee on SRTOL attempted to identify with 
their actual audience of teachers is through constant communication with the actual audiences. 
Though the SRTOL Committee had received continual feedback from the Executive Committee, 
it also received feedback from respondents who communicated with individual members or 
through CCC. The CCCC’s SRTOL committee changed some of the contents of SRTOL based 
on feedback they received in an attempt to make SRTOL not only more palatable to the 
membership but also to convince the membership to adopt the core beliefs of the document.  
 On the “Responsiveness to Exigences” list, Bitzer writes, “Speaker and audience are also 
more likely to respond if they believe their efforts must occur now or never—that there is no 
opportunity for postponement” (“Functional” 33), hence, the nearly synonymous use of the terms 
“exigences” and “urgencies.”  Here he points to the fact that the rhetor and audience agree that 
some course of action must happen. There is a short window of time and both rhetor and 
audience must modify the exigence—together.  Related to the concept of “now or never” is the 
notion of fully understanding the seriousness of a given situation. In his discussion on the 
differences between understanding the Holocaust as fact and knowing the Holocaust as a reality,  
Bitzer points out that when knowing a factual condition, both rhetor and audience can, for 
example, “apprehend [the Holocaust]  directly and sensibly” (“Functional 32). Thus, it is up to 
speaker to provide a “vivid representation” of a given situation to the audience. In this respect, 
both rhetor and audience share a bond—that is the knowledge of the exigence and the 
circumstances that may have produced the exigence (“Functional” 32).  
 Hence, Bitzer implies that it is up to the speaker to provide the context and details 
concerning the need to address the exigence immediately. One of the things that stood out to me 
about SRTOL was that the CCCC did not go into detail about the cultural and political 
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happenings at the time, and, most importantly, did not provide a vivid representation as to why 
the exigencies exist and why they need to be addressed immediately.  Perhaps the CCCC felt that 
by using the phrase, “social upheavals of the 1960s” (CCCC 709), the audience would 
understand implicitly what it was referring to. But, then again, perhaps if the CCCC had gone 
into detail, it might have ended up being associated with overtly leftist politics, something it 
wanted to avoid (Parks 166-67).  
 Most importantly, the CCCC did not discuss concretely the ways in which the country 
had engaged in linguistic discrimination of students. SRTOL did not mention how, during the 
nineteenth century, Native Americans were prohibited from speaking their indigenous languages 
in schools (Aguilera and LeCompte 72). SRTOL did not discuss the discrimination against 
linguistically marginalized students through the Hawaiian English Standard school system during 
the twentieth century; it did not mention how some schools and universities required Chicano 
students (or other linguistically marked students) to take speech classes designed to remove the 
students’ accents. (See Gloria Anzaldúa’s Borderlands/La Frontera for more information.)  Had 
the CCCC done this, it would have shown that the United States had a history of engaging in 
linguistic oppression within the educational sphere. 
Nevertheless, the CCCC had to invoke and address the audiences in order to convince 
them to examine their attitudes towards dialects and to respect the dialects that students already 
have.  By providing the stage for audiences to examine their attitudes towards dialects and 
language, the CCCC began the process of converting the audiences into rhetorical audiences. 
Likewise, it also directly addressed the actual audience of teachers, especially with its use of the 
background statement. The inclusion of the background statement did more than provide 
additional information. It was, in essence, a persuasive piece addressed to its audience of 
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teachers. CCCC geared the piece to address issues related to curriculum, pedagogy, textbooks, 
and the like. By addressing and invoking the audience simultaneously, it created a rhetorical 
audience of teachers who can effect change in the classrooms. 
Before I go into detail about the rhetorical audience of teachers, I want to examine how 
the CCCC transformed the Executive Committee from an actual audience to a rhetorical 
audience. 
 
Rhetorical Audiences and Their Reactions to SRTOL 
Rhetorical Audience One: Executive Committee 
 Throughout the process of creating the document, the Executive Committee provided 
feedback to the Task Force and in many instances ordered, not merely suggested, changes. For 
example, at the Executive Committee meeting in April of  1973, the Executive Committee 
ordered the removal of gendered pronouns in the resolution, insisted that the document be 
written for those who “are not linguistically oriented” (“Secretary’s Report No. 68” 338), and 
initially wanted to expand the audience so that it was not limited to the teachers. Additionally, 
several members commented on how initial drafts of the background statement seemed to “’play 
down’ the high school teacher” and that it exhibited a “patronizing attitude towards the high 
school teacher” (“Secretary’s Report No. 68” 338). In other words, the Executive Committee 
did not want language that would alienate specific audiences. 
Likewise, the Executive Committee debated the following: 
 Dialects to emphasize in the background statement. 
 Definition and description of English as a language. 
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 The statement, “The claim that any one dialect is unacceptable amounts to an attempt of 
one social group to exert its dominance over another.” In fact, thirteen people voted not 
to re-word that statement at the 1973 meeting, though seven wanted to modify it.  
 Format of the background statement, especially the introduction and the bibliography.  
 Pedagogy that teachers needed to have especially as it relates to “how to deal with 
linguistic options, with students, teachers’ procedures in classrooms, in private 
conversations with students, general linguistic knowledge and the understanding of it” 
(“Secretary’s Report No. 68” 338).  
 The purpose of the document and the audiences for SRTOL. (“Secretary’s Report No. 68 
338-339). 
The last point was important because there was debate as to whether SRTOL should primarily be 
a pedagogical document or a document that also examined the ethical and philosophical concerns 
related to language. If SRTOL were solely a pedagogical document then it was a document that 
was geared specifically for teachers. To be effective as a pedagogical document, SRTOL would 
thus have to provide specific guidelines as to how teachers should use SRTOL in the classroom.  
Accordingly, it seems that SRTOL would be a resolution designed to solve a specific problem. 
However, if SRTOL were a philosophical document, then the audience would be broader. Not 
only could the CCCC speak to teachers, but it could also speak to the general public. Moreover, 
there was discussion about the possibility of creating two documents, one designed for the public 
and the other designed for teachers. Having two documents could certainly address the 
controversy regarding the overall purpose of SRTOL, especially as it related to audiences 
(“Secretary’s Report No. 68” 339). This, of course, did not happen. 
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 Nevertheless, the Executive Committee also debated and voted whether or not it should 
limit SRTOL’s audience to English teachers or address teachers from all fields. In the end the 
Executive Committee tabled the following motion: “That the primary audience of this document 
be the English profession” (“Secretary’s Report No 68” 339). By the end of the Executive 
Committee meeting, the Executive Committee had provided the Task Force with additional 
editorial suggestions. Interestingly, a motion was made and accepted for the following: “that the 
committee be asked to provide the background to the statement on language explaining and 
supporting the resolution and not go into further detail regarding classroom implementation” 
(“Secretary’s Report No. 68” 340).   
The fact that the Executive Committee was so divided on the content, goals, and 
audiences for SRTOL is significant because it seemed as if it were unable to answer this question 
that had been posed at the Executive Committee meeting: “For whom are we speaking?” 
(“Secretary’s Report No. 68”).  Was the Committee speaking for the organization, teachers in 
general, English teachers specifically, students, and/or the general public? Related to the 
question of for whom the Committee spoke, the Committee seemed confused as to whom it 
wanted to speak. Based on the Secretary’s Report, I’m not sure that the Executive Committee or 
the Task Force committee concretely answered that question. For one, the CCCC was still 
debating the audiences it wanted to address. I believe that the CCCC knew it wanted teachers as 
the primary audience, but it also seemed as if the organization was trying to figure out if it 
wanted additional audiences. Secondly, the CCCC debated what it wanted to invoke from the 
audiences. Did it want the audience to reconsider how it examined language? Did it want the 
audience to be more respectful of people (not just students) who used dialects other than standard 
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English? Lastly, the CCCC seemed to be implicitly debating whether or not it wanted to speak 
for students, for the organization, for teachers in general or English teachers in particular.  
In addition to struggling to understand to whom and for whom the CCCC spoke, the 
CCCC seemed to struggle with understanding the technicalities of SRTOL and which audiences 
would use the document; related to this, the organization also seemed to debate the function of 
the document. For the Executive Committee to discuss the possibility of not exploring classroom 
implementation of SRTOL might have left people wondering what the purpose of the document 
was. Readers, especially teachers, may have wondered why a document that was described by 
McPherson to Butler as “extremely important” to educators and students would not be used, 
implemented, or applied in a classroom setting.  
The important take-away is that at this particular meeting, the Executive Committee was 
divided as a group about SRTOL as a document. The Task Force clearly had more work to do in 
terms of convincing the Executive Committee to not only respond, but to also act on the report. 
Not only did the Task Force have to work through the conflicts that occurred between a group of 
writers and an actual audience, but it also had to negotiate how it would revise the document in 
time for the next Executive Committee meeting scheduled for November of 1973. 
By the November 1973 meeting, Melvin Butler, who had chaired the committee which 
produced the background statement for SRTOL, had died. Nevertheless, the Task Force had 
presented the Executive Committee with an updated draft and took questions regarding the 
“rhetoric used, the political implications, and the controversial nature of the background 
statement” (“Secretary’s Report No. 69” 331). Stephen Parks notes that some at the meeting 
seemed to have been confused about what specifically SRTOL was endorsing and how teachers 
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were supposed to use SRTOL. Although discussion was held regarding whether the resolution 
could be reworded, the decision to reword the resolution had been turned down (Parks 191). 
Unlike previous meetings in which the Executive Committee debated about the actual 
audience of the piece, discussion focused on the distribution of SRTOL to various audiences. It 
was decided that the CCCC membership would receive a special letter with a copy of SRTOL by 
mail prior to its 1974 Conference in Anaheim, California. Additionally, discussion then turned to 
how to provide SRTOL to audiences beyond the CCCC. People debated whether to provide the 
document for free or to charge a cost. Despite what looks like on paper a spirited meeting, the 
Executive Committee did not unanimously agree on the following motion: “That the covering 
letter indicate approval of the resolution by the Executive Committee and recommend that the 
membership approve the resolution at the business meeting” (“Secretary’s Report No. 69” 331). 
While the overwhelming number of people at the Executive Meeting agreed to the motion 
(twelve), there were four who voted no and two who abstained.   
 
Rhetorical Audience Two: Teachers 
          Though SRTOL did not receive much attention in mainstream media, it received quite a 
bit of attention in academic journals read by those within the English profession. Because of this, 
the CCCC had the opportunity to persuade CCCC members and English teachers in general to be 
the rhetorical audiences for SRTOL. Not only did the CCCC reference college teachers, which 
make up the core members of the CCCC, but it also referenced English teachers who worked in 
primary and secondary education.  In the background statement of the document, the CCCC 
acknowledged the mandatory requirement that students attend primary and secondary schools 
and discussed what happens to students who come from homes where standard English is the 
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norm: “They sit in the head of the class, are accepted at ‘exclusive’ schools, and are later 
rewarded with positions in the business and social world” (710). Thus, the organization implied 
that success began for these students in primary and secondary schools. To help those who tend 
to be less successful due to dialect differences, the organization encouraged “English teachers, at 
all levels from kindergarten through college, [to] uncover and examine some of the assumptions 
on which our teaching has rested” (709-10). The organization requested that the audience 
members carry out the exigencies by 1) understanding the pedagogy of how English is taught; 2) 
educating themselves in linguistics; and 3) revising their pedagogical approaches to the teaching 
of English to those who do not speak and/or write in standard English.  
 Because most of the members of the CCCC are teachers on the college level, I, at times, 
reference the membership of CCCC; however, I also recognize that the CCCC is also speaking to 
and for individuals who are not members of the CCCC and I acknowledge these individuals as 
well. 
Linda Alcoff tells us that “the rituals of speaking that involve the location of the speaker 
and listeners affect whether a claim is taken as a true, well-reasoned, compelling argument, or 
significant idea” (13). In other words, to understand how successful the CCCC was in speaking 
on behalf of English teachers, readers need to understand how English teachers reacted to the 
document and how or why they may have agreed or disagreed with the document. Most 
importantly, we have to understand the style and the logic used to create the “well-reasoned, 
compelling argument” that seeks to influence the audience to accept how it speaks on behalf of 
them or another group of people.  
 On one hand, the style of the resolution itself was forthright. The first two words of this 
one hundred eight one word resolution were “We affirm”; the first three words of the last 
169 
 
sentence of the resolution were “we affirm strongly.” On the other hand, the style of the 
background statement was defensive. It anticipated that the audience might not believe that the 
claims in the document were “true” and/or “well-reasoned.” To restate, CCCC envisioned its 
primary audience of English teachers as being confused: “The members of the Committee 
realized that the resolution would create controversy and that without a clear explanation of the 
linguistic and social knowledge on which it rests, many people would find it incomprehensible” 
(711). Thus, committee members did what Walter Ong suggests fiction writers do when thinking 
about an audience: “First, the writer must construct in his imagination, clearly or vaguely, an 
audience cast in some sort of role—entertainment seekers, reflective sharers of experience, . . . 
inhabitants of a lost and remembered world of prepubertal latency . . ., and so on” (12). In some 
regards, the committee saw the audience as “reflective sharers of experience.” The committee 
anticipated that the audience of English teachers would be perplexed by the necessity of the 
document and claims made in the document. To help readers understand the document, the 
committee attempted to use the background statement to “answer some of the questions the 
resolution will raise” (711). This led to the second component of audience that Ong considers: “a 
reader has to play the role in which the author has cast him, which seldom coincides with his role 
in the rest of actual life” (12). Thus, the committee expected the audience to question the theories 
used to inform the creation of the document; and it was certainly possible that the committee 
would want the audience to eventually agree with the resolution and background statement.   
Moreover, the committee expected that the rhetorical audience would modify the 
exigencies addressed in the document.  Thus, the committee used the word “we,” which was 
used to create a camaraderie (or, as Burke would say, an identification) between itself and 
English teachers. For example, an excerpt from the beginning of the background statement said, 
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“And many of us have taught as though the function of schools and colleges were to erase 
differences. Should we, on the one hand, urge creativity and individuality in the arts and the 
sciences, take pride in the diversity of our historical development, and, on the other hand, try to 
obliterate all the differences in the way Americans speak and write?” (710). By the end of the 
document, readers knew the answer to the rhetorical questions: “Common sense tells us that if 
people want to understand one another, they will do so. Experience tells that we can understand 
any dialect of English after a reasonably brief exposure to it. And humanity tells us that we 
should allow every man the dignity of his own way of talking” (726). 
 To understand the complexity of the responses from the rhetorical audience of teachers, 
we need to understand the role that identity plays in the audience’s acceptance of the 
organization speaking on its behalf as well as the audience’s willingness to modify the exigence. 
As was discussed in an earlier chapter, the institutional identity (I-Identity) of the CCCC 
revolves around advocacy. It is an organization specifically designed to represent the teachers 
and field of Composition and Rhetoric within academia as well as within the National Council 
for the Teachers of English. Moreover, CCCC has various caucuses (or affinity groups) which 
advocate for various issues within Rhetoric and Composition. Thus, the organization seems to 
be, by its very nature, one that is supposed to speak on behalf of its membership and teachers. 
 I argue that some members of the actual audience of English teachers and CCCC 
members reacted negatively to the CCCC speaking on behalf of them because their identities as 
English teachers did not correspond to the identity of the English teacher that SRTOL attempted 
to construct. As a result, the audience of English teachers and CCCC members split to form two 
informal (though not officially recognized) affinity groups related to SRTOL: supporters and 
opponents of SRTOL. The affinity groups spoke on behalf of each other by engaging in 
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advocacy and re-presentation. Additionally, they also spoke on behalf of their opponents by re-
presenting them negatively. To supporters of SRTOL, the English teacher was one who 
advocated for students; the English teacher recognized and tried to resolve the disconnect 
between the linguistic acceptance of (nonstandard English) dialect and the societal disapproval of 
that dialect. Opponents, on the other hand, emphasized the non-acceptance of student dialect by 
the general society, and they focused on students having to learn to conform to society’s standard 
of what acceptable English was in the workforce and in the classroom.  
Opponents of SRTOL portrayed or re-presented teachers as those who should help 
students learn standard English. They emphasized that students live in a society that as a general 
rule did not accept alternate dialects in the workplace or within educational arenas. The goal of 
the English teacher was not to change society, but to help students understand how to 
communicate within society.  SRTOL opponent William Pixton wrote, “Teachers must not allow 
their students to remain linguistically different and deficient, thus ensuring [the students’] 
communicative attempts as well as their comprehension will be inadequate” (“Contemporary” 
252); Allen Smith asserted that teachers “are custodians of the past. No matter how often we 
embrace the idea of ‘relevance’ or ‘accountability’ in education, our particular role in any society 
is to gather and disseminate the standards and values of the past for the coming generation to our 
respective chosen fields” (156); and David L. Shores believed that teachers should “respect 
diversity,” but teachers must also make clear to students that “members of language communities 
do have attitudes toward their language and its varieties. Schools and colleges . . . must inform us 
about those attitudes and the situation as it is . . .” (9). Notice that the emphasis was on how 
dialect marked the student as different and how the teacher’s job was to help the student 
assimilate into mainstream society.  
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To assist in the assimilation, teachers had to inculcate the “values” of middle-class 
respectable society. According to Lynn Z. Bloom, the composition classroom was supposed to 
serve as a primary means of helping students attain linguistic respectability in the workplace and 
within society. The teacher, therefore, was seen as responsible for emphasizing “correctness” 
(i.e. grammar) and “decorum” (i.e. formality, not dialect) (Bloom 659-60). In fact, Richard P. 
Caporale, in his article against SRTOL, highlighted Bloom’s assertions when he made clear that 
the “teachers of language (or its guardians, at least)” should concern themselves with helping 
students move up the socioeconomic ladder (105). By doing this, teachers helped students get rid 
of the deficiencies Pixton alluded to and disseminate standards that Allen proposed. 
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Opponents of SRTOL pointed out why the CCCC did not speak on behalf of them. In the 
Inside English journal, one opponent of SRTOL believed that SRTOL took a condescending tone 
towards teachers. After explaining that teachers knew not to belittle students with non-standard 
dialects, the person wrote, “In short, I find the air of the essay under discussion to be patronizing 
at the least, if not actually derogatory” (2). Jeff Zorn contended that “SRTOL tries to shame 
English Teachers” for emphasizing standard English in the classroom (325). He believed 
teachers who rejected the tenets of SRTOL and engaged in “purposeful instruction in Formal 
Written English” help students enter into professional and educational domains (326). Most 
importantly, opponents also pointed out that the people SRTOL seek to speak on behalf of—the 
students, especially students of color—might not agree with SRTOL. Susan Passler Miller, for 
example, provided commentary on her perception of how African American students viewed the 
document: “Black students who hear about ‘The Students’ Right to Their Own Language’ may 
respond by asking what new shuck and jive this is. Whatever that resolution’s intentions are, 
these students suspect that they’re being hustled, denied the same prescriptive help that elevated 
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some of us above otherwise predictable lower-class futures” (13). Here she implied that black 
students wish linguistic assimilation because it meant the possibility of socioeconomic 
improvement. Jeff Zorn told readers that upon reading SRTOL, his African American mentor at 
a historically black college in Alabama declared, “With friends like these, black children hardly 
need enemies” (qtd. in Zorn 311). While we see Zorn’s mentor speaking on behalf of African 
American children, we also get a sense of how at least one African American professor views the 
document with disdain.  
Supporters of SRTOL, however, portrayed or re-presented teachers as being responsible 
for helping students achieve individuality, self-esteem, and knowledge within a subject 
matter. Vandover stressed the obligation teachers have “to help the student arrive at his fullest 
possible competency in language” (5); and Glissmeyer wondered if teachers were doing the 
following: 
As English teachers are we talking to our students and our colleagues about how 
society uses language “as its most insidious means of control, how we are led to 
judge others—and ourselves—by criteria which have no real bearing on actual 
worth”? Are we doing whatever we can in working for social justice? In the 
farther reaches of our total lives are we concerned that the affairs of the 
community should be conducted by one or all of the constituencies? (204) 
 In other words, Glissmeyer questioned how proactive teachers were in helping students not only 
understand the social components of language but also contributing in the improvement of 
society. This need for the English teacher to improve the society in which he or she lived was 
echoed implicitly by James Sledd. Sledd commented that many teachers were ignorant of the 
issues that face the working class and poor and naively assume that all students would want to 
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learn standard English norms. He pointed out that there were some students who “have much 
greater concerns than the details of usage, the study of socially graded synonyms” (Sledd 673). 
Like the writers of SRTOL, he believed that if a student chose not to learn standard English, the 
teachers should design assignments that would allow the student to develop continuing literacy 
in his or her own dialect. Teachers who did this, Sledd acknowledged, would end up challenging 
society, and society’s insistence on the supremacy of standard English (Sledd 674-75). 
As teachers define “the role of the English teacher,” they engage in re-presentation and 
representation which Spivak discusses in her work. Though she uses these terms to critique the 
way in which academics represent the subaltern, these terms are important for understanding the 
way in which teachers portray themselves. To iterate, re-presentation refers to the way in which 
someone or a group is portrayed and representation refers to the way in which someone is spoken 
for (Spivak, “Subaltern” 275). When teachers describe the role of teachers and what they are 
expected to do, they engage in re-presentation. This re-presentation is a depiction, in many 
respects, an idealized depiction of how the English teacher should behave. Additionally, the re-
presentation also serves as a means of creating an institutional identity for the English teacher. 
After all, this institutional identity highlights how the English teacher fits into society. Notice, 
for example, how Allen Smith focused on the traditional role of the English teacher: “the 
custodians of the past”; Caporale saw them as “guardians” of the language; and Glissmeyer 
concentrated on what teachers should do: “[work] for social justice”; the descriptions of the role 
of the English teacher help to institutionalize the profession within society.  
Nonetheless, because teachers engage in re-presentation, they also have an opportunity to 
use their own subjectivity in speaking on behalf of themselves as individuals, as well as speaking 
on behalf of their fellow teachers. According to Royster, “subjectivity as a defining value pays 
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attention dynamically to context, ways of knowing, language abilities, and experience, and by 
doing so it has a consequent potential to deepen, broaden, and enrich our interpretive views in 
dynamic ways” (29). Writers such as Pixton, Smith, Shores, Glissmeyer, Caporale, and Sledd all 
provided their own interpretation and used their experiences as teachers to speak for themselves; 
but when they (and by extension CCCC) discussed what teachers should do, their subjectivity 
became problematic because they assumed that all teachers shared the same subjectivity, the 
same “ways of knowing” and the same pedagogical context for the teaching of English.  
I want to make clear that I am not saying that opponents of SRTOL did not acknowledge the 
exigencies that existed in SRTOL. Many, in fact, recognized that more and more dialect-
speaking students were entering the classroom, and thus, believed that teachers should have 
linguistic training to help address the needs of these students. It seemed that they had constructed 
a different identity for the English teacher, one that could not accept some of the precepts that 
existed in the SRTOL. When Linda Alcoff discusses the “social location of the speaker,” (the 
identity) we need to think about the social location of CCCC and how that location differed from 
some members of the audience.  
In re-presenting the English teachers, the writers also engaged in another form of 
speaking on behalf of others: advocacy or (representation) for the English teacher. Many 
opponents both implicitly and explicitly called for teachers to reject some if not all of the 
premises of SRTOL. C. Lamar Thompson and Juanita V. Williamson said that there needed to be 
a “statement on the students’ right to be taught standard English” (“Bait/Rebait” 13); the person 
against SRTOL in Inside English asked this question: “Are we going to use the English teacher 
in his classroom as a tool to carry out the particular ideology of the Executive Committee of 
CCCC?” (“Students’ Right” 6). The answer was presumably no. Pixton pointed out that the 
176 
 
primary purpose of his article, “A Contemporary Dilemma,” was “to encourage the CCCC 
membership to reject the resolution” (247), while it was clear that Zorn’s article called for 
“repudiating SRTOL and the entire body of mis-educative ‘counter-hegemonic training’ that has 
followed in its wake” (326). Because opponents called for the rejection of SRTOL, this affinity 
group could not be an ideal rhetorical audience, since it sought to actively undermine SRTOL. 
To show how they were separate from opponents of SRTOL, supporters of SRTOL used 
labels and terms to describe those who disagree with their ideologies. Elizabeth McPherson and 
Eleanor Kutz, for example, referred to their opponents as “traditionalists” (McPherson 
“Language” 75; Kutz 385) and James Sledd referred to them as “conformists” (672). The term 
“traditionalist” has a specific meaning in Rhetoric and Composition, at least to the degree that it 
echoes the term “current-traditionalism,” a term of disparagement among compositionists. 
Current-traditionalists are seen as teachers who are more interested in having students conform 
to grammar rules and less interested in the content of students’ papers. In fact, Robert J. Connors 
called traditionalists (he does not use the term current-traditionalist) “the front-line teachers, the 
proponents of writing as a vocational skill” (70). In contrast, Connors defined rhetoricians as 
teachers interested in “writing as discovery or communication” (70). The traditionalists or 
current-traditionalists, thus, were re-presented as scholars who were opposed to student 
individuality (though I’m sure traditionalists would not see themselves as such). They were more 
concerned with how students conformed to the rules of the grammar handbook. Sledd’s use of 
the term “conformist” corresponded to the term “traditionalist,” in that these were individuals 
who do not question the concept of “Good English” (672). 
In their attempt to re-create their identities, supporters of “Students’ Right” sometimes 
used an array of terms to define themselves. The terms supporters most often use to describe 
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themselves were “leftists” and “progressives.” Donald Lazere asserted that leftists were those 
who supported “open admissions, the open classroom and Freireian liberatory literacy, [and] 
Students’ Right to Their Own Language” (7). As a self-described “leftist,” Lazere saw the 
contradiction between the leftist association with uplifting the poor and the life of an average 
leftist. According to Lazere, the average leftist grew up in middle-class, highly educated 
households. Leftists had access to the academic discourse that allowed them to critique what they 
saw as an unfair educational system that penalized the poor; many high profile leftists taught 
(and currently teach) at “elite” institutions—i.e. Ivy League institutions (17-18). His discussion 
of whom leftists were is important for helping us better understand how certain SRTOL 
supporters relate SRTOL to various issues within education. It also spoke on behalf of leftists by 
describing who they were and what they represented. 
 For example, SRTOL supporter Geneva Smitherman believed that composition 
specialists who cared about SRTOL and other issues related to language rights needed to “align 
with political progressives in demanding the restoration of budget cuts from education and other 
domestic programs and in opposing the military build-up and its gross and offensive budget” 
(“Towards” 34). While Lazere told readers that leftists were the ones who support SRTOL, 
Smitherman told readers that supporters of SRTOL needed to be politically involved with 
“progressives” (“Towards” 34). Progressives, Smitherman implies, should establish political 
connections with groups interested in improving education and society. Because supporters 
sought to find ways to uphold and implement SRTOL, they became the rhetorical audience who 
actively sought to modify the exigencies. 
 But pro-SRTOL supporters were not the only ones to use labels; anti-SRTOL used labels 
to define SRTOL supporters as well. David Shores, for example, called SRTOL supporters 
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“armchair liberals” (9). While Zorn didn’t use a label per se his description of SRTOL contained 
implicit labeling of supporters. Zorn referred to the SRTOL as “the official position statement of 
the guild of college compositionists on dialect differences, lionized to this day as a first principle 
of ‘liberatory’ English teaching” (311). Though the word “guild” denotes a “group” or “club” 
(“Guild,” Roget’s 21
st
 Century Thesaurus), it also connotes a sense of exclusion or privileging of 
people—that is “college compositionists.” The fact that he said this group “lionizes” liberatory 
learning provides sarcastic commentary on what he perceives to be problematic with SRTOL: 
SRTOL doesn’t liberate students from “underachievement” (326).  
 
From Rhetorical Audience to Constraints 
 Earlier in the chapter, I noted that Hunsaker and Smith devised three main audiences: 
situational, actual, and rhetorical. A “[rhetorical] audience must be capable of modifying the 
exigence positively” (Bitzer, “Functional” 23). Unfortunately for the CCCC, the audience of 
teachers segmented themselves into affinity groups. In fact, we see this when the audience who 
rejected SRTOL and the audience who supported SRTOL both use labels to define themselves 
and their opponents.  As discussed earlier in Gee’s “Identity as an Analytic Lens for Research in 
Education,” an affinity group has an “allegiance to, access to, and participation in specific 
practices that provide each of the group’s members the requisite experiences” (105). Those in an 
affinity group may not know each other, but they understand what they like and engage in 
“specific practices.” For example, supporters of SRTOL write about how to implement the ideas 
of SRTOL in the classroom. According to Valerie Kinloch, supporters seek to use the 
“democratic values” of SRTOL to encourage teachers to talk to students about language and its 
use in various situations (“Revisiting” 90); similarly, Scott Wible points out that SRTOL is a 
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“heuristic scholars have used and continue to use for inventing ethical and productive responses 
to linguistic diversity” (469). These examples help illustrate how the rhetorical audience of 
supporters attempt to address the exigencies inherent within SRTOL. 
Not only do those in an affinity group engage in specific practices, but they may engage 
in labeling, as seen in the discussion of how supporters of SRTOL define themselves. If like-
minded individuals who may or may not know each other decide to adopt a label to define 
themselves, the individuals speak not only on behalf of themselves individually, but also speak 
on behalf of people who too have adopted the label. We see this in the Lazere discussion of 
leftists when he describes who leftists are, what they believe in, and why he is a leftist.   
Likewise, we see affinity groups labeling their opponents and thus re-presenting who 
they are. By re-characterizing their opponents, the affinity group has the power to frame the 
debate by denigrating their opponent. Think about Sledd’s use of the term “conformist” and 
Shores’s use of the term “armchair liberal.” Both terms were more than just slights against their 
political opponents. The terms served as a means of defining who their opponents were without 
taking into account the complexity of their opponents’ belief regarding the support of and 
opposition to SRTOL. As Joy Moncrieffe notes, labeling “obscures the diversity of 
interpretations that may be critical for addressing the very problems/cases that the label 
highlights” (10). Thus, the “conformist” label doesn’t take into consideration the various 
pedagogical theories that opponents might have in regards to the teaching of writing and the 
“armchair liberal” label doesn’t take into consideration the various ways supporters of SRTOL 
conceivably interpret the document. 
Hence, an affinity-group’s labeling of opponents constitutes an attempt to speak about 
others and in an unconventional way, speak on behalf of the opposing group—though clearly 
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that group would not want the opponent speaking on behalf of them. Yet the label signifies a 
means of describing and defining the opponents, as my definition (found in chapter one) of 
“speaking on behalf of others” indicate. Affinity groups who use labels to describe opponents 
seek to not only define the audience to others, but also to use the label to interpret their 
opponents’ theories. Therefore when supporters of SRTOL call opponents “traditionalists,” they 
invite the audience to think of the terms associated with “traditionalists” (a quick thesaurus 
search came up with the following: “purists”; “conformists”; “fundamentalists”; “conservatives” 
[“Traditionalist,” Roget’s 21
st
 Century Thesaurus]), which are not necessarily considered 
positive, and thus, show that opponents view language (or dialect) from a restrictive and 
judgmental perspective. 
 Though she discusses labeling of formal political groups, Rosalind Eyben’s discussion of 
labeling can apply to what are opposing and supporting affinity camps for SRTOL. She writes 
that “labeling may shift—or sustain—power relations in ways that trigger social dislocation and 
prejudice efforts to achieve greater equity” (177). Thus, if the goal of SRTOL is to help teachers 
find ways of working with students who speak a stigmatized dialect, the labels that affinity 
groups (within the audience) use to describe their opponents serve as a means of exhibiting 
power over their opponents, exemplifying the “rituals of speaking” Alcoff discusses in her work. 
 When examining the success of speaking on behalf of others, readers need to consider 
how the rhetorical audience responds to the group or individual speaking on behalf of them. I 
consider myself lucky in that the rhetorical audience of teachers has responded robustly to 
SRTOL and has focused on their agreements and disagreements with the document. This makes 
it easier to gauge the success (or lack of success) as to how well the CCCC spoke on behalf of 
others.  However, there are other situations in which a rhetor may speak on behalf of the 
181 
 
rhetorical audience, but researchers have no published articles, books, interviews or speeches as 
to how the audience felt about the way in which the rhetor spoke on behalf of it. 
 Additionally, rhetors who speak on behalf of a seemingly disfranchised group to a 
rhetorical audience (consisting of people not in the disfranchised group) may find that the 
rhetorical audience might respond by attempting to address the exigence and by speaking on 
behalf of themselves or the group in the process of addressing the exigence. Thus, the rhetor 
begins a chain reaction in which he/she speaks on behalf of someone and the rhetorical audience 
responds by speaking on behalf of themselves or others.  
Interestingly, in the case of SRTOL, individual members of the rhetorical audience of 
teachers responded to the CCCC by representing and re-presenting themselves, the affinity group 
who hold their beliefs, and the opposition. In other words, they, like the CCCC committee who 
created SRTOL, spoke on behalf of others. 
In this chapter, I have highlighted how actual audiences have become rhetorical 
audiences. I showed how the committees that created SRTOL sought to convince the Executive 
Committee of the importance of the document. By doing this, they were able to get the majority 
of members on the Executive Committee to become a rhetorical audience. Likewise, I showed 
how some members of the actual audience of teachers rejected and actually worked to undermine 
SRTOL and how other members became proponents of SRTOL and thus a rhetorical audience 
for SRTOL.  
But I also implicitly highlighted the constraints within the creation and promotion of 
SRTOL. One of those constraints dealt with who the audiences were and how the audiences 
would perceive the document. The fact that the Executive Committee demanded changes in 
phraseology so as not to offend potential actual audiences exemplifies my point. Another 
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constraint dealt with the purpose of the document. Questions were raised at the Executive 
Committee (and even among publications) regarding whether or not SRTOL was supposed to be 
a teaching guide or policy statement.  Perhaps the most important of the constraints dealt with 
how two audiences—the opponents of SRTOL and supporters of SRTOL—struggled to 
reconcile their own pedagogical ideas about the purpose of teaching and the functions of 
teachers. 
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Chapter Five: 
Speaking on Behalf of Others: Constraints 
 
 Constraints, as defined by Bitzer, are “made up of persons, events, objects, and relations 
which are parts of the situation because they have the power to constrain decision and action 
needed to modify the exigence” (“Rhetorical” 8). In this definition, constraints, as a concept, 
seem like something the rhetor must overcome in order to convince the audience to address an 
exigence. In this respect, Bitzer’s definition of constraints corresponds to the conceptual 
definition of constraint found in the 2013 online edition of the Oxford English Dictionary. It 
defines a constraint as “the exercise or force to determine or confine action” (“Constraint,” def. 
1a). Constraints, then, seem like the “things” or the “people” that can prevent or limit an 
audience from either becoming a rhetorical audience or prevent or limit the rhetorical audience 
from trying to modify the exigence. Keith Grant-Davie notes that critics normally see constraints 
as “prescriptions or proscriptions controlling what can be said, or how it can be said, in a given 
situation” (272). In other words, constraints inhibit rather than free a rhetor when talking to or 
working with a potential rhetorical audience. But Bitzer notes that constraints can be a positive 
influence on the rhetor. In his article on functional communication, Bitzer points out that 
constraints “are capable of influencing the rhetor and an audience” (“Functional” 23). Thus, 
rhetors use constraints to help them determine how to discuss an exigence when addressing an 
audience. Unlike the formal definition offered by the O.E.D., Bitzer sees constraints as 
potentially generative of rhetorical action. 
 In addition to laying out what constraints are, Bitzer also compartmentalizes constraints 
into two groups: the artistic proofs internal to the rhetor and the inartistic proofs faced by both 
the rhetor and the audience (“Rhetorical” 8). The artistic proofs correspond to Aristotle’s pathos, 
ethos, logos triad and refer to how the rhetor draws upon internal resources to communicate with 
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the audience. In a sense, then, rhetors always serve as constraints upon themselves because 
rhetors rely on their communication skills in order to appeal to the audience, and those skills 
always have limitations as well as advantages.  Thus, as their own constraint, rhetors have the 
potential to positively persuade the audience or even to accidently alienate the same audience. 
Additionally, rhetors take into account the inartistic proofs involving other “sources of constraint 
[which] include beliefs, attitudes, documents, facts, traditions, images, interests, motives, and the 
like” (“Rhetorical” 8). These inartistic proofs influence how and perhaps why the rhetorical 
audience responds or does not respond to a given situation. Rhetors need to think about how they 
use both artistic and inartistic proofs to show the audience how the exigence came into being; 
why the exigence came into being; why the exigence needs to be addressed; and how the 
exigence can be addressed.  
Constraints, Bitzer makes clear, are necessary for rhetors to utilize. But constraints, from 
the audience perspective, are also important for it to utilize. After all, it seems that the audience 
must determine which constraints it needs to consider before becoming a specifically rhetorical 
audience. These determinations center upon how the audience interprets the rhetor’s artistic as 
well as its own inartistic constraints. As can be seen in this and previous chapters, the audience 
for SRTOL considered its own pedagogical ideologies and how those ideologies conformed or 
differed from the pedagogical ideologies inherent within SRTOL before they made a decision to 
support or oppose the document. These pedagogical ideologies stemmed from the audience’s and 
the rhetor’s understanding and interpretation of dialect, standard English, and what each saw as 
the best interest of the students. 
One of the more interesting aspects of Bitzer’s discussion is that his definition of 
constraints reiterates, word-for-word, a key phrase that is used when he earlier defined the 
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rhetorical situation. 
29
 The fact that Bizter uses the phrase, “persons, events, objects, and 
relations,” a phrase identical to his definition of constraints, may indicate how Bitzer sees the 
importance or perhaps the primacy of constraints. The “persons” in the rhetorical situation can 
indicate the rhetor and the audience; the “events,” perhaps, refer to the actual rhetorical situation 
or various events within the rhetorical situation; the “objects” may refer to tangible documents or 
items (inartistic proofs) or maybe even goals or ideas; and “relations” might refer to the 
relationship among the rhetor, audience, exigence, and/or constraints. If readers read “The 
Rhetorical Situation” closely, when Bitzer discusses the exigence, he gives various examples of 
it including, but not limited to, environmental pollution and the various exigencies associated 
with the assassination of John F. Kennedy. When Bitzer discusses rhetorical audience, he 
emphasizes how certain types of audiences, namely literary and scientific, cannot be rhetorical, 
thus helping the reader better determine what is a rhetorical audience. And yet when constraints 
are discussed, Bitzer does not provide concrete illustrations of what he has in mind or imagines.   
On the one hand, the reader might conclude that of the three features of the rhetorical 
situation, constraints might be the most important, especially since the components of constraints 
are listed within the definition of the rhetorical situation. On the other hand, it might seem that 
Bitzer minimizes the importance of constraints. As an example, he notes that abolitionist 
William Lloyd-Garrison “[looked] for an audience and for constraints” (“Rhetorical” 12, 
emphasis mine); likewise, civil rights leaders who cannot “locate compelling constraints and 
rhetorical audiences” ultimately fail in their rhetorical endeavors to affect change (“Rhetorical” 
12). The problem is that in “The Rhetorical Situation,” Bitzer does not specifically discuss what 
constraints Lloyd-Garrison or civil rights leaders need to employ. This makes it difficult for 
readers to know or see how rhetors use specific constraints to their advantage. Additionally, it 
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also makes it difficult to see how constraints inhibit an audience or rhetor from being able to 
modify the exigence.  
Thus, I define constraints as the devices, both inartistic and artistic, that help both rhetors 
and potential rhetorical audiences make decisions about why and how to positively modify 
exigencies or actively undermine the modification of exigencies. I will pay particular attention to 
the artistic and inartistic proofs that make up important constraints within the rhetorical situation 
surrounding SRTOL, and I will try to identify, concretely, the constraints at work on this 
particular situation. 
  
Artistic Proofs 
Rhetors seeking to convince others to modify an exigence need to consider how they will 
appeal to their audiences. First, rhetors need to think about the way in which they present 
themselves and their message. If a rhetor uses enthymemes that the audience doesn’t understand 
or misinterprets, then he or she may lose the audience’s attention; if a rhetor shows too much 
emotion in delivering a message, the audience may perceive him as being “angry” or “crazy”; if 
a rhetor doesn’t show any emotion, an audience might perceive her as being uninterested or 
passionless about her cause.  Interestingly, the range of choices that rhetors make in regards to 
how they utilize artistic proofs represents a “creative task” rhetors undergo. Writes Bitzer, “The 
rhetor’s central creative task is to discover and make use of proper constraints in his message in 
order that his response, in conjunction with other constraints operative in the situation, will 
influence the audience” (“Functional” 23-4). Part of understanding the creative task a rhetor must 
undergo includes understanding the ideologies that exist within the situational and rhetorical 
audiences a rhetor encounters. Rhetors, thus, need to think about how they use artistic proofs as 
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constraints and how their audiences interpret these artistic proofs, since each audience member 
has to consider such proofs before making a decision to modify the exigence (Patton 45). In this 
section, I will examine the artistic proofs the CCC utilizes that are manifested in SRTOL and 
how the CCCC was cognizant of these proofs. 
 
Ethos 
 In Rhetoric, Aristotle notes that ideally audiences should judge the “personal character” 
of a speaker based on the speaker’s speech, not on the speaker’s reputation. He writes, “This 
kind of persuasion . . . should be achieved by what the speaker says, not by what people think of 
his character before he begins to speak” (Book I, Ch. 2). However, famous speakers or writers 
know that their “personal character” has already been established before they begin a text and 
also know that they may have to address the preconceived notions (or perhaps hostilities) the 
audience might have of them. For example, a general audience may be hostile towards Michael 
Vick doing a speech on the importance of animal rescue or Lance Armstrong doing a speech on 
the immorality of doping. Both athletes know that they must restore their reputations in order to 
be taken seriously. Thus, they may find that that they have to address their misdeeds in their 
speeches in order to establish their rhetorical ethos. Interestingly, should both athletes be able to 
convince the general public that they are now changed men, they will likely find their rhetorical 
ethos strengthened by having overcome their earlier failings. Ethos, in other words, is not a static 
or fixed attribute of persons or organizations. 
Though the CCCC never had the credibility problem that Vick or Armstrong had, it did 
reevaluate its own personal character before and during the creation of SRTOL, thus helping 
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readers understand the effort the organization put forth to use its reputation as a positive 
constraint. Allow me to explain by drawing upon a concept introduced in a previous chapter. 
Earlier in the dissertation, I focused on the CCCC’s I-Identity, the identity related to 
institutions. I noted that today, the CCCC sees itself as an advocacy organization devoted to 
helping scholars and teachers in Rhetoric and Composition; thus it fits into Spivak’s theory of 
representation. But I also noted that the organization engages in re-presentation in the way in 
which it seeks to portray the English professor. How it portrays the English teacher may be 
influenced by the various affinity groups (A-identity) within the CCCC. The I-Identity of the 
CCCC and the A-Identities within the CCCC contribute to the ethos—or constraint—of the 
organization.  
 During the beginning stages of the creation of SRTOL, the Executive Committee, at its 
March 1972 meeting, discussed the importance of who should serve on the committee to write 
(the background statement of) SRTOL. According to the Secretary’s Report, two members of the 
Executive Committee “wanted more representation of minority groups” on the Task Force 
(“Secretary’s Report No. 66” 324). Stephen Parks also notes that discussion centered on having a 
“larger cross section of the CCCC constituency” (163). These requests probably indicated a level 
of consciousness among members about how the organization should be represented and how the 
organization might be perceived.  
By having individuals who represented different types of higher educational institutions, 
the CCCC could show its members that SRTOL had the support of an array of institutions 
including HBCUs, research and doctoral institutions, and community colleges as well as 
institutions from various regions of the county. By having minority representation on the Task 
Force, the CCCC could also stave off accusations that it was an all-white upper middle-class 
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organization seeking to protect and/or speak for minority dialect speakers or stigmatized white 
dialect speakers (such as those from Appalachia). If someone wanted to examine the CCCC 
discussion of minority representation from a cynical perspective, he or she might conclude that 
the CCCC was engaging in descriptive representation—an attempt to use an individual of an 
historically disfranchised group to “represent” or speak on behalf of the group he or she belongs 
to (Dovi 729). Suzanne Dovi notes that those who value descriptive representation believe that 
descriptive representatives can counteract the privileged group’s dominance over the 
conversations that take place in the sociopolitical, cultural and educational spheres. Thus, 
descriptive representatives “revitalize democracy” by strengthening institutions that have 
traditionally excluded the groups they represent (730). To be sure, descriptive representatives are 
not the same as the “native informants” that Spivak references in “Can the Subaltern Speak?” 
Native informants may “give voice of the Other” (284) to the sociopolitical elite, but they do not 
necessarily have to advocate for the group’s behalf.  Descriptive representatives, however, seek 
equality on behalf of their groups traditionally left out of elite institutions. 
Dovi emphasizes that descriptive representatives must be accepted by the community to 
which they belong, and, in turn, they must also accept the community they represent. If the 
community does not accept the descriptive representative, for example, it is difficult for a 
descriptive representative to “mobilize a historically disadvantaged group, encouraging the 
active engagement of the group” (736). Dovi also highlights how Hannah Pitkin, Melissa 
Williams, and Anne Phillips have criticized the concept of descriptive representation noting that 
descriptive representatives are not always conscientious about the community to which they 
belong or represent; moreover the political or institutional organizations engaging in descriptive 
representation may assume that the individual can automatically speak for the group, though 
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members of that group seldom make that mistake (730-31). Dovi quotes Anne Phillips: “[If] the 
presumption is that all women or all black people share the same preferences and goals, this is 
clearly—and dangerously—erroneous” (qtd. in Dovi 731). In other words, it would probably be 
in the best interest of the CCCC not to assume that because one African American scholar agrees 
with SRTOL that all African American scholars and individuals will agree as well. 
  Nevertheless, it was probably in the best interest of the CCCC to have descriptive 
representatives contributing to SRTOL. If readers recall, I noted that several scholars, when 
discussing SRTOL, emphasized the importance of Ernece B. Kelly and her criticism of the 
CCCC during the 1968 convention. Kelly had criticized the CCCC for not reaching out and 
supporting African American scholars in Rhetoric and Composition. Kelly says, “Here we meet 
in a body with just a sprinkling of Black folk: so few that it could be called ‘tokenism,’ but just 
enough so that the charge of exclusion can’t be leveled. Why aren’t there more Blacks on the 
panels? Why do Black women far outnumber Black men participating here” (Kelly 107). Kelly’s 
criticism was a challenge to the CCCC to not only work to increase the presence of African 
Americans but to also allow African Americans a chance to provide voice to African Americans 
who were discussed about in panels. In other words, Kelly wanted African Americans to be an 
integral part of the research conversations that take place at CCCC. 
Kelly probably recognized something also emphasized within description representation. 
Descriptive representatives can introduce viewpoints and topics that may not get the attention 
from the privileged groups (Dovi 730). Additionally, they can also defend the group from 
“attacks” or inaccuracies often raised against them by those in the dominant class.  Kelly noted 
that in the beginning of the conference she saw herself as an “English instructor.” However, she 
became “blacker” as the conference proceeded:  
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I grew more Black as the Conference proceeded, and as I watched the 
awful resistance of white participants to the challenges to recognize their biases 
and to work to defeat them.  
I grew blacker as I realized the awful blindspots which prevented some 
whites here from seeing Blacks as humans who could contribute to a conference 
or a classroom. 
I am tired, very tired of being the object of studies, the ornament in 
professional or academic groups, the object to the changed, reshaped, made-over. 
I feel sure that thousands of Black students would echo these words. (107-08) 
Here Kelly presented herself as the descriptive representative for African Americans. As a 
descriptive representative she not only had the chance to challenge those who were in power, but 
she also pointed out how the actions of the powerful led to the objectification of African 
Americans. Notice how Kelly discussed the re-presentation of African Americans. White 
researchers could “change,” “reshape,” and “makeover” African Americans, especially those 
who were students. Notice, also, how she spoke for African American students by “echoing” 
their thoughts and feelings. 
 Perhaps Marianna Davis and Wallace W. Douglas, the two Executive Committee 
members who insisted on having minority members in the writing and research of the larger 
SRTOL document, wanted to make sure that scholars of color, (perhaps African American 
scholars), had a say in the creation of a document that would most likely affect dialect-speaking 
students of color. Perhaps they wanted to make sure that scholars of color had an opportunity to 
contribute to the CCCC in the way that Ernece Kelly advocated. Perhaps they wanted to make 
sure that the Task Force had not only scholars of color, but also scholars who taught within 
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various types of colleges, so that the Task Force would better understand how SRTOL affected 
different types of institutions. The notes from the Secretary’s Report did not go into detail about 
the reasoning for why they wanted this. But we do know that Marianna Davis was a founding 
member of the CCCC Black Caucus; and, as Keith Gilyard emphasized in his article “African 
American Contributions to Composition Studies,” Davis had helped craft a 1970 resolution 
“[criticizing] the academic colonization of Black topics” (636). 
 The person who eventually headed the Task Force was Melvin Butler, an African 
American linguist who taught at Dillard University in Louisiana. I want to make clear that I’m 
not saying that the CCCC chose Butler to head this Task Force because he was black. It’s clear 
based on his research and teaching that he had the qualifications to serve as chair. However, we 
need to consider the dynamics of having a predominately white organization talk about (speak on 
behalf of) people of color and the way that that could have possibly been received in the public. 
Would audiences, especially those of color, have perceived this document as a paternalistic 
document designed for white people to protect minorities? Or even worse—a document designed 
to justify not teaching linguistically-marked students (especially students of color) standard 
English? To have an African American head this Task Force could buffer any criticism that the 
CCCC was an exclusively “white” organization speaking about and on behalf of dialect-speaking 
(African American) students. In fact, the CCCC commitment to make sure to have African 
Americans on the Task Force certainly indicated that the voices of African American scholars 
(and students) were heard.  
 But the problem is that Melvin Butler died before SRTOL was published. Thus, we are 
left wondering whether or not Butler would have addressed questions from scholars about the 
appropriateness of a predominately white college educated organization speaking on behalf of 
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dialect-speaking students. More pointedly, one wonders if he would have tackled the issue head-
on. (Keep in mind that most people discussing SRTOL during its initial publication focused on 
AAEV speakers.) Interestingly, most of the initial publications of SRTOL did not deal so much 
with why the CCCC wanted to speak on behalf of students; the focus was on how the CCCC was 
speaking on behalf of its members and English teachers. 
 Thus, we see the need for the Executive Committee of the CCCC to focus on what 
Aristotle might say is the “personal character” of the speaker or rhetor. If we focus on the 
“personal character” of the organization outside of SRTOL, we see that, in this particular 
rhetorical situation, the CCCC needed to think about the perception of the organization among 
various groups, especially its African Americans members. Ernece Kelly made them aware of 
that. Additionally, she made the organization aware that if it were going to discuss issues related 
to African Americans, it needed to have African Americans as part of the conversation. In this 
respect, Aristotle’s discussion of ethos can no longer solely be defined as the “personal character 
of the speaker”; rather, the speaker—the CCCC—needs to think about its role as a spokesperson 
not only for the organization, but for groups the organizations seeks to protect. 
 But the organization also knew that it had to create a document with which the majority 
of English teachers, from elementary schools to colleges, would agree. As mentioned earlier, the 
Executive Committee meetings about the document focused on the perception of how the CCCC 
would be perceived within the profession. For example, at the April 1973 meeting, “Secretary’s 
Report No. 68” reported that one Executive Committee member was concerned that an earlier 
draft of the document “’played down’ the high school teacher” (338). Another committee 
member expressed concern about whether English teachers would agree with the definition of 
standard English as expressed in a draft of SRTOL (338). These conversations showed the 
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concern the CCCC had about its ethos, especially in consideration of the entirety of the NCTE 
membership. 
 The main problem with organizations creating a controversial document like SRTOL is 
that they tend to ask like-minded members of the organization (or those who are part of the same 
or similar A-Identity groups) to craft professional documents. As mentioned earlier in the study, 
those who have a different A-Identity (or affinity identities) may not get a say in the creation of 
such documents, though they may get to vote for approval or disapproval. Interestingly, it seems 
that members of the Executive Committee during the creation of SRTOL were part of the A-
Identity group related to progressive politics. In fact, Stephen Parks implied that the CCCC 
recognized the difficulty and controversy of getting Rhetoric and Composition scholars on board 
in supporting SRTOL (167), which was why the CCCC decided to create the background 
statement in the first place. 
 
Logos 
 In his discussion of logos, Aristotle notes that “persuasion is effected through the speech 
itself when we have proved a truth or an apparent truth by means of persuasive arguments 
suitable to the case in question” (Book I, Ch. 2). Certainly, part of being able to prove your truth 
is being able to recognize the best genre to use to prove your case. I’ve already discussed earlier 
in the dissertation the fact that SRTOL is sometimes referred to as a position statement and 
sometimes a resolution. What I’m interested in doing in this section is discussing the format of 
SRTOL and how it helps reveal the apparent truth of the argument the organization seeks to 
make. 
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 When SRTOL was published in 1974, those who subscribed to the CCC received a 
special issue dedicated to SRTOL. The issue began with a one-page note from Richard Larson, 
then chair of the CCCC; in the note, Larson explained the origins of SRTOL. He talked about the 
controversial nature of the resolution and the need to have a background statement that would 
not only help readers understand the claims made in the resolution but also help readers locate 
research materials related to education and linguistics. Within the note, Larson highlighted the 
resolution by making sure it was bolded. In the last paragraph of the letter, Larson noted that 
“this perceptive statement . . . has won the praise of many linguists and rhetoricians” (CCCC). 
After Larson’s note, readers saw a heading Students’ Right to Their Own Language with the 
subtitle: “Introduction.” After the introduction, SRTOL contained a series of italicized questions 
which were then answered. After the background statement, there was an introductory page 
discussing the bibliography. In the bibliography, the CCCC made clear for whom SRTOL was 
created: “Because it [SRTOL] is designed to appeal to a varied audience of teachers with 
differing interests and preparation, elementary, intermediate, and advanced considerations of 
socio-linguistic problems surveyed in the statement itself are included” (19). After this page, 
readers noticed annotations for the research needed to answer the italicized questions within the 
document. 
 By contrast, readers who read about SRTOL in the journal, College English, did not get 
to see a note from Richard Larson, nor did they get to see the annotated bibliography 
accompanying SRTOL. In fact, the first words of SRTOL were as follows: “Committee on 
CCCC Language Statement” followed by “Students’ Right to Their Own Language.” There is no 
subtitle labeled: “Introduction,” though College English did preserve the question and answer 
structure of SRTOL. 
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 I point out the physical differences in how SRTOL was initially published to highlight the 
different ways in which the CCCC’s argument within SRTOL is shaped.  If we look at SRTOL 
as a meal, then the introductory note serves as the appetizer; the note helps CCC readers 
understand and appreciate what is to come; because the introductory note highlights the passage 
of the resolution at the CCCC meeting in Anaheim, California, it justifies the soundness and 
substance of the main course, and it whets the appetite of all the many guests seated at the 
table—members of CCCC of course, but linguists and rhetoricians too. The dessert, the 
annotated bibliography, emphasizes how SRTOL is informed by research. Thus, the CCCC not 
only shows that the truths of the document were found in the research, the truths of the document 
were accepted by CCCC members. It’s the kind of dessert that’s good for you, in other words. 
 Though College English, like the CCC, presented the entrée—that is, the background 
statement on SRTOL, College English presented no appetizer or dessert. If a reader were not 
active in the CCCC, he or she might not have any basis for understanding the genesis of SRTOL 
nor would the reader understand what research was used for formulating the claims made in 
SRTOL.   
 What I find most fascinating about SRTOL is the question and answer format it utilized 
to help explain the exigencies to the rhetorical audiences. Using this method does more than just 
establish logos. It, in fact, utilizes the concept of stasis, which Alan Gross defines as “a set of 
questions by means of which we can orient ourselves in situations that call for a persuasive 
response” (7). Unknowingly, perhaps, the CCCC used the stasis method in order to “prove a 
truth” (as Aristotle might say). Rhetors who use a stasis format not only anticipate questions that 
an audience might ask, but also anticipate objections as well. The goal is to use the question and 
answer format to resolve any potential conflicts that might arise (Carter 98-99).  
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 Writes Sharon Crowley and Debra Hawhee, the stasis method does the following for 
rhetors: 
1. Clarifies their thinking about the point in dispute 
2. Forces them to think about the assumptions and values shared by members of 
their targeted audience 
3. Establishes areas in which more research needs to be done 
4. Suggests which proofs are crucial to the case 
5. Perhaps even points the way toward the most effective arrangement of proofs. 
(54) 
If we examine how SRTOL was created, we’ll see that in “Secretary’s Report No. 68,” there was 
discussion about the question and answer format. Executive Committee member Robert Bain 
suggested that the Task Force, after stating each question, “begin the statement with the 
definition of the dilemma; then relationship between elementary, high school, and college 
teachers; then suggested solutions” (339). By suggesting that the stasis be set up in this manner, 
Bain forced the Task Force to think about how it defined the problems it addressed in SRTOL;  
encouraged the Task Force to analyze the specific and general experiences that affect English 
teachers on the primary, secondary, and college levels; and considered the “effective 
arrangement of proofs.” Most importantly, Bain’s insistence that the Task Force first consider 
the “dilemma” of the questions highlighted how crucial the stasis method was in discussing 
exigencies. According to Grant-Davie, rhetors who use the stasis method for articulating their 
exigencies can interrogate why a particular discourse is essential and the affect the discourse 
might have on the audiences (266-68).  
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 The stasis also allowed the Executive Committee to better see how well the Task Force 
answered the questions posed in SRTOL. Executive Committee members, for example, pointed 
out that certain questions had not been satisfactorily answered and solutions had not been given. 
The solution is important within a stasis method. According to Carter, stasis “provides a 
direction for action—toward the resolution of the conflict” (100).  Like Grant-Davie, Michael 
Carter likens stasis to the exigence in Bitzer’s rhetorical situation (110). Just as the exigence 
provides a motive for the rhetor to address a problem, the stasis provides a method for the rhetor 
to explain the exigence and thus, convince the rhetorical audience to solve (or positively modify) 
the exigence. 
 In the published version of SRTOL, some of the answers to the questions were not set up 
according to Bain’s suggestions. For one, some questions were so general that they did not 
require a specific answer for different audiences of English teacher. Examples of these questions 
include: “What Do We Mean by Dialect?” “Why and How Do Dialects Differ?” and “Why Do 
Some Dialects Have More Prestige than Others?” For others, some questions were geared 
primarily towards a specific audience. When the CCCC answered the question, “Does Dialect 
Affect the Ability to Read?”, it noted that schools and colleges privilege Edited American 
English in the classroom; however, most of the information discussed was for the primary 
teacher. For example, the CCCC referenced a “child” or “children” reading. Additionally, 
examples given in this section related to children’s literature and children’s readers.  
  In some respects, SRTOL, like the U.S. Constitution, represented the cultural and 
historical time in which it was produced; but SRTOL also represented a document that could be, 
and was intended to be, used for future audiences. After all, SRTOL gave an explanation of 
dialects and the way in which they influenced how we read, write, judge, and think about 
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language. Like the Constitution, which has been amended throughout the years, an updated 
SRTOL did come out in 2006. Though the content of what was said remained the same, the 
bibliography was revised to reflect new research done on education and language. Additionally, 
the 2006 version no longer used question headings; instead it contained content headings. The 
new heading entitled “Understanding Language Varieties” replaced the original question 
headings dealing specifically with dialects; the heading “Language Varieties and Learning” 
replaced question headings dealing with dialects and their effects on reading, writing, and critical 
thinking; and the heading “Language Varieties and Educational Policies and Practices” replaced 
questions dealing with grammar, handbooks, standardized tests, and dialect acceptance among 
teachers outside of English. Most importantly, question fifteen, “What Sort of Knowledge about 
the Language Do English Teachers Need?”  in the original document was moved to the 
“Language Varieties and Educational Policies and Practices” section. Instead of ending the 
updated SRTOL with this profound statement: “Common sense tells us that if people want to 
understand one another, they will do so. Experience tells us that we can understand any dialect of 
English after a reasonably brief exposure to it. And humanity tells us that we should allow every 
man the dignity of his own way of talking,” the updated SRTOL ends with the section entitled 
“Language Varieties, Linguistic Profiling, Housing, Civil Rights, and Employability.” The last 
words, thus, emphasize (inadvertently?) the importance and primacy of standard English: “Then 
students will be in a much stronger position to consider the rhetorical choices that lead to 
statements written in EAE.”   
 The changes in the document not only reflected a way of making the document more 
understandable to today’s audience, but also reflected the constraints that the CCCC encountered 
after the CCCC voted to approve SRTOL in 1974.  
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Pathos 
Many critics use the terms “emotion” or “emotional” to describe pathos in writing. 
Aristotle, in fact, notes that “persuasion may come through the hearers, when the speech stirs 
their emotions” (Book I, Ch. 2). Thus, in oral communication, hearers listen and observe the 
ways in which speakers use cadences, body language, and the like to appeal emotionally to the 
hearer. In hortatory texts, such as SRTOL, pathos is important. After all, hortatory discourse, 
according to Robert E. Longacre, “aims at influencing conduct, that is getting the receivers of the 
text to do something they are not currently doing, to continue doing something they are already 
doing, to expend greater effort in an activity already embarked on, to modify the nature of their 
efforts, and so on” (“Discourse” 109). In other words, hortatory texts are specifically designed to 
get the readers to modify one or more exigencies. In writing, readers notice how writers 
emphasize or deemphasize words and phrases through the use of italics, bold lettering, or 
punctuation marks such as exclamation points or question marks. In both speaking and writing, 
rhetors may use repetition to reinforce points or to provoke reactions from their audiences.  
SRTOL used repetition and pathos to establish the CCCC positions and to convince its 
audiences of teachers to accept the document and implement the suggestions it advocated. While 
the document didn’t use the word “I,” it did use the word “we” to not only articulate its positions 
but to also establish a connection with the audience. In fact, I discussed this connection earlier in 
the dissertation. What I want to do here is focus briefly on SRTOL’s use of questions and 
repetition for emotional effect to help highlight pathos and heighten hortatory discourse within 
SRTOL. 
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According to Crowley and Hawhee, questions are not only designed to trigger an answer; 
they can also be designed to arouse, shame, or insult an audience (299). Longacre, in fact, notes 
that within hortatorical texts, “rhetorical questions may be used to reprimand as well as to teach” 
(Grammar 11). Take for example these series of questions found within the first section of 
SRTOL: 
And many of us have taught as though the function of schools and colleges were 
to erase differences. Should we, on the one hand, urge creativity and individuality 
in the arts and the sciences, take pride in the diversity of our historical 
development, and, on the other hand, try to obliterate all the differences in the 
way Americans speak and write? Our major emphasis has been on uniformity, in 
both speech and writing; would we accomplish more, both educationally and 
ethically, if we shifted that emphasis to precise, effective, and appropriate 
communication in diverse ways, whatever the dialect? (CCCC 710) 
The questions represented an attempt by the CCCC to arouse the audience and make it ponder 
the contradictions teachers, nay—the CCCC and teachers—had with language and with a sense 
of justice. Likewise, the questions were designed to reprimand teachers who sought to “obliterate 
all the [linguistic] differences” students had. If the goal of the first question was to emotionally 
appeal to the American value of individuality, then the goal of the second question was to 
emotionally appeal to the American value of justice. According to Walter Davis, researchers 
have noted that Americans tend to adhere to two sacred values related to the abovementioned 
passage: individuality and justice: “Historically, the United States has maintained two conflicting 
views: one elevates individual freedom and choice above every other value, while the other 
raises justice and the common good above private, individual good” (160). The first question 
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emphasized the American values of individuality and creativity. The second question 
emphasized the morality (“ethics”) of teaching. Both questions were designed to make the 
audience of teachers ponder how far it should adhere to pedagogical principles that ultimately 
undermine basic American values. The second question, however, was designed to convince 
teachers to shift their “emphasis to precise, effective, and appropriate communication in diverse 
ways.”  
 Throughout SRTOL, the authors used repetition as a means of creating intensity. Though 
there were some editors and writers who view repetition in writing as negative, Crowley and 
Hawhee note that repetition can actually be a good rhetorical device to use. Rhetors who use 
repetition are able to inscribe important images and concepts in the minds of the audience (293). 
In fact, critics have noted that African American preachers who use repetition (along with other 
figurative devices) in their sermons are able to engage the audience in call and response, a form 
of pathos in which the audience responds to the preacher (Britt 217).  
 Perhaps the most effective use of repetition occurs at the end of the original SRTOL 
document. Though I’ve discussed these lines before, it is important to reemphasize them: 
  Common sense tells us that if people want to understand one another they will do  
  so. Experience tells us that we can understand any dialect of English after a  
  reasonably brief exposure to it. And humanity tells us that we should allow every  
  man the dignity of his own way of talking. (726) 
Notice that there was a personification of the words “common sense,” “experience,” and 
“humanity.” These words obviously could not talk, but in this instance they did. They “tell us” 
important points. The repeated use of the phrase “tell us” called attention to the need for the 
audience to use common sense, have experiences, and to recognize its humanity. Indeed 
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repetition invited the audience to link emotionally with the rhetor; after the first two “tell us,” the 
audience could expect, in some respect, to say “tell us” again.  
 This invitation to repeat along with the rhetor happened earlier in SRTOL when, in the 
introduction, the audience was asked to “say with Langston Hughes”: 
  I play it cool and dig all jive 
  That’s the reason I stay alive 
  My motto as I live and learn  
  Is to dig and be dug in return. (qtd. in CCCC 710). 
The CCCC used this example to highlight what the CCCC considered to be “linguistic 
virtuosity” (710). In this example, Hughes repeated the word “dig” and its variation “dug.” 
Additionally, the focus was on the word “I”; Hughes used the word “I” in the first three lines of 
the excerpt. Not surprisingly this passage was found on the same page in which the CCCC issued 
its question about individuality. In the excerpt, the focus was on the individual’s coolness (or 
creativity), his goals (“my motto as I live and learn/Is to dig”) and on his hope to be accepted as 
he was (“to be dug in return”). The use of this passage by Langston Hughes was designed to help 
the audience understand the appropriateness of students using their linguistic repertoire to 
express their individuality. By asking the audience to repeat the lines, the CCCC perhaps hoped 
that its audience of teachers would see and hear the different ways in which a rhetor could 
express his or her outlook on life. 
 In his article “Functional Communication,” Bitzer discusses the “evolutions of 
situations.” In stage one, the constituents within the rhetorical situation come into being. In 
addition to a rhetor addressing the audience, the rhetor “cultivate[s] an audience” and 
“generate[s] constraints” (34). In this section, I examined how the CCCC generated constraints 
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using its own artistic proofs. I paid particular attention to not only how the CCCC originally 
produced SRTOL, but also how it used ethos, pathos, and logos as constraints to persuade 
audiences to pay attention to the issues it seeks to address and to hopefully modify the 
exigencies. In the upcoming section, I will discuss the inartistic proofs and the ways in which the 
CCCC failed and succeeded in their mission. 
 
Inartistic Proofs 
 In the section above, I focused on the positive ways in which the CCCC harnessed artistic 
proofs as constraints to help the organization attract a rhetorical audience to address the 
exigencies. I discussed how the Executive Committee of the CCCC attempted to seek African 
American representatives and those from schools outside the research universities; I examined 
the ways in which the CCCC shaped the document; I noted how the CCCC attempted to 
emotionally connect to readers. In this section, I will pay attention to the inartistic proofs and 
how these constraints helped and/or hindered the CCCC. 
 For this section, I will focus on three main inartistic constraints: one deals with the 
“climate” of the 1980s and how SRTOL fit into it. The other deals with the people who wish to 
repeal SRTOL; and the third constitutes a potential constraint: the acceptance or rejection by 
students and parents of the document. 
 
The Climate of the Times: Conservative Depictions of Schooling 
 In the sample rhetorical situations that Bitzer discusses, the rhetorical situation seems 
rather limited in terms of time and scope. For example, Bitzer discusses the assassination of John 
F. Kennedy, the Gettysburg Address, and the presidential campaign of 1964. These rhetorical 
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situations, as Bitzer presents them, have a clear beginning and a clear end as events. However, 
there are some rhetorical situations that endure over time, that constitute “movements” in which 
there may be debates as to when the movement began and/or when the movement ended. 
(Examples about dates regarding disputed movements include the Harlem Renaissance and the 
Civil Rights Movement.) When there is a movement, J. Robert Cox tells us, there are unique 
constraints in regards to the goals inherent within the movement. These goals include the 
“degrees of change” and “explicitness of the movement’s objectives” (Cox 257). Do rhetors want 
a simple change (policy change) or a reorganization of a societal institution? Do rhetors want to 
have an explicit definition of goals, objectives, and procedures or do rhetors want to use 
indirection so as to not scare off potential supporters (Cox 257-59)? Though Cox does a good job 
of discussing how rhetors within a rhetorical movement encounter and negotiate constraints, he 
does not discuss what happens when a counter-movement serves as a constraint on a rhetor. 
No doubt, many critics such as Stephen Parks, Patrick Bruch and Richard Marback, 
Valerie Kinloch and others subsume SRTOL as part of the Civil Rights Movement. But many of 
these same critics also point out that SRTOL experienced a backlash as a result of the 
conservative educational movement that seemed to intensify during the 1970s and 1980s. 
Though Geneva Smitherman points to the constraint of the CCCC not providing enough teaching 
materials to help teachers understand how to develop curriculum on SRTOL, she also concedes 
that the conservative political climate (in the 1970s and 1980s) made it difficult for the CCCC to 
address language rights (“Retrospective” 24). One of the major movements going on was the 
“back to basics movement” which began in earnest during the 1970s.  According to Paula 
Johnson, the back-to-basics movement represented a “return to a mythical childhood where rules 
were simple, clear, invariant, and prescriptive. Law and order” (18). If we apply this definition to 
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the mythical college classroom, then it might look like the nineteenth century college 
composition classroom Johnson described at Harvard University: a classroom where teachers 
spent their time grading essays for structure, grammar, and spelling; or, it could look like the 
nineteenth and twentieth century college composition classroom at Yale University: there, 
teachers taught literature and rhetoric to their first-year students; those freshman, however, 
whose writing was deemed “awkward” had to take a supplementary course focusing on 
punctuation, grammar, and spelling (Johnson 19-20); or it could look like the current-
traditionalist classroom of the twentieth century: one in which “language must be precise” and 
“must conform to certain standards of usage, thereby demonstrating the appropriate class 
affiliation” (Berlin 9).  Hence, the “back to basics” movement’s emphasis was not about the 
elaboration of concepts and ideas in writing; it was about praising or penalizing students for their 
ability to conform to standard English. 
We see this play out in the Merril Sheils 1975 Newsweek article, “Why Johnny Can’t 
Write.” Shiels asserted that many college students were “unable to write ordinary, expository 
English with any real degree of structure and lucidity.” Shiels later criticized the CCCC for 
passing SRTOL and (mis)interpreted it as a document that allowed for teachers to “refuse to 
teach” standard English. Shiels, however, praised the “Competence” course at Phillips Academy. 
“Competence” was a required course that stressed “sentence and paragraph construction and 
elements of style.” The implication was that students needed to understand the “rules” in order to 
communicate well. According to Shiels, “If the written language is placed at the mercy of every 
new colloquialism and if every fresh dialect demands and gets equal sway, then we will soon 
find ourselves back in Babel.” This belief in the preservation of standardized language was 
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inseparable in the preservation of history and values espoused by conservative critics such as 
George Will, William Bennett, and Dinesh D’Souza. 
While Smitherman does not go into detail about the specifics of what was occurring at 
the time, Ellen Schrecker notes that in the late 1970s and early 1980s, conservative foundations 
and philanthropists (such as Coors and Sarah Scaife foundations) donated resources to 
conservative university student and faculty organizations, as well as to think tanks such as the 
American Enterprise Institute and the Heritage Foundation. The goal of these organizations was 
to push back against what conservatives saw as the “radical domination of the academy” (78-80). 
These organizations played an influential role in shaping mainstream discussions about 
university education and what should be emphasized. 
One of the ways in which these individuals and organizations did this was through the 
promotion of pro-Western “traditional” values. David Bromwich highlights conservative 
commentator George Will’s influence on mainstream culture and Will’s belief that the 1980s’ 
politically correct notion of “tolerance” needed to be supplanted by “a core consensus of the 
Western political tradition as first defined by Aristotle, and added to by [Edmund] Burke and 
others” (qtd. in Bromwich 63). Promoting his ideas through his newspaper columns and books, 
Will not only found supporters within political circles, but he also found supporters within 
academia. One of the more enthusiastic supporters was William Bennett, who served as 
Secretary of Education during the Reagan administration.  
Bennett, in fact, believed that the humanities needed to adopt a “core curriculum” that 
would encourage college students to study “great books” and encourage teachers to “transmit” 
civilization and culture to their students (Bromwich 83-85). Bromwich points out that Bennett 
and his “study group” who helped him develop his 1984 pamphlet, “To Reclaim a Legacy,” 
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believed that university professors were using the humanities to discuss subjectivity and 
relativism, but not the “value of historical facts, empirical evidence, or even rationality itself” 
(qtd. in Bromwich 87). In the pamphlet, Bennett asserts that “the study of the humanities and 
Western civilization must take its place at the heart of the college curriculum” (4). He advocated 
for E.D. Hirsch’s “cultural literacy” paradigm, which posited that everyone should “possess the 
basic information needed to thrive in the modern world” (Hirsch xiii). That information included 
understanding the rhetorical significance of the “sign of the cross,” but not understanding the 
rhetorical significance of signifying, which might be needed for politicians, educators, 
community and religious leaders to communicate with those living within some African 
American communities.   
Though Bennett emphasized the diversity of higher education and the importance that 
higher educational institutions determine “what [they] consider an educated person to be and 
what knowledge that person should possess,” he also asserted that “some things are more 
important to know than others” (10). He then listed what they were: “A careful reading of several 
masterworks of English, American and European Literature” and “a deeper understanding of a 
single non-Western culture than a superficial taste of many” (13). Out of all the works and 
authors Bennett thought college students should read, only one person of color was on that list: 
Martin Luther King, Jr. (16). 
In his speeches, Bennett criticized teachers and students who challenged authority and 
government. Bromwich quotes him as saying that “campus radicals” sought to “frustrate the 
government, discredit authority and promote a radical transformation of society” (qtd. in 
Bromwich 89). Like Will, Bennett romanticized Greco-Roman culture and the traditions of 
Western Europe. According to John K. Wilson, Stanford University, in 1988, decided to revise 
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its curriculum requirement so that students would not have to take its “Western Culture” course; 
instead students would take “Cultures, Ideas, and Values,” a course that emphasized both 
Western and non-Western history. Not recognizing that the new course still emphasized Greco-
Roman and Judeo-Christian texts, Bennett, nonetheless, accused Stanford of “trashing Western 
culture” (qtd. in Wilson 64). Other critics of the course believed that the goal of “Cultures, Ideas, 
and Values” was to “impose [discussions about] race, class, and gender on students” (Wilson 
68). One critic, Dinesh D’Souza, attacked one text used in the course, I, Rigoberta Menchú, and 
claimed that Menchú was “a mouthpiece for a sophisticated neo-Marxist critique of Western 
society” (qtd. in Wilson 70). (This, of course, is interesting in that he is claiming that Menchú is 
speaking on behalf of others.) D’Souza then went on to make a gross generalization about 
minorities: “Like Rigoberta Menchú, they tend to see their lives collectively as a historical 
melodrama involving the forces of good and evil, in which they are cast as secular saints and 
martyrs” (qtd. in Wilson 71). D’Souza, thus, used Menchú’s work to condemn the way in which 
race was discussed and historicized in the academy and within mainstream media. If we are to 
believe that Wilson has not taken D’Souza’s work out of context, then we can conclude that 
when D’Souza spoke about minorities, he essentialized them and assumed that minorities saw 
their experiences within binaries: good and evil and oppressor and oppressed. In fact, in a 1998 
article on Menchú, D’Souza asserted an uneducated peasant such as Menchú would not know 
how to use Marxist terminology, and thus cast doubt on the authenticity of Menchú’s 
autobiography (“Liar”). The irony, of course, was that he implicitly assumed that a poor person 
could not learn the language of an educated class, something that poor people in the United 
States (and indeed around the world) could then and now do. 
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If it is true, as Geneva Smitherman implies, that the CCCC felt afraid to promote SRTOL, 
it certainly seems feasible to come to the conclusion that the conservative political climate of the 
1970s and 1980s served as a constraint. After all, SRTOL seems to challenge the prevailing 
notion of what constitutes “correctness” within written and spoken language by emphasizing the 
plurality of dialects within the United States. Moreover, it encourages teachers and educational 
institutions to expand the core curriculum related to English by allowing students to practice  
“linguistic versatility” in the ways that writers such as John O. Killens, Langston Hughes, and 
others have done (CCCC 719). Likewise, SRTOL promotes “tolerance” of other cultures and the 
values that these cultures have in regards to their linguistic practices. Most importantly, SRTOL 
acknowledges the importance of sociolinguistics—a field of linguistics that examines cultural 
perceptions of language and language speakers; in other words, the field interrogates issues 
related to race and gender, which some conservatives might interpret as “imposition” on college 
students.  
The effects of such an intimidating climate were manifested in a number of different 
ways. According to Smitherman, this climate possibly contributed to the CCCC’s decision to 
renege on the teacher resource book (“Retrospective” 24). It is not too hard to imagine that the 
CCCC would be fearful of damaging its reputation by releasing a teacher resource book that 
would no doubt address issues regarding language, ethnicity, and economics (how can one 
discuss AAEV, Chicano English, Appalachian English, etc., without doing so?) and provide 
activities and assignments that might seem like a rejection of the “back to basics movement.” To 
release this book might have left the organization vulnerable to mainstream attacks that it was 
not encouraging teachers to teach standard English. Remember, critics such as J. Mitchell Morse 
and William Pixton had already accused the CCCC of this anyway. According to Smitherman, 
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the CCCC “reluctantly decided” against publication (qtd. in Smitherman “Retrospective” 24) and 
did so when the political climate was becoming more conservative. The fact that the book was 
rejected in the late 1970s around the time that the “back to basics movement” and the Newsweek 
article held sway (over mainstream opinion) is telling. Similarly telling is the fact that the CCCC 
and NCTE did not try to create a specific SRTOL teacher resource guide during the 1980s at a 
time when Will, Bennett, and D’Souza promoted Western values at the expense of other cultural 
values and understandings.  
In a possible move to not make this resource available, was the CCCC trying to anticipate 
a debate in which others, including those within the organization, would speak about the 
organization in ways that would risk embarrassment? After all, there were members of the 
CCCC advocating the rescinding of the document. How could the organization, through SRTOL, 
advocate or speak for its members or teachers in general if the members of the organization were 
opposed to the basic premise of SRTOL? How could it re-present the English teacher as 
someone committed to understand various cultures, linguistic traditions, et cetera, if English 
teachers such as William Pixton and J. Mitchell Morse, were presenting alternate versions of the 
English teachers? How could it represent—that is, speak for—students when its own members 
did not hold the same views that are contained within SRTOL? These questions are complex and 
difficult to answer. Smitherman, who served on the committee that was to create the teacher’s 
resource guide, seems to indicate that the CCCC did not give an explanation for its refusal to 
publish the book. 
In my attempt to understand the constraint of a conservative atmosphere that existed 
within the rhetorical situation, I cannot help but wonder why the CCCC refused to publish its 
teachers’ resource book. As an outsider, I rely on Smitherman’s insider perspective regarding the 
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conservative political atmosphere. Still, from each of our perspective accounts, we are speaking 
about the organization as if we understand what might have informed the CCCC’s decision. As 
Alcoff reminds us, speaking about others can be dangerous. And the danger I confront is the 
same danger that all of us who theorize and hypothesize about others’ actions confront: we might 
be wrong. To minimize the possibility of being incorrect, I support my claims with research and 
with the testimony of what those present at SRTOL’s inception, such as Smitherman, have to tell 
us. Knowing that I might be wrong, I qualify my claims with certain key words/phrases such as 
“I imagine” or “In a possible move” or “If it is true” to indicate my uncertainty.  
The problem, of course, is that there are writers and writing teachers who see phrases 
such as these as problematic. Why? Because those phrases such as “I believe,” “I think,” and “I 
feel” are often viewed by writers and editors as ineffective and weak. A cursory look at writing 
blogs and writing Web sites explains why. In Precise Edit’s Blog, the editor writes that phrases 
such as “I think,” “I feel,” et cetera, show a writer’s “insecurity” and “delay the writer’s 
message.” The Writing Center Web site at the University of North Carolina says that using the 
phrases “I think, “I feel,” and “I believe” are “less effective” forms of first person; and the 
Online Writing Lab at Aims Community College asserts that the “I think” and “I believe” 
phrases are “better written in the third person.” 
However, these phrases make it clear that the writer is speaking for himself, not for a 
group of people. Writers who use these phrases recognize the same thing that Bosavi recognized: 
sometimes it is best not to “speak others’ thoughts,” unless it’s clear that one is doing so—and 
doing so carefully (Schieffelin 435). Yet for this dissertation, I do not feel it is right to simply say 
that Geneva Smitherman points to a conservative atmosphere without explaining what that 
entails.  
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Interestingly, Stephen Parks quotes Elisabeth McPherson as saying that the reason why 
the book was never published was “because of the illness of Geneva Smitherman, co-editor, and 
the lack of enough high quality submissions” (qtd. in Parks 210). Smitherman, however, never 
indicates these issues as reasons for not publishing the book. Smitherman, in fact, calls the 
materials “excellent” and never references her illness. In fact, she mentions serving on the 
committee, but does not call herself “co-editor” of the publication, a term McPherson gives to 
her. As we can see, there are two interpretations of a particular situation in which I have to 
negotiate between how to “speak others’ thoughts” and re-present them correctly. 
The important thing to note, however, is that others, besides Smitherman, have discussed the 
conservative political atmosphere and its effect on the acceptance of SRTOL. Stephen Parks, for 
example, believes that “the left in the CCCC” did not “articulate a strong response to the 
emerging cultural shifts” occurring during the time (208). He notes that the right within the 
CCCC was using its ideology as a means of rescinding the document. Parks points to the use of 
certain phrases such as “legitimacy” and “moral choice” as terms the right within the CCCC 
coopted from the left to justify its actions against SRTOL (213-14). 
 
Repealing or Rescinding SRTOL 
This, of course, brings me to the second constraint: the nonacceptance of SRTOL by 
CCCC members and subsequent repeated attempts to amend or repeal SRTOL.  According to 
Campbell and Huxman, rhetors who succeed in convincing an audience to make a change, must 
include the audience throughout the rhetorical act (188). If the rhetor cannot earn the audience’s 
trust and convince the audience to address the exigencies, then the rhetor will have difficulty 
speaking on behalf of an audience that is hostile to the rhetor’s goals.  
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One of the major problems with Bitzer’s theory is that he does not take into consideration 
the hierarchical dynamics of rhetor and audience. According to Molefi Kete Asante and Deborah 
F. Atwater, Bitzer assumes that the rhetor and audience are on an equal playing field. The 
rhetorical situation, they argue, needs to take into consideration the rhetorical condition, which 
they define as “the structure, power pattern, assumed or imposed, during a rhetorical situation by 
the communicators” (171). In order to understand the rhetorical situation, we need to understand 
who gets to control the discourse and how the individual or people do so. For example, many 
rhetors within a rhetorical situation will issue one or more commands or suggestions. These 
commands may be implicit or explicit, indirect or straightforward (171-72). 
Individuals who accept the rhetor’s message may do so because they feel the rhetor 
possesses more knowledge than they do and thus the audience may give the rhetor a certain 
authority. However, there are times when an audience may choose not to defer to the rhetor. For 
example, a Catholic who is pro-choice may choose to reject the discourse of an anti-abortion 
priest, though the priest holds a higher position of authority than a Catholic layperson (Asante 
and Atwater 173-174). However, if the Catholic priest or any other rhetor wants to control the 
rhetorical condition, three occurrences must occur: the rhetor must have “control over the 
rhetorical territory through definition, [must establish] . . . a self-perpetuating initiation rite de 
passage, and . . . [must stifle] . . .  opposing discourse” (Asante and Atwater 174). To understand 
why people wanted to repeal SRTOL, we need to understand how they interpreted how the 
CCCC created and passed SRTOL. 
 In the “Bait/Rebait” debate published in the English Journal in 1980, C. Lamar 
Thompson and Juanita V. Williamson reminded readers that at “the 1973 4C’s meeting in New 
Orleans, dissatisfaction about the resolution was voiced by many members. The next year in 
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Anaheim it was voted on by a ridiculously small number of the membership” (11). Notice that 
the authors used both general and specific terms to describe SRTOL’s acceptability by the 
CCCC: “many members” voiced dissatisfaction; a “ridiculously small number” of people voted 
to support the document. Instead of providing facts to support their claims, they used 
generalizations to show that SRTOL was a document that did not speak for the membership of 
the organization. Most importantly, they criticized the rite de passage regarding SRTOL. 
 According to Asante and Atwater, the rite de passage is a “self-perpetuating ritual where 
the truth in effect is reserved for those who are initiated” (174). The authors make clear that the 
audience is also a part of the initiating process. In their example of rite de passage, the authors 
point to conventions where audience members are acknowledged and allowed to speak about a 
specific issue. They note that within this process, those who get to acknowledge the audience 
members also have the power to determine how long the audience members can talk, have the 
power to steer the direction of the conversations, and have the power to focus attention on 
specific audience members (Assante and Atwater 174-75). When Thompson and Williamson 
discussed the CCCC’s meeting in New Orleans, they emphasized “the dissatisfaction” among 
participants regarding SRTOL. It was as if they were implying that the CCCC decided that it 
would ignore its members who opposed SRTOL in favor of a “ridiculously small” group of 
people who voted for SRTOL the next year. 
 Yet opponents of the document had been allowed to voice their concerns at the CCCC 
meetings and in journals read by members of NCTE and CCCC. One of the members who spoke 
vehemently against SRTOL was William H. Pixton.  In his article, “A Contemporary Dilemma: 
The Question of Standard English,” Pixton stated that the intention of “this paper [is] to 
encourage the CCCC membership to reject this resolution” (247). He interpreted the document as 
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justification to not teach standard English in college (247). He further criticized the document in 
his 1975 “An Open Letter of Congratulation to the NCTE for the 1974 Resolutions.”  He 
questioned if the resolution fulfilled or exemplified the “best interest of NCTE objectives” (93).  
While he did not mention the CCCC as author of the text, he did intimate that the general public 
would criticize the document and have a negative opinion of NCTE: “The problem here, of 
course, is that if enough truly educated people find out what is going on in the schools, then we 
devotees of NCTE are likely to be thrown out of our jobs” (“Open” 93). In other words, if the 
NCTE didn’t fulfill its educational obligations to teach standard English to students, English 
teachers would be the ones sacrificed. (This is especially true for primary and secondary English 
teachers who may live in states where they do not have tenure or unions and are penalized if they 
introduce pedagogical materials not approved by their school districts.) By not crediting CCCC 
as author, he gave authorship to NCTE. By pointing out the NCTE members would look bad to 
the general public, he, in effect, questioned how well NCTE could speak for its members.  
 Pixton was not the only one who called for the rescinding of the document. James Sledd 
published “In Defense of Students’ Right” after he discovered that his friend Louie Crew “had 
been appointed ‘to a CCCC Committee charged to report whether the CCCC needs to revise 
‘The Students’ Right to Their Own Language’” (667). This committee, called the Committee on 
the Advisability of a New Language Statement for the 1980s and 1990s, was formed in 1981 and 
was a response to SRTOL (Parks 210-11). The committee seemed to have come to the 
conclusion that “SRTOL had failed to create an intergenerational alliance among teachers” 
(Parks 215); had failed to recognize that teachers were more conservative (pedagogically) than 
the committee that created the document; and that SRTOL failed to take into account state and 
local educational requirements and mandates. As information about the committee spread, Sledd, 
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Crew, and the newly formed Progressive Composition Caucus began pressuring CCCC and 
committee members to keep SRTOL as is (Parks 215-23). In the end, the committee suggested a 
reaffirmation of the statement, though it acknowledged that SRTOL was subjected to criticism 
“with respect to its style, its logic, and its inadequate reliance upon insights available in the 
research of American dialectologists, sociolinguistics, and linguistic anthropologists” (qtd. in 
Parks 222). 
According to Smitherman, NCTE, like some members of CCCC, wanted to distance itself 
from the document so that people would not view SRTOL as an NCTE document. This shows 
that the CCCC did not do a good job of speaking for all English teachers, especially since NCTE 
decided to “pass a weaker version of the CCCC’s ‘Students’ Right to Their Own Language’” 
(“Retrospective” 22). If we take Smitherman’s word for it, when it comes to defending students 
and their dialects, NCTE’s document is less explicit and perhaps more indirect than SRTOL. 
 One of the interesting things about SRTOL is that the CCCC did not initially seem to 
actively suppress opposition to SRTOL.  According to Asante and Atwater, rhetors will 
sometimes attempt to silence or restrain their opponents within a rhetorical condition (175). The 
CCCC allowed for articles and editorials against SRTOL to be published in its journals; it even 
created a committee to ascertain the effectiveness and usefulness of the document. However, as 
James Sledd showed, there seemed to have been a lack of transparency regarding the committee; 
nevertheless, the committee came to some conclusions that are important when discussing how 
one speaks on behalf of others: Was the Task Force politically on the same page as the people for 
whom they spoke? The committee seemed to have said no. Was the Task Force able to speak on 
behalf of a diverse group of people? According to the committee, the answer was no. Was the 
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Task Force able to consider the vast educational dictates under which teachers operated? 
According to the committee, the answer was no. 
 
Acceptability of SRTOL among Students and Parents 
 One of the possible constraints not necessarily explored in articles and books about 
SRTOL deals with whether or not SRTOL would be acceptable to the group of people whom 
SRTOL protects: students. Related to that constraint is whether or not SRTOL would have been 
acceptable to the parents, which many readers should assume would want to exercise a say in the 
way in which their children are educated. 
Early articles point to the SRTOL as a document geared solely towards African American 
students.  Permit me to reemphasize some quotes I introduced earlier in the dissertation:  
Clearly, the statement of the CCCC has important implications today for the 
education of black children who are desperately floundering in an educational 
system that unfortunately has been for them alienating, constricting, irrelevant, 
and uncompromising (Baxtor 677). 
 
Many of our African-American students would quickly agree with the Language 
Statement of CCCC and the thinking of the members of the socio-politico-
linguistic camp. They all seem to feel that if they can do the job, then it should not 
matter how they speak (Fitts 6).  
 
Black students who hear about “The Students’ Right to Their Own Language” 
may respond by asking what new shuck and jive this is. Whatever the resolution’s 
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intentions are, these students suspect that they’re being hustled, denied the same 
prescriptive help that elevated some of us above otherwise predictable lower-class 
futures. (Miller 13).   
These quotes point to the assumption that not only can these individuals speak on behalf of 
African American students, but that they can also articulate the experiences of African American 
students within the educational system. From these statements, African American students are re-
presented as students who struggle academically; they either insist on speaking AAEV or insist 
on learning standard English. Moreover, there is no indication of students possessing double-
consciousness—that is, the understanding of how African Americans are perceived by both 
whites and blacks. The complexity of not only how African Americans view AAEV, but how 
they use AAEV within different rhetorical situations is lost within these articles. 
In fact, Lisa Delpit, in her work Other People’s Children, points out that some dialect 
speaking students and their parents may prefer teachers who emphasize standard English for the 
following reasons:  
  First, they know that members of society need access to dominant discourses to  
  (legally) have access to economic power. Second, they know that such discourses  
  can be and have been acquired in classrooms because they know individuals who  
  have done so. And third, and most significant to the point I wish to make now,  
  they know that individuals have the ability to transform dominant discourses for  
  liberatory purposes—to engage in what Henry Louis Gates calls “changing the  
  joke and slipping the yoke,” that is, using European philosophical and critical  
  standards to challenge the tenets of European belief systems. (Delpit 162) 
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Delpit does not explicitly discuss SRTOL and how students or parents relate to the document. 
Thus, some may even ask, how can nonacceptance of a document be considered a constraint if 
the groups in question do not know about the document? I assert that there is ample evidence to 
show that there would be some students and parents who would have had problems with the 
document, especially if we examine issues related to SRTOL: the Ann Arbor case of 1978 and 
the Oakland “Ebonics” debate of 1997. 
Before I examine these two cases, it is worth noticing that there has been considerable 
research done on how African Americans feel about AAEV dialect. For example, in a 1992 
study, Speicher and McMahon interviewed sixteen African American college students, 
professors, and staff members at a Catholic university in the Midwest about their perception of 
Black English Vernacular (BEV), the term used in the article. According to the article, the 
participants “do not represent African Americans in general or middle class African Americans. 
They represent themselves, their own voices and experiences” (388).  Their study showed that 
some participants exhibited negative feelings towards the dialect: one participant described BEV 
as “idiotic” and a “ghetto language.” One half described the dialect as “slang”; three refused to 
give a name to the dialect, and some used the more technical terms, “Afro American English,” 
“Black English,” and “Black English Vernacular” (qtd. in Speicher and McMahon 389). 
Moreover, half of those studied expressed concern over the affiliation of the dialect to 
African Americans. Some participants pointed out that they knew whites and Latinos who grew 
up in predominately black communities and subsequently spoke BEV. Two felt that the dialect 
should not be attributed to race; one even suggested that the linguistic study itself represented a 
“strange place where people were preoccupied with race and finding ways to trap those 
preoccupations with language” (qtd. in Speicher and McMahon 390). Most importantly, half of 
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the respondents felt the knowledge and fluency of BEV was unnecessary for African Americans. 
After all, some African Americans did not live or work in communities where it was spoken. 
One respondent went so far as to say, “I think it’s [BEV] a disadvantage. Because, like with my 
children, I do not allow them to speak that type of language, the slang, the dialect. I don’t like 
that and I don’t like for them to speak that” (qtd. in Speicher and McMahon 399-400). 
This belief that children, especially African American children, should not learn or be 
encouraged to speak a dialect was echoed by Milton Baxter. In his article, he notes that African 
American parents may not embrace the principles of SRTOL because a) some parents see AAEV 
as an inferior dialect; and b) some parents want their children to be rid of AAEV since, to them, 
it represents a subordinate socioeconomic class (679-80). The idea that parents would disapprove 
of the document that was supposedly designed to help their children can certainly serve as a 
constraint. 
 In fact, the anger that some parents feel about the explicit teaching of AAEV or another 
dialect has manifested itself in various situations, most notably the Ann Arbor decision of 1979 
and the Ebonics debate of 1996. As discussed in the introduction, some African American 
parents sued Martin Luther King, Jr., Elementary School (in Ann Arbor, Michigan) because their 
children had been or were about to be placed in special education courses. In court, the parents 
proved that because their children spoke AAEV, the teachers and administrators wrongly 
assumed that the students were intellectually deficient. The judge, Charles W. Joiner, ordered 
that teachers and administrators undergo training that would help them understand AAEV and 
how to work with students who used AAEV.  Because of the case, the African American media 
explored whether AAEV should be explicitly taught in school. George Todd of the New York 
Amsterdam News recounted a parent, who, upon hearing about the case, declared, “I don’t want 
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my children to learn any Black language. It’s ridiculous!” (qtd. in Todd 13). A principle at a high 
school in New York told George Todd that he would not allow anyone to “institutionalize Black 
English” at his school (13).  
 Lu Palmer of Chicago Metro News wrote of the various misunderstandings African 
American parents and others had about the case and the ruling. He said that some parents, 
notably middle-class African American parents, assumed that the judge demanded teachers to 
teach AAEV. Moreover, he emphasized, parents believed that by teaching AAEV, students 
would find themselves “at a disadvantage in their learning experience” (3). He then went on to 
defend the ruling by writing words that could be construed as being supportive of SRTOL: 
“Many teachers ridicule Black children for the way they talk not taking into account the fact that 
this is the way they have learned to talk from birth and there is a cultural legitimacy for this 
variant of the English language” (3). His statement is reminiscent of SRTOL’s declaration that 
people need to recognize America’s “diverse heritage,” (CCCC 711) especially as represented by 
dialects and that teachers need to explore if their rejection of a student’s dialect is also a rejection 
of a student’s racial or cultural heritage (CCCC 710).  
 One of the strongest critics of the Ann Arbor case was Benjamin L. Hooks, who was head 
of the NAACP during the time of the ruling. In a 1979 opinion piece published by Chicago 
Metro News, he never mentioned the fact that the parents sued the school because their children 
were being mislabeled as learning disabled or that dialect speaking students were systematically 
being placed in lower-level classes. Instead he asserted that the children (not the parents) were 
suing because they wanted to “impose Black English on the system” (7). He then went on to say, 
“The effort to require Black English in public schools is a sin and a crime that should be 
condemned in no uncertain language” (7). Like the middle-class parents in Lu Palmer’s piece, 
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Hooks feared that the study of Black English would legitimize a dialect that he described as 
damaging. However, he also seemed to recognize that teachers needed formal preparation to 
work with multicultural and presumably multidialectical students.  
 This type of teaching preparation was not only encouraged by SRTOL but also by Judge 
Joiner who ruled that teachers and administrators needed to have training to work with 
multidialectical students. In fact, if we examine the Ebonics debate, we’ll see that the Oakland 
County School Board was not only interested in helping students learn standard English, but also 
helping teachers receive the training they needed to work with students. 
 In a 1996 Oakland Unified School District in California decided to address the low verbal 
and written standardized tests scores of its African American students. Theorizing that the 
students’ low scores were the result of not mastering standard English, the school district passed 
a resolution, known commonly as the “Ebonics resolution,” which called for the teaching of 
standard English through the use of Ebonics or African Language System. However, because the 
school district called for the recognition of Ebonics and insisted that Ebonics be utilized for the 
teaching of standard English, it did what Benjamin Hooks feared: it legitimized Black English 
via the term Ebonics.  
 The controversy regarding this resolution was swift. Like the Ann Arbor decision, many 
misconceptions about the Ebonics resolution became accepted as truth. According to Cheryl D. 
Fields, some people assumed that the school district did not want to teach standard English, but 
instead wanted to teach Ebonics (“Ebonics”). Others assumed that the students could not and did 
not wish to learn standard English. According to Teresa Perry, media commentators openly 
wondered why African Americans could not master standard English if other groups could 
(Perry 11). The school board resolution unintentionally served as a means for Americans to 
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speak about and for African American students and AAEV speakers. Some sought to re-present 
them, taking note of how African Americans spoke; others, such as the school board, sought to 
represent them by advocating for better educational services that would help. 
 It is important to note that some African American students, both in and outside of 
Oakland, did not like the way in which the Oakland school districted re-presented students. 
Aaron Andrews, a student in Oakland, told a New York Times reporter, “I’m black, I speak 
English. What they’re trying to say is that we don’t talk proper English. That’s not true” (qtd. in 
“Black” L8). Erica Allen, a student in Tampa, Florida declared, “I was, and still am, appalled to 
a certain degree about this notion that we (blacks) speak a different language” (qtd. in Riddick 
1). These individuals responded to the way in which the school board not only spoke on behalf of 
African American students in Oakland, but also students outside of Oakland. After all the first 
line of the resolution read: “Whereas, numerous validated scholarly studies demonstrate that 
African American students as part of their culture and history as African people possess and 
utilize a language described in various scholarly approaches as ‘Ebonics’ (literally Black sounds) 
or Pan African Communication Behaviors or African Language Systems” (qtd. in Perry and 
Delpit 143). As Fields noted, the resolution did not seem to acknowledge African American 
students who were fluent in standard English or African Americans who were successful at code-
switching (“Ebonics”). In other words, in the school board’s attempt to re-present African 
American students, the school board did not take into consideration the diversity of African 
American students in Oakland (and perhaps beyond). 
 I recognize that my decision to discuss a possible constraint is a controversial one. My 
assumptions, after all, constitute a form of speaking on behalf of others. I am speculating on how 
an entire group of people might respond to SRTOL by discussing how that group reacted to two 
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different and unique cases. These responses represent just some of the beliefs within the African 
American community. However, there are other beliefs too. For example, Theresa Perry pointed 
out that there were “African Americans who strongly supported the Oakland resolution and yet 
equivocated, wondering if this was a conversation that African Americans could have 
productively in public” (11). This idea is important in that it shows that researchers, in their 
attempt to speak on behalf of a group, may not be able to do so because of the refusal of 
individuals within a group to discuss issues with them or within the public sphere.  
The reality is that I do not know for sure about how the CCCC might have marketed or 
promoted SRTOL to the general public. As I mentioned earlier, the Task Force and the 
Executive Committee did consider creating and releasing a different version of SRTOL designed 
for the general public. I do not know how they would have framed the document and whether 
they would have addressed issues (e.g. English Standard schools) not discussed in the official 
SRTOL. What I do know is that many individuals or organizations who speak on behalf of others 
should think about how the individuals or groups might respond to them. This is a necessary 
constraint that can help rhetors shape their text. 
 Obviously, the CCCC’s SRTOL was produced before the Ann Arbor and Ebonics cases. 
However, these cases are important because they show that not every African American student 
or parent was supportive of the Ann Arbor decision and the Oakland School Board. And if they 
were not supportive of these two incidences, it is also probable that if they had heard of SRTOL, 
they may not have been supportive as well. In fact, they might have believed what the opponents 
of SRTOL believed: SRTOL does not advocate the teaching of standard English.   
  
SRTOL: Gauging the Success of the Document 
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 Though it might come across that SRTOL is an unsuccessful document, we need to gauge 
the success of the document by not only understanding how popular the document is among 
educators, but also how the document informed, or continues to inform, educational practices. 
While I am interested in examining these issues, the problem is that we don’t have updated in-
depth studies on the acceptance of the document and how widespread the document is used in the 
classroom or within the educational system (as a means of determining policy, for example). 
Earlier in the dissertation, I pointed to two studies which examined how people in the fields of 
English and Rhetoric and Composition felt about the document as a whole and sentiments within 
the document. Terry Lynn Irons’ study published in 1993 examined acceptance of the principles 
of SRTOL at three unnamed institutions. Irons designed a questionnaire that asked respondents, 
both professors and students, to rate whether they agreed or disagreed with excerpted statements 
from SRTOL. He then asked them questions related to their attitudes regarding standard English, 
teaching, and their use of dialect. His study found that the longer a student stayed in school, the 
less tolerant he or she was of dialect used in academic writing (65). Additionally, he found that 
fifty nine percent of instructors disputed the statement: “The claim that one variety of language is 
unacceptable leads to false advice for speakers and writers” (64). About forty percent of 
instructors disagreed with the idea that “teachers must have the experience and training that will 
enable them to respect linguistic diversity” (64).  
Elaine Richardson’s study published in 2003 examined the Language Knowledge and 
Awareness Survey, which showed that 60.9 % of CCCC and NCTE members who had taught for 
fifteen or more years were not aware of SRTOL; and 76.8% of teachers who taught from one to 
six years were not aware of SRTOL. Among those who knew about SRTOL, 67.9% of 
respondents were supportive of it (58-60). Though the lack of awareness about SRTOL may 
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seem like failure, keep in mind that most of the articles published within the first ten years of 
SRTOL were primarily critical of the document; very few provided information on how to use 
SRTOL in teaching; it has only been recently that books and articles such as Jerrie Cobb Scott, 
Dolores Y. Straker, and Laurie Katz’s Affirming Students’ Right to Their Own Language and 
Valerie Felita Kinloch’s “Revisiting the Promise of Students’ Right to Their Own Language: 
Pedagogical Strategies” have provided teachers with strategies on how to use SRTOL in 
teaching. 
 The CCCC has certainly done a better job of addressing the criticism regarding SRTOL. I 
mentioned earlier in the study the differences between the updated version of SRTOL and the 
earlier versions. Though the content remains the same, the organizational structure makes it 
easier for readers to understand the main points of the document. Additionally, the CCCC 
updated its annotated bibliography so that readers can access more up-to-date information on 
linguistics and pedagogy.  
 Most importantly, critics have begun examining how SRTOL affects students besides 
African Americans. In the Scott, Straker, and Katz book, there is information on how SRTOL 
relates to indigenous speakers of American Indian and Hawaiian Pidgin (or Creole) languages. 
Bruch and Marback’s The Hope and the Legacy as well as Affirming Students’ Right provides 
information on how multilingual societies outside of the United States work with multilingual 
and multidialectical students in the classroom. And lastly, the conservative movement of the 
1980s has given way to a more progressive movement today in which teachers and school 
districts have become more aware and more vocal about the problems with regards to the high-
stakes standardized testing (No Child Left Behind) that penalize students who don’t speak 
standard English or who are second language learners. According to John Baugh and Aaron 
228 
 
Welborn, opponents of No Child Left Behind and equivalency programs point out that entire 
schools are penalized if they have students who have intellectual disabilities, are second 
language learners, come from low-income families and are multiracial. This is because each 
school must gauge the progress of students who come from various ethnic, economic, language, 
and disability group. If a school has a student who is a second-language learner, poor and Asian 
and the student doesn’t score well on the tests, the person’s score affects every group listed. To 
do well on the tests, every student must be proficient in standard English. Regrettably, No Child 
Left Behind doesn’t provide the adequate teacher training and resources needed to help teachers 
and students (45-47). SRTOL, however, provides a reference point in which to discuss these 
issues regarding standardized testing, dialect, and pedagogy. 
 It is my hope that by studying SRTOL, readers will understand not only the historical 
importance of SRTOL, but also the underreported rhetorical importance of the document, namely 
the way in which the Task Force which created SRTOL spoke on behalf of others and how 
people reacted to it. By explicitly showing how SRTOL spoke on behalf of others, I seek to 
highlight how researchers can contemplate the ways in which they speak on behalf of others and 
the politics involved in doing so. Of course, one way to contemplate this rhetorical issue is to 
make oneself aware of the issue. When researchers are aware of how they speak for and speak 
about others, researchers can then think of how they re-present the individual or the group for 
whom they speak.  
 In the conclusion, I will briefly discuss the implications for researchers who do not take 
into consideration how they speak on behalf of others and will provide information on how 
researchers can make themselves more aware of this rhetorical process. I do this by showing first 
how many researchers learned to speak on behalf of others in the classroom, and secondly 
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demonstrating through the use of a classroom exercise, how researchers can make themselves 
more aware of when they are engaging in this rhetorical practice.  
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Conclusion: 
Pedagogical Implications of This Study 
 
 As you may have noticed in the reading of this dissertation, I have spoken about, and, in 
many respects, spoken on behalf of CCCC, various critics, ethnic groups, and students.  I do this 
through interpreting and commenting on what people have written about “Students’ Right to 
Their Own Language” as well as other topics related to speaking on behalf of others, pedagogy, 
and rhetoric. Like other writers, I am aware that whenever I analyze people’s comments, 
theories, and actions, people may disagree with the way in which I speak on their behalf. After 
all, the way in which I speak on someone’s behalf reflects how I render his or her culture, 
beliefs, traditions, and the like.  And what’s more, every time I speak on behalf of someone else, 
I reiterate the very theme of my study, whether I intend to or not. My dissertation, then, is 
unavoidably reflexive. 
For the past few decades, the theoretical concept of speaking on behalf of others has been 
theorized and discussed by those in postcolonial theory and Women’s Studies. I designed this 
dissertation so that people can understand how previous theories on speaking on behalf of others 
relate to SRTOL. But I also wanted to show how scholars in Rhetoric and Composition might 
take up the discussion of speaking on behalf of others. I wanted to examine this phenomenon 
using rhetorical theory, not just postcolonial and feminist theory, so that readers could also see 
the manner in which I theorized why and how the committee who created SRTOL engaged in 
this phenomenon.  
In writing this dissertation, I realize that the way I speak on behalf of someone often 
causes me to enter into contact zones with the various scholars I discuss in my text. Mary Louise 
Pratt defines contact zones as “social spaces where cultures meet, clash, and grapple with each 
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other, often in contexts of highly asymmetrical relations of power, such as colonialism, slavery, 
or their aftermaths as they are lived out in many parts of the world today” (501). I find myself 
frequently thinking about contact zones in relationship to Royster’s contention that academics 
cannot study the cultures outside of their own without having “home training.” Home training, as 
readers will recall, “underscores the reality that point of view matters and that we must be trained 
to respect points of view other than our own” (Royster 32). In other words, a scholar with home 
training is going to be aware of the “asymmetrical relations of power” that exist between the 
researcher and the researched. The scholar-researcher is the one who speaks about, and speaks on 
behalf of, the people being researched.  He or she must be aware of and take into consideration 
viewpoints that conflict with his or her own. Most importantly, the scholar-researcher must 
“draw conclusions about others with care” (Royster 33). As the author of this study, I have tried 
to take Royster’s advice as seriously as others have in my field. 
 An example of this seriousness can be seen in the work of Ellen Cushman. In her work, 
The Struggle and the Tools: Oral and Literate Strategies in the Inner City Community, Cushman 
discusses how researchers might (mis)interpret a situation in which Lucy, an African American 
woman, must provide her daughter’s birth certificate to a social service worker so that her 
daughter can receive social assistance. Though Lucy knows that she doesn’t have to provide the 
birth certificate, she nonetheless agrees to provide the documentation. Of this situation, Cushman 
writes: 
Many social and cultural theorists would point to this exchange as convincing 
evidence of systematic oppression in inner cities, and would paint Lucy in the dull 
colors of someone who blindly reproduces the social structures that may not be in 
her best interest. Here, their arguments would leave off—without asking what 
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happened before or after this public interaction, without seeking the hidden 
ideologies informing Lucy’s statements, without acknowledging the subtle ways 
in which Lucy bends her language to be both accommodating and challenging.  
And their convincing discussions leave us with not only an inaccurate portrayal of 
the overly determined politics of day-to-day life, but worse, a shallow and 
reduced characterization of Lucy as “disempowered” and unreflective in the face 
of these politics. (2) 
Not only does Cushman point out how theorists have the power to reduce someone to a single 
term (“disempowered”), but she also points out how they do not understand the culture and the 
people that they study. Social and cultural theorists, Cushman emphasizes, do not recognize how 
Lucy manipulates her language to indicate that she understands the power structure she seeks to 
subtly challenge.  Their theories may not take into consideration how Lucy contextualizes “the 
hidden ideologies” within the situation she finds herself. Cushman, in effect, indicts mainstream 
social and cultural theorists for mischaracterizing the very people they theorize. 
Many critics, beside Cushman, note how people of color are often mischaracterized or 
misunderstood within major research projects. For example, some critics reviewing Stephen 
Parks’ Class Politics: The Movement for the Students’ Right to Their Own Language felt that 
Parks mischaracterized or underestimated the role that African American CCCC members played 
in the formation of SRTOL. Carmen Kynard points out that the Black Caucus (an affinity group 
within the CCCC) “both collectively and in terms of individual, historical leaders—has quite 
forcefully contended that his book erases its presence as well as Geneva Smitherman’s work in 
shaping the politics of CCCC and SRTOL” (361). Kynard then goes on to provide a more 
thorough history of the Black Caucus and its members’ influence on SRTOL and the language 
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rights movement in general; additionally, she highlights what she liked about Parks discussion of 
the Student Nonviolence Coordinating Committee, Black Panther Party, Stokely Carmichael, and 
Geneva Smitherman; however, she also provides additional contexts to understanding the views 
of these organizations and individuals. While Parks, according to Kynard, focuses on how the 
aforementioned organizations and individuals addressed class politics, Kynard notes how these 
organizations and individuals addressed racial politics, something she felt Parks downplayed.  
Kynard, especially, takes issue with Parks’ interpretation of Geneva Smitherman’s essay, 
“Black Power is Black Language.” According to Kynard, Parks interprets the essay as being a 
complaisant examination of Black Power and a departure “from the radical protests of her time” 
(367). Kynard, however, believes that Smitherman’s essay “functions as almost the 
quintessential Black Arts Movement piece—written by blacks, for blacks—the sister movement 
not examined by Parks” (367).  Likewise, Keith Gilyard also takes issue with Parks’ 
interpretation of Smitherman’s essay. He claims that Smitherman “was reflecting the 
complexities of Black rhetorical and political engagement” and as an activist from the 1960s, 
Smitherman was not “going to enter classrooms to glorify violence, which is not, in any event, 
the litmus test for progressive Black political activities” (“Holdin’” 120). Gilyard, thus 
challenges Parks’ belief in what constitutes black progressivism. Most importantly, Gilyard and 
Kynard both feel the need to speak about and speak on behalf of African American organizations 
and scholars. They, in effect, fill in the gaps that they feel Parks left in the book. As Gilyard 
explains, “The main point to make here, however, is that Parks silences African American 
scholars” (“Holdin’” 122). Their articles serve as a means of allowing them to talk. 
Just as researchers have to take into consideration how they speak about and speak for the 
people they study, teachers, too, have to take into consideration how they speak on behalf of 
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others in the classroom. As a teacher, I have encountered students who have dismissed and 
disregarded the lives of homosexuals or Muslims, and I have defended these and other groups by 
speaking on their behalf. Though I am not a Muslim and am not a part of the LBGT community, 
I have used my “power” as a teacher to legitimize (at least, for some) their existence, especially 
if it looks as if no other student in the room will do so. I have attempted, in the words of Alcoff, 
to “[represent] the other’s needs, goals, situation, and in fact, who they are” (9). Other teachers 
prefer not to speak on behalf of others, but rather choose to incorporate texts that allow writers to 
speak about their own cultures. Teachers interested in discussing immigration and assimilation 
may feel more comfortable incorporating multicultural textbooks and requiring their students to 
read excerpts from Gloria Anzaldúa’s Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza or James 
Baldwin’s “Stranger in the Village.” However, teachers need also to be aware of the politics of 
using minority writers from textbooks.  As Sandra Jamieson points out, many textbooks that 
include writers of color often select pieces in which the “writer is still constructed as victim” 
(166). This could unintentionally cause students to construct people of color as victims in need of 
saving (Jamieson 166-69). Teachers, then, must show that they have “home training” so that they 
can select texts that represent the diversity of experiences within various groups.  
Thus, it seems that speaking on behalf of others is an inevitable part of academic 
discourse—evident, say, not only when we represent others in our scholarship but also when we 
represent others in our classrooms, even though it seems likely that many professors and students 
may be unaware that they are engaging in speaking on behalf of others. The ways we do this are, 
no doubt, many, but three practices, in particular, can best illustrate what I mean: the Socratic 
dialogue, ventriquilizing, and rivaling. 
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Socratic Dialogue 
 The Socratic dialogue not only calls for students to provide facts and formulate a 
position, but it also encourages students to examine the multiple perspectives of a given situation 
(Cooper 55). According to Linda Elder and Richard Paul, teachers who use Socratic dialogue do 
so to encourage students to engage in critical thinking. Critical thinking thus calls for “a 
disciplined ‘executive’ level of thinking, a powerful inner voice of reason, to monitor, access, 
and reconstitute—in a more rational direction—our thinking, feeling, and action” (298). In other 
words, critical thinking challenges students to understand how they individually examine a given 
situation. To this end, Socratic dialogue aids in critical thinking because “it cultivates that inner 
voice by providing a public model for it” (298). Specifically, Socratic dialogue calls for 
individuals to engage with others in rigorous dialogue; this engagement allows for individuals to 
express their “inner voice” and to have their existing inner voices challenged and questioned.  
 Teachers who use this method often “respond to all answers with a further question” 
(Elder and Paul 298). Socratic questioning should thus help students—or the respondents—to 
understand the “foundations for what is said and believed” and help them see the 
interconnectedness of thoughts (298). Most importantly, Edler and Paul stress, teachers who use 
Socratic dialogue must make several assumptions regarding the respondent. Teachers must feign 
ignorance of the respondent’s agenda, background knowledge of the subject, conceptual 
understanding of the subject, or the respondent’s viewpoint (298-99). Ideally, teachers should not 
speak for the student, and the best way to assure this is for the teacher not to assume that he or 
she has more knowledge about the student than the student has about herself. To put this a bit 
differently, the Socratic teacher must rather, in Royster’s words, use her “home training” 
strategically, for the ultimate goal is that the student should learn to speak for himself or herself. 
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 However, this pedagogical method does not stop students from speaking on behalf of 
others. In an example of Socratic dialogue, one student in response to a teacher’s question about 
why people turn to science rather than religion to understand life’s origin, says, “Nowadays most 
people believe that science and religion deal with different things and that scientific questions 
cannot be answered by religion” (qtd. in Elder and Paul 300). The teacher, however, never 
questions the student’s assumptions. Rather, the teacher replies, “And by the same token, I 
suppose, we recognize that religious questions cannot be answered by science” (qtd. in Elder and 
Paul 300). The point is that in this Socratic dialogue, the teacher assumes that “we” all agree 
with the viewpoint he espouses. The question then becomes who is this we?  Does this we consist 
of the teacher’s own likeminded group—that is, his friends and colleagues who all agree with 
him? Or the students in this particular class? Or does the we constitute the American society, a 
nebulous term that at best aspires to describe and thus speak on behalf of all Americans? The 
Socratic dialogue, therefore, invites people to not only address the audience (of respondents or 
the questioner) but also to invoke an audience.  In this way, the Socratic dialogue may invite 
individuals to speak on behalf of others.  
Often times those who use the Socratic dialogue for teaching will also simultaneously 
engage in devil’s advocacy.  Writes, Boyd McCandless: 
The role of Devil’s Advocate is to ask as many pointed and embarrassing 
questions as possible, demanding factual answers to them, with a double goal: 
first, to arrive at the facts of the case; and second, to force those he questions and 
who provide him, if they can, with the facts, more clearly to formulate their entire 
position. As such, the Devil’s Advocate plays an intensely useful but unpopular 
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role. It is also an uncomfortable role for him, as in his heart he is likely to believe 
strongly in the very thing or things he is attempting to case in doubt. (149). 
As McCandless makes clear, those who engage in devil’s advocacy often voice opinions or 
viewpoints that are contrary to their own. It calls for teachers to not only know how others might 
view opposing theories, but also speak on behalf of these groups. While some people might 
assume that the purpose of playing the devil’s advocate is to merely provide an opposing 
viewpoint, the reality is that the devil’s advocate helps people understand how their “facts” and 
“positions” came into being and how the facts and opinions may be flawed. Shimon M. Glick 
makes clear that teachers “should act as the devil’s advocate towards every point of view 
expressed, forcing students to clarify their thought processes, defend their positions logically, 
and be able to articulate them” (241). The goal, Glick makes clear, is not to force students to 
change their views. Rather it is to encourage students to (re)evaluate their views in light of 
different perspectives. Ideally, it could do the same for the Socratic teacher. In its best version, 
the devil’s advocate assumes that people can change their minds, that people can be persuaded 
by rational argument. 
 And yet, because the devil’s advocate approach and the Socratic dialogue often involve 
intense questioning, those being questioned can sometimes feel humiliated and uncomfortable. 
This is especially true for people who come from cultures where direct questioning is considered 
rude.  Notice that McCandless acknowledges that the questions associated in the devil’s advocate 
approach are considered “pointed” and “embarrassing.” If not done appropriately, L. Amede 
Obiora notes that the Socratic dialogue can encourage people to engage in “polemics” not 
“conscientious dialogue” (361). According to Obiora, many law school professors use the 
Socratic dialogue as means for students to seek the “right answer”; professors, then, end up being 
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the sources of “truth” (361). Peter Boghossian likewise points out that students engaging in 
Socratic dialogue with teachers can steer their responses to cater to what they deem their teachers 
want (3). In this respect, students engaging in Socratic dialogue can end up speaking on behalf of 
their teachers by attempting to figure out how to voice or parrot their teachers’ point of view. 
Such questioning is sometimes referred to as catechistic questioning, a term that refers to 
scripted question and answer formats found in the training of Catholic schoolchildren. 
 Whether or not teachers use the devil’s advocate or Socratic dialogue approach to 
teaching, teachers must consider what happens when students try to speak on behalf of each 
other. Obiora, for example, recounts a story (told by law critic C.K. Worden) of a female law 
student who wanted to comment on a rape case in her class. When the student “felt the sting of 
critical incomprehension from her classmates, she abruptly terminated her remarks . . .” only to 
find a male student trying to “[jump] in to ‘save’ her.” While trying to help a classmate formulate 
her response may seem like an appropriate thing to do, his attempt to speak on her behalf turned 
her “richly textured narrative web into depersonalized abstractions of rules and logic” (371). 
Thus, he may have spoken for her, but he did not speak for her appropriately. 
 Sometimes when students do speak on their own behalf, they encounter what Royster 
says she encounters when she occasionally speaks: disbelief or silence from the audience. Victor 
Villanueva alludes to this issue in his essay on racism within the academy. He points out how 
students of color feel when they do speak and are simultaneously not heard in the classroom. 
“She [a South Asian student] speaks about the difference between speaking and being heard, that 
if one is constantly speaking but is never heard, never truly heard, there is, in effect, silence, a 
silencing” (837). In other words, this student, who has an opportunity to, in the words of Alcoff, 
represent her own “needs, goals, and situation, and in fact, who [she] is” can speak for herself. 
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But the irony is that sometimes without an acknowledgement from the audience, the person who 
does speak for herself may not feel that she is believed or at least recognized. Royster and Spivak 
may even say that this person is “Othered.” 
As a teacher, I am mindful of how I encourage students to express themselves. And, as I 
conclude this dissertation, I am becoming even more mindful of how I approach speaking on 
behalf of others in the classroom. I never thought about how the summation and collection of 
research constitute a re-presentation of other researchers and subject matters. And I certainly 
never considered how to approach the ethical issues of speaking on behalf of others with my 
students. 
Assuming that our students will be in the workforce, we also have to assume that they 
will have to write to, for, and about multiple audiences. For example, we may teach future 
political leaders who will speak on behalf of the constituents they represent. We may teach future 
fundraisers who will speak for the organization where they work and the people who benefit 
from the organization; and we may teach future religious leaders who will speak for their 
congregation and the people who belong to their religion. Our students, then, must be cognizant 
of how they render themselves and how they render others.  
 
Ventriloquism 
 It is not unusual for teachers to ask students to imagine living another person’s life or 
adopting another person’s values and traditions. Teachers, after all, do this to help students 
understand perspectives that students might not have considered. When students begin 
reimagining themselves as someone else, they begin the process of speaking on behalf of others. 
Why? Because students must consider how another person might feel about a situation or why a 
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culture might engage in a specific ritual. When students try on the perspective of another culture 
or as a different person, and do so using language, they engage in a kind of ventriloquism. 
Deborah Tannon defines ventriloquism as a “phenomenon in which a person not only speaks for 
another but as another” (55).   
We can find examples of students being ask to engage in ventriloquism in textbooks. In 
Reading the World: Ideas That Matter, Michael Austin asks students to do the following: 
Write a pacifist response to Orwell. Construct an argument for pacifism’s 
morality, even in the face of unwarranted aggression. (Austin 287) 
In this exercise, students not only must adopt the ideology and terminology of pacifists, but they 
also have to act as if they themselves are pacifists; to do the assignment well, they must construct 
“a pacifist response to Orwell.”  In other words, they need to read George Orwell’s “Pacifism 
and the War” and write to Orwell. As a pacifist, they have to articulate the attitudes of pacifists 
and the goals of pacifism.     
 While Austin seeks to have students write an article from the viewpoint of a general 
adherence to a specific ideology, David Bartholomae and Anthony Petrosky seek to have 
students write as specific writers. In one example found in the eighth edition of Ways of 
Reading: An Anthology of Writers, the editors request that students compose “a dialogue” 
between Richard Rodriguez and Paulo Freire: 
Write a dialogue between the two in which they discuss what Rodriguez has 
written in “The Achievement of Desire.” What would they say to each other? 
What questions would they ask? How would they respond to each other 
conversation? (Barthalamae and Petrosky 257). 
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Students, thus, must understand the philosophies both writers hold in regards to education and 
culture. Most importantly, they must pretend to be Rodriguez and Freire. To be Freire and 
Rodriguez, students have to adopt the writing styles of both writers. Students have to note the 
length of the writers’ sentences; the ways in which the writers express pathos; and reoccurring 
words, metaphors, or images used. Though the editors indicate that the assignment does not call 
for the authors to debate each other, students have to consider the ways in which the writers 
might agree and disagree with each other and imagine how the writers would voice their 
concerns in a question and answer format. The students, thus, speak on behalf of Rodriguez and 
Freire by pretending to be both authors. 
 There are some advantages of asking a student in engage in ventriloquism. A student who 
pretends to be Freire and Rodriguez has to engage in critical reading, research, and thinking. He 
or she must read and re-read the authors’ writings; additionally, the student may find it valuable 
to read other articles and books written by and about Freire and Rodriguez in order to get a 
complete understanding of their philosophies and how their philosophies have developed over 
time. The student then has to consider what philosophies or ideas Freire and Rodriguez would 
emphasize or deemphasize in their conversations with each other. Likewise, the student has to 
think about how the writers would rhetorically communicate and respond to each other. How 
would both writers develop their arguments in a conversation? 
 Teachers using the ventriloquism method also need to be mindful of the disadvantages. 
For example, students required to write an essay about pacifism may inadvertently engage in the 
essentialization of pacifists. Who are pacifists and what does it mean to practice pacifism? A 
student might adopt the definition of a pacifist as discussed by Ralph Albertson in his 1940 
article “Who is a Pacifist?” A pacifist, according to Albertson, is “a person who under no 
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circumstances will fight” (155). He then discusses “true pacifists,” those who “would turn the 
other cheek not only once but always. They would not fight for their homes nor for their women 
nor for their children” (155). This belief that a pacifist would not engage in any aggression is not 
only a mischaracterization, but it is also a stereotype. If you notice, Albertson discusses a “true 
pacifist”; thus, he hints that there are other types of pacifists, though he does not give these other 
pacifists formal names or titles. David Clough, however, does. He notes that strategic pacifists 
are against violence, but also acknowledge that violence may be necessary for defending 
communities and individuals (375); classical pacifists believe that “limited force in restraining 
evil” should be used, especially in peacekeeping missions (376-77); universal pacifists believe 
that everyone, regardless of class, nationality, religion, socioeconomic status, et cetera, should 
adopt pacifism, while communal pacifists believe that individual groups should adopt pacifism, 
but should not make that a requirement for people in the larger society (378). Thus, the idea that 
all pacifists believe in nonviolence “even in the fact of unwarranted aggression” (Austin 287) as 
Michael Austin concludes is simply not supported in fact. 
 Therefore, it is important for teachers who ask students to adopt an ideological position 
within a paper to make sure that students understand the complexity of the ideological position 
they are asked to voice; additionally, it is important that teachers who ask students to adopt the 
persona of a writer make sure that the student understands the writer’s life and works. Because 
ventriloquism requires that students speak on behalf of others and as others, students need to 
make certain that they do not simplify the experiences and philosophies of people. 
 
Rivaling 
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As teachers we need to consider techniques that will allow students to speak for 
themselves and also recognize how they speak for others. One technique teachers could use to 
help students understand how to speak for themselves and for others is rivaling (also referred to 
as the rival hypothesis stance). Linda Flower, Elenore Long, and Lorraine Higgins describe 
rivaling as “an important literate practice in which people explore open questions through an 
analysis of multiple perspectives and evidence” (4). Like the Socratic dialogue, this pedagogical 
tool focuses on using questions as a means of exploring a given topic. After developing open 
questions, students then create rival hypotheses, and later reach conclusions about a given 
situation (Flower and Long, “Tracking” 86).  As students engage in the rivaling process, they 
speak on behalf of others by not only imagining how different individuals or groups of people 
might interpret issues or situations, but also imagining how readers might react to the text.  
 At the beginning stage of rivaling, a student formulates an open question. An open 
question, Lorraine Higgins explains, is one that “cannot be resolved by available ‘facts’ alone but 
will require further deliberation.” Most importantly, these “open questions call for contingent 
responses and working hypotheses” (97). In other words, an open question is one that cannot be 
answered simply.  Open questions do not lend themselves to simple “yes or no” answers, nor do 
they lend themselves to the “either for or against” type of responses. They are designed to be 
complex and nuanced.  
 The open question then gives way to the rival hypothesis stance. Because the rival 
hypothesis stance encourages students to develop multiple perspectives on a given subject, 
students engage in “questioning [their] own or another author’s assumptions, assessing evidence, 
adding new information that sheds light on a position, or coming up with alternative 
explanations” (Higgins 100). As students analyze text and engage in the research process, they 
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begin to come to their own conclusions about the writer, the text, the subject, and the like. 
Students, thus, begin the process of speaking on behalf of others; after all, students must consider 
how they speak about the writers they use, address the various viewpoints others might have 
towards the subject, and imagine and/or address the various audiences who might read their 
work. 
 As an example of showing how the rival hypothesis stance works, Long, et.al., asks 
readers to imagine being an African American teen who attends a school where illicit drugs are 
readily available. As a teen, the reader notices ineffectual brochures that encourage people “to 
just say no” to drugs. The reader has an opportunity to participate in a literacy program at the 
Community Literacy Center where the reader and his or her peers have an opportunity to work 
with college students to create drug education brochures that are more effective and more 
relatable to the target audiences. To do this, the reader works with a mentor and both engage in 
rivaling. Sometimes the rivaling takes on the form of Socratic dialogue where the mentor asks 
the reader questions that will help the reader consider how he or she approaches the topic. 
Sometimes, the rivaling calls for the mentor or reader to explicitly speak for or as someone 
affected by drugs. The point here is that the rival hypothesis stance calls for the reader to 
understand his or her viewpoints and the viewpoints of others.  Until the reader has an 
opportunity to meet and interview a drug user, a drug counselor, or a police officer, the reader 
must imagine and in some respects, speak for, these and other groups as the reader creates the 
brochure. Most importantly, the reader has to imagine how groups of people might interpret, 
agree, or disagree with what is written (Long, et.al “Rivaling” 229-30). 
 As Flower makes clear, rivaling is a part of intercultural inquiry. In her article, 
“Intercultural Inquiry and the Transformation of Service,” Linda Flower uses a figure of a table 
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and chairs to illustrate how intercultural inquiry and rivaling work. “Intercultural inquiry is not a 
study of others, but a collaborative inquiry with others into shared, mutually significant 
questions. It seeks the grounds for understanding and action in alternative readings of the world, 
based on diverse racial, social, cultural, class, and gendered experiences” (189). Thus, 
intercultural inquiry encourages people to speak to and with, not solely speak on behalf, of 
others.  
 Just as teachers need to consider the pedagogical methods they use to speak on behalf of 
others, students should also consider how they speak on behalf of others and the implications for 
doing so.  The next section will help teachers develop activities and assignments that help 
students explore how people, including themselves, engage in speaking on behalf of others. 
 
A Pedagogical Strategy for Speaking on Behalf of Others 
 By the time our students have entered college, most have been exposed to the multiple 
ways in which people speak on behalf of others. However, many students have not thought about 
the implications of speaking on behalf of others. The purpose of this pedagogy is to help students 
think about the power dynamics of speaking on behalf of others. As Alcoff has said, and as my 
dissertation has shown, “the rituals of speaking” involve understanding the dynamics of who gets 
to speak on behalf of others and who does not; who gets silenced and who has the opportunity to 
listen; and who is the subject of the discourse and who is allowed to respond to the discourse 
(15-18). 
 The first activity is inspired by Linda Alcoff. For those interested in incorporating the 
activity within their pedagogy, I would suggest you read “The Problem of Speaking for Others.” 
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This activity relates to her section on elected representatives and the ways in which they are 
authorized to speak on behalf of others.  
 
Activity One: Spokesperson 
 This is an exercise which calls on students to perform two main activities. One, students 
must work in groups and engage in class discussion; two, students must individually write about 
their thoughts on speaking on behalf of others. The goal is for students to reflect on the ways in 
which they speak on behalf of others and the ways in which others speak on behalf of them.  
In the first part of the exercise, teachers should either ask students to think about an issue 
that students would want to debate or bring an issue up for discussion. Teachers, then, put the 
students into groups and request that students note the commonalities and points of difference 
they have in regards to the issue. All groups then select a spokesperson who is responsible for 
articulating the views of the group.  
As a teacher, I prefer to have students watch a controversial video or read a short news 
article. Let’s suppose that I’ve had my students read “Arts of the Contact Zone” by Mary Louise 
Pratt. I then have them read an article about NewSouth Book’s decision to remove the word 
“nigger” in its publication of Mark Twain’s Huckleberry Finn; and finally, have my students 
watch an excerpt from 60 Minutes regarding the issue. After having a class discussion on how 
Pratt’s theories on the contact zone relate to the controversy, I can put my students into groups 
and request that certain groups come up with explanations as to why the removal of the word is 
necessary and other groups explain why the removal of the word is unwise. After each group 
selects a spokesperson, I then request that that the spokesperson work with his or her group to 
247 
 
present opening “arguments” for the next class period (assuming my class is fifty minutes to an 
hour and fifteen minutes long). 
During the next class period, each spokesperson would have three to five minutes to 
explain the group’s position. After each spokesperson has communicated his or her position, the 
teacher and other spokespersons ask questions and make comments regarding their positions. 
(Group members would not be allowed to answer or ask questions in this particular instance.) 
When the teacher is ready to end discussion, the teacher can then request spokespersons to write 
down how they felt about the way in which they represented the group. Likewise, group 
members also write down how they felt the spokesperson represented them. 
 After this exercise, it’s important to discuss how students felt as spokespersons and as 
people who were represented. In order to deepen the students’ awareness of speaking on behalf 
of others, I present them with the following heuristic. Questions include the following: 
1. Everyone: How did you all decide who would be spokesperson for your group? 
2. Everyone: What are the desirable characteristics of a spokesperson? 
3. Group members: Were there times in which you wanted to interject? If so, when? What 
would you have said? 
4. Group members: Because you were not allowed to speak, did you feel silenced? If so, 
what did that feel like? If you didn’t feel silenced, why not? 
5. Group members: Did your spokesperson say something that you disagreed with? If so, 
what was it? 
6. Group members: Did you spokesperson not emphasize something you felt should have 
been emphasized. If so, what was it? 
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7. Spokespersons: What are some issues that arise from having to speak for everyone in the 
group? 
8. Spokespersons: Listening to the conversations about what your group members or other 
group members would have said, what would you do or say differently as spokesperson? 
Of course, there are other questions that can be asked. Going back to my example, I would ask 
students to relate this activity to Pratt’s discussion of the contact zone. Other teachers may find 
that the activity could be used to discuss readings in which an author, such as Malcolm X or 
Gloria Steinem, is considered a spokesperson for an organization or a movement.  
 The second part of the assignment includes a short writing exercise in which students 
discuss what it was like to be a group member or spokesperson. If you are a teacher who likes to 
give students a question as part of the writing prompt, some questions you can consider: What 
are the positive and negative implications of being a spokesperson for a group? How would you 
describe the power dynamics between the spokesperson and group? What did this exercise teach 
you about speaking on behalf of others? 
 The questions for the writing prompt as well as the questions used for the in-class activity 
directly relate to Alcoff’s rituals of speaking. To remind, Alcoff says, “the rituals of speaking 
that involve the location of the speaker and listeners affect whether a claim is taken as a true, 
well-reasoned, compelling argument or a significant idea” (13). If you notice, my questions deal 
with the “location of the speaker and listener”: I ask students to discuss how they decided who 
would be the spokesperson and who would not; I ask my students to discuss the “truth” of the 
claims presented. I also asked my students to describe their feelings regarding how well they felt 
their representative or spokesperson described their “situation and wishes” (Alcoff 10). In many 
respects I am introducing Alcoff’s ideas regarding the concept of speaking on behalf of others as 
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encompassing speaking about others and speaking for others, though I may not be explicitly 
discussing her text. 
Activity two can be used in conjunction with activity one or it can be a separate activity. 
Activity two calls for students to analyze speeches. Teachers can decide to explicitly discuss how 
Alcoff’s concept of speaking about and speaking for others is manifested in a selected speech; 
others may decide that they want to use Spivak’s “Can the Subaltern Speak?” to discuss the 
concept of representation and re-presentation within a speech. As I have shown in the 
dissertation, speaking about and speaking for directly relates to re-presentation and 
representation. Spivak, in fact, notes that “representation” means “speaking for” and “re-
presentation” relates to a type of portrayal or speaking about “as in art or philosophy” 
(“Subaltern” 275). When reading activity two, please note that I have created the activity and the 
questions to reflect concepts by Alcoff and Spivak. 
 
Activity Two: Analyzing Speeches 
 If you are a teacher who incorporates public speaking or teaches texts based on speeches, 
then this assignment might be useful for helping students understand Alcoff’s discussion of 
speaking about someone and speaking for someone. For such an activity, I would suggest either 
Jacqueline Jones Royster’s “When the First Voice You Hear is Not Your Own” or  Barack 
Obama’s 2008 “A More Perfect Union” speech. For the sake of argument, let’s say that I have 
selected Obama’s speech. Here Obama addresses the criticism of his former minister, Reverend 
Jeremiah Wright, who was accused of being anti-American when his sermon about the 
September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States had been released. In this speech, Obama 
speaks about and for various individuals and groups of people: Americans, his campaign staff, 
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Jeremiah Wright, African Americans, and middle and working class white Americans who feel 
disempowered due to affirmative action and economic recession.  
 In the process of analyzing this speech, teachers can help students engage with Spivak’s 
concept of representation and re-presentation. Teachers should ask students to pay particular 
attention to when Obama speaks “as an African American” and when he does not; when Obama 
speaks as a member of Jeremiah Wright’s church and when he does not. Likewise, teachers can 
help students see when Obama re-presents various communities and individuals and when he 
represents them. Questions that will help students explore speaking on behalf of others: 
1. How does Barack Obama represent and re-present the United States? 
2. How do you think Barack Obama represents and re-presents Trinity United Church of 
Christ, his former church? 
3. Are there parts of the speech with which you think African Americans might disagree?  
4. Are there parts of the speech with which you think white Americans might disagree? 
5. In what ways have you spoken about and for African Americans and white Americans in 
your discussion? In what ways have you spoken as a representative of African Americans 
or white Americans? In what ways have you re-presented the groups? 
Question five is important because it encourages the students to engage in metacognition. They 
have to think about the ways in which they have just engaged in re-presentation and 
representation. Likewise, they also have to think about the ways in which they have spoken 
about and for others. This type of metacognition is advocated by Alcoff. She writes that “anyone 
who speaks for others should only do so out of a concrete analysis of the particular power 
relations and discourse effects involved” (24). In other words, people need to be aware of how 
they speak on behalf of others and the power they exhibit by speaking on behalf of others. 
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 A good follow-up writing and research assignment, then, would be for students to 
analyze Obama’s speech according to the Spivak’s concepts of re-presentation and 
representation as well as Alcoff’s concepts of speaking for and about others. To aid in the 
analysis, students should research reactions individuals had towards the speech, especially in 
regards to the sections where students see Obama engaging in re-presentation and representation. 
This will help students understand how people react to being spoken about and spoken for and 
help them understand the dynamics of speaking for and about others. 
 I hope that these pedagogical activities will spur readers, especially teachers in Rhetoric 
and Composition, to consider how they can explicitly discuss the rhetorical ways in which 
writers and speakers speak on behalf of others. Readers will notice that my dissertation is an 
elaborate exercise on how one could examine “Students Rights’ to Their Own Language” from a 
rhetorical perspective. Not only do I use feminist and post-colonial theories to analyze SRTOL, 
but I also incorporate Lloyd Bitzer’s theory of the rhetorical situation. I want to show how the 
speakers, within a rhetorical situation, often speak on behalf of others, especially when 
addressing exigencies. Additionally, I want to show how speakers will link themselves with the 
rhetorical audience to speak on behalf of the rhetorical audience and themselves. During the 
entire process, speakers think about the constraints as they prepare their speeches and activities 
to address the exigence. 
 Readers may also notice that within the pedagogical activities, I did not incorporate 
Lloyd Bitzer, nor did I require the students to read the actual texts from Alcoff, Spivak, or 
Royster. The reason for not initially incorporating Bitzer is that Bitzer does not explicitly discuss 
speaking on behalf of others. To incorporate Bitzer within the situation may confuse students 
who are learning the concept of speaking on behalf of others for the first time. 
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Now, Alcoff and Spivak do explicitly discuss speaking on behalf of others. 
Unfortunately, the texts by Alcoff and Spivak are difficult for undergraduates (and some 
graduate students) to understand. To require some undergraduates to read both writers might be 
too frustrating for them, depending on the class. This is why I encourage teachers to use the 
writers as “inspiration” for class activities, discussions, and assignments. After all, teachers can 
apply the ideas of Bitzer, Royster, Alcoff, and Spivak to the writing classroom without asking 
students to read their primary texts. 
 
Final Thoughts on SRTOL 
For those who seek to teach or to analyze better “Students’ Right to Their Own 
Language,” I hope that this dissertation has provided additional ideas on how to rhetorically 
approach SRTOL.  Likewise, I hope that the sample pedagogical unit may inspire readers to see 
other ways of not only teaching SRTOL but also of analyzing other texts. 
I have used CCCC’s “Students’ Right to Their Own Language” as an example of how a 
complex and multifaceted organization such as the Conference on College Composition and 
Communication speaks on behalf of others. As seen throughout the dissertation, some members 
of CCCC’s audience did not feel that the document adequately represented their pedagogical 
beliefs. Others, however, did.  
 It is important that those in Rhetoric and Composition examine speaking on behalf of 
others not just from a feminist and postcolonial perspective, but also from a rhetorical 
perspective.  Using Lloyd Bitzer’s rhetorical situation allows researchers to consider how 
rhetors, audiences, and rhetorical audiences speak on behalf of others throughout the rhetorical 
situation, as is seen in my study. Most importantly, researchers should examine how constraints 
253 
 
and exigencies affect how people speak on behalf of others. During the process of creating 
SRTOL, the CCCC continually thought about their exigencies, their audiences, and their 
constraints.  
 Though the CCCC is clearly an organization that is a part of the National Council for the 
Teachers of English, it is, nonetheless, an organization that caters to college teachers, not 
necessarily teachers who work mostly with secondary and primary students. Part of me wonders 
if the document would have been stronger had the organization solely addressed issues affecting 
college students in writing classrooms, rather than those in primary and secondary schools. Part 
of me wonders, too, if the document would have been stronger if it had focused on specific 
instances—such as the establishment of the English Standard schools in Hawaii and the boarding 
schools for Native Americans—of how the government on federal, state, and local levels 
penalized students for the language and dialects they spoke. Part of me also wonders about the 
role students played in the shaping of SRTOL. In my research, I was not able to find written 
evidence of CCCC acknowledging students who helped shaped the SRTOL document. Would 
students have deemphasized or emphasized certain sections within the document? This is 
certainly a question that could be asked by teachers who teach SRTOL in their classroom, and 
one reason I include a pedagogical application here is to glean some insight, however limited, 
into how students think about the problem of speaking on behalf of others. 
 At the beginning of the dissertation, I noted that speaking on behalf of others can look 
like this: 
Speaking on Behalf of Others 
 
  Speaking about Others   Speaking for Others 
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This illustration, however, does not cover what happens when a speaker speaks with others not 
on behalf of them. Additionally, it does not cover what happens when a speaker, conscious of the 
concept of speaking on behalf of others, attempts to allow the “others” to speak for themselves.  
As scholars and researchers, though, how might we academics and our professional 
organizations allow for research subjects to speak for themselves? In addition to some academics 
establishing their own positionality (by acknowledging their race, gender, educational 
attainment, et cetera) some incorporate first person written accounts and/or interviews with the 
interviewees within their research or formal documents. Others invite research subjects to read 
what is written and provide feedback or commentary. A few even encourage research subjects to 
co-present papers at conferences with them. The point is that there are academicians who are 
aware of the issues inherent with speaking on behalf of others, and they do what they can to 
incorporate other voices and make sure that these voices are heard. The hope, however, is that 
these writers who engage in the creation of multi-vocal texts understand how they as writers 
have the power to shape the texts and also have the opportunity to engage in the 
misrepresentation of the voices they incorporate and the subject matter discussed (Kirsch, 
“Multi-Vocal” 193-95). 
 And yet, as my dissertation shows, there are many in the academy who do not think about 
how they speak on others’ behalf. When SRTOL came out, respondents wrote articles claiming 
that they either knew what African Americans and/or African American students thought of the 
document or what these groups should think about the document. Sometimes, respondents wrote 
about how they, as teachers, felt about the document; and, using their own feelings, the 
respondents concluded that other teachers felt the same way—the exception being the committee 
who created SRTOL, or the people against SRTOL. A few respondents engaged in labeling (e.g. 
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“traditionalists” or “radicals”) those who didn’t agree with them. This labeling allowed for them 
to speak about others in such a way that Linda Alcoff would conclude that these respondents 
were speaking on behalf of them.  
 SRTOL is a document created by a committee in which members had to negotiate with 
each other about what would be included and excluded and emphasized and deemphasized 
(Smitherman, “Retrospective” 24).  Though I personally consider SRTOL to be a not-exactly-
perfect document, I do consider it to be a valuable document. SRTOL is centered on the ideals of 
an educational system that upholds rather than ridicules groups and the dialects they use. It is 
centered on the belief that teachers should understand how to work lovingly and respectfully 
with linguistically diverse students, whether it is an Appalachian speaker or a second language 
learner.  It is centered on the belief that language—dialects included—is valuable for 
communication, creativity, and the conscious or unconscious spiritual connection that is obtained 
between those who speak to each other—whether speakers choose to speak to each other in 
standard English or Castilian Spanish, AAEV or Hawaiian Creole.   
 Just as SRTOL challenges teachers to confront their own prejudices regarding dialects, 
this dissertation challenges researchers, teachers, and others to confront the ethical (and perhaps) 
unethical ways in which we speak on behalf of others. By doing this, we will understand better 
how to communicate with others, not just for others. 
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Notes 
 
Introduction 
 
1
 While I recognize that some linguists assert that standard English is an abstract concept that is 
difficult to define, I do recognize that many Americans believe in the concreteness of standard 
English. Thus, I use the term “standard English” much in the same way that Walt Wolfram and 
Natalie Schilling-Estes use the term. They say that formal standard English “tends to be based on 
the written language of established writers and is typically codified in English grammar texts. It 
is perpetuated to a large extent in formal institutions, such as schools, by those responsible for 
English language education” (10). In contrast, informal standard English, is subjective and is 
based on a community’s mutual understanding of what constitutes “good” English and “bad” 
English. Thus, informal standard English is “a variety [of English] free of stigmatized features” 
(13). 
 
2 There are three different publications of “Students’ Right to Their Own Language,” which I will 
discuss in upcoming chapters. Unless otherwise stated I will use the version published in College 
English.   
 
3
 As you read this study, you will see that my definition is influenced by my understanding of 
Linda Alcoff and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak.  
 
Chapter One 
 
4
 Please note that the person or group who is spoken on behalf of may not necessarily approve of 
the person who speaks on behalf of them. That issue will be addressed in subsequent chapters. 
 
5
 The irony is not lost on me that I’m speaking about others now. 
 
6
 The essay is written in parts clearly identifying the author who is writing each part. 
 
7
 Apart from the problem of academic Othering, and in addition to the contributions of Alcoff 
and Spivak, Othering is a central theme in postcolonial discourses, probably owing to the wide 
influence of Edward Said’s Orientalism. Of course, Othering routinely occurs in situations 
outside of theoretical and academic contexts. For example, during the 2012 Republican primary, 
Newt Gingrich told people in New Hampshire that “If the N.A.A.C.P. invites me, I’ll go to their 
convention, talk about why the African-American community should demand paychecks and not 
be satisfied with food stamps” (qtd. in Gabriel). His words represent a distorted description and 
interpretation of the African American community. He assumes that African Americans do not 
advocate for jobs; the implicit assumption is that white and perhaps other groups of Americans 
do. 
 
8
 In a different context, Frank Farmer suggests as a rule for how to respond to overheard (or 
overread) characterizations: “Every representation of us is,” Farmer suggests, ought to be 
regarded as “an address to us.”  We should operate on the premise “that every word spoken about 
us is a word spoken to us” even if it is not (626). Though the “us” in Farmer’s usage refers to the 
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discipline of Rhetoric and Composition, the “us” in the example of Royster refers to African 
American culture. 
 
9
 The concept of “voice” in Rhetoric and Composition is a controversial one; the idea that there 
is an “authentic voice” has been discredited by some scholars, though some who focus on culture 
and gender still find the concept of voice useful when discussing certain identities.  See Darsie 
Bowden’s The Mythology of Voice. 
 
10 This excerpt is reminiscent of Alcoff’s discussion of truth and essentialism. Alcoff reminds the 
reader that the social identity of a speaker is not fixed but multidimensional. Thus, the audience 
should recognize that how a speaker or writer communicates on behalf of others depends on the 
social identity or social location of the writer at a certain point in time (Alcoff 16-17).  
 
11
 Spivak has since regretted promoting strategic essentialism and has since “given up on it” 
(Danius, Jonnson, and Spivak 35). As she states, “ . . . my notion just simply became the union 
ticket for essentialism. As in what it meant by strategy, no one worried about that” (Danius, 
Jonsson, Spivak 35). 
 
12 Though my discussion of silencing encompasses the idea of an individual or group who is 
silenced by another, there are times when individuals or groups decide to exercise silence as a 
means of agency. Thomas Huckin’s “On Textual Silences, Large and Small” discusses how and 
why rhetors use silence. 
 
13 An example of this is seen with Gramsci’s use of the word “subaltern.” Marcus Green notes 
that there are scholars (including Spivak) who believe that Gramsci used “subaltern” rather than 
“proletariat” so as not to arouse anger against Italian fascists who had imprisoned him for his 
Marxist beliefs. In fact, Green quotes Spivak as saying, “’Gramsci used [the term subaltern] 
because Gramsci was obliged to censor himself in prison” (qtd. in Green 390). Green disagrees 
with Spivak and others who claim that Gramsci uses subaltern as opposed to proletariat as a 
means of “censoring himself” from prison officials (392-93). 
 
14
 Thus, it seems that intellectuals are interested in essentializing the Other. 
 
15
 In her discussion, Royster cites Barbara Christian’s article “The Race for Theory,” which 
discusses academia’s preference for the “Western form of abstract logic” (52) and the need 
philosophers have for using language that “mystifies rather than clarifies,” thus making it 
difficult for general readers to understand what is being written (55). 
 
Chapter Two 
 
16
 According to Stephen Parks, the 1972 Executive Committee of the CCCC changed the rules 
regarding what constituted a quorum. Originally a quorum consisted of 100 voting members. 
That was changed to 50 voting members (168).  
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17
 A copy-reader is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as “one who reads copy for a 
newspaper or a book.” 
 
18
 Fusing both African American English Vernacular and EAE is something Geneva Smitherman 
and Keith Gilyard have utilized in their academic works.  
 
Chapter Three 
 
19
 According to Jennifer C. Nash, intersectionality within legal studies focuses on 
“multidimensionality” and the “notion that subjectivity is constituted by mutually reinforcing 
vectors of race, gender, class, and sexuality” (2).  
 
20 I want to thank University of Illinois Archives for providing me a copy of the unpublished 
Commission on Language’s “Statement on Usage” report. This report can be found at the NCTE 
Archives Holdings at the University of Illinois. 
 
21
 In her work Writing Genres, Amy J. Devitt discusses the importance of genre variations in her 
chapter entitled “A Study of Genres in Context.” 
 
Chapter Four 
 
22
 As readers will see, I address a number of ways an actual audience can respond (or not) within 
a rhetorical situation. Though Bitzer’s rhetorical audience responds to the information, it must 
respond to the information in a certain way—that is the rhetorical audience must engage in the 
positive modification of an exigence. 
 
23
 On the SUNY Fredonia Web site, Susan Spangler provides a pedagogical activity which helps 
students understand how the audience addressed and audience invoked theories can lead to 
stereotyping and essentializing. 
 
24
 Walter Ong also discusses the use of demonstrative words and certain phrases such as “Once 
upon a time” and “Dear reader” in invoking audiences (10-17). 
 
25
 All italicized words indicate changes from the original text. 
 
26
 It is worth noting that “Student’s Right to His Own Language” is now degendered so that it 
reads “Students’ Right to Their Own Language.” 
 
27
 I examined various databases to locate articles including the New York Times, ProQuest, and 
NewsBank. While I did find additional articles on SRTOL, one mentioned it as a part of a 
conference on English and another on the history of teaching grammar in the classroom.  
 
28
 Now, I want to make clear that Bloom is not advocating against SRTOL. Rather, she 
acknowledges that composition teachers are expected by the colleagues in English departments 
and by their administrators in the university to emphasize the importance of standard English 
over the significance of dialectical and non-Western rhetorical usage found in the works of 
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writers such as Langston Hughes, Gloria Anzaldúa, and the like who, it seems, are permitted a 
flexibility with dialects that our students do not enjoy (Bloom 669-672). 
 
Chapter 5 
 
29
 Bitzer defines the rhetorical situation as “a complex of persons, events, objects, and relations 
presenting an actual or potential exigence which can be completely or partially removed, if 
discourse, introduced into the situation, can so constrain human decision or action as to bring 
about significant modification of the exigence” (“Rhetorical” 6). 
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